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ABSTRACT 
 
With the establishment of the Directorate of Special Operations (Scorpions), the  
Asset Forfeiture Unit (AFU), the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) and the 
Departmental Investigating Unit (DIU), questions were asked as to whether this is 
a creation of new units of the Police Service. These questions were exaggerated 
by the fact that the media uses the term “Scorpions” whenever the Scorpions, the 
AFU, SIU and the DIU perform their functions.  
 
South African legislation that governs organised crime does not demarcate 
activities to be dealt with by the SAPS, AFU, DIU, Scorpions and the SIU. The 
Constitution of South Africa lays down the objects of the police, but it is silent 
about the objectives of the Scorpions, AFU, SIU, DIU and other investigative 
institutions except that it only mentions the creation of a single National 
Prosecuting Authority (NPA). 
 
A literature study was used as the basis for this study. In addition, unstructured 
interviews and observation were used to gather evidence from the relevant 
stakeholders. An analysis of the SAPS Detective Service, the Special 
Investigating Unit (SIU), the Scorpions, the Departmental Investigating Unit (DIU) 
of the Department of Correctional Services and the Asset Forfeiture Unit (AFU), 
was done in order to establish the overlapping of functions.  
 
Indeed, overlapping was discovered between the Scorpions and the SAPS 
Detective Service, the AFU and the SIU, as well as between the SAPS and the 
DIU. In order to make a proper finding, an analysis was done of anti-corruption 
agencies in Botswana, Nigeria, Malawi and Hong Kong. The findings indicate 
that the better way of fighting corruption, fraud, economic and financial crimes, is 
through the establishment of a single agency that will work independently from 
the police, with a proper jurisdiction. 
 
 
 v
OPSOMMING 
 
Met die totstandkoming van die Direktoraat vir Spesiale Operasies (Skerpioene) 
en die Batebeslagleggingseenheid (BBE), die Eenheid vir Spesiale Ondersoeke 
(ESO) en die Eenheid vir Departementele Ondersoeke (EDO) is vrae gevra oor 
of hierdie skeppings nuwe eenhede vir die polisiediens is. Hierdie vrae is versterk 
vanweë die feit dat die media die term “Skerpioene” gebruik wanneer die 
Skerpioene, die BBE, die ESO en die EDO hulle funksies verrig. 
 
Die Suid Afrikaanse wetgewing wat georganiseerde misdaad beheer, baken nie 
die aktiwiteite af wat die SAPD, die BBE, die ESO, die Skerpioene en die EDO 
aandag aan moet gee nie. Die grondwet van hierdie land bepaal die doelwitte 
van die polisie, maar rep geen word oor die doelwitte van die Skerpioene, die 
BBE, die ESO en ander ondersoekinstansies nie, behalwe dat daar slegs 
melding gemaak word van ‘n enkele Nasionale Vervolgingsgesag. 
 
‘n Literatuurstudie is gebruik as basis vir hierdie studie. Saam daarmee is 
ongestruktureerde onderhoude en waarnemings gebruik om bewyse van die 
betrokke rolspelers te verkry. ‘n Analise is gemaak van die SAPD 
Speurdienseenheid, die Eenheid vir Spesiale Ondersoeke (ESO), die 
Skerpioene, die Eenheid vir Departementele Ondersoke (EDO) van die 
Departement Korrektiewe Dienste en die Batebeslagleggingseenheid (BBE) om 
sodoende die oorvleueling van funksies te bepaal. 
 
Oorvleueling tussen die Skerpioene en die SAPD Speurdienseenheid, die BBE 
en die ESO sowel as tussen die SAPD en die EDO is inderdaad vasgestel. Ten 
einde ‘n behoorlike bevinding te maak, is ‘n analise van die antikorrupsie-agente 
in Botswana, Nigerië, Malawi en Hong Kong gemaak. Uit die bevindings blyk 
duidelik dat die beste manier om korrupsie, bedrog, ekonomiese en finansiële 
misdade te bekamp, die daarstelling van ‘n enkele agentskap is wat onafhanklik 
van die polisie werk en oor sy eie jurisduksie beskik. 
 vi
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CHAPTER 1: GENERAL ORIENTATION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Before 1994, the three legs of the criminal justice system consisted of the 
Department of Prisons, Department of Law and Order and the Department of 
Justice. In terms of this arrangement, the office of the Attorney General (AG) did 
not have investigative powers, as opposed to post-1999 when the National 
Prosecuting Authority (NPA) was established. The same applies to the 
Department of Prisons as opposed to the Department of Correctional Services 
(DCS). 
 
As a result of the promulgation of the Interim Constitution Act on the 27th of April 
1994, a lot of changes were introduced within the South African Criminal Justice 
System. Some of the radical changes included the adoption of the Bill of Rights, 
which had an impact on the admissibility of confessions and admissions by the 
courts, and the move from reactive policing to proactive policing which had an 
impact on the functioning of the Criminal Justice System (CJS). It is of primary 
importance to indicate that before 1994 most of the government’s resources were 
used to fight the so-called terrorists or freedom fighters.  
 
All these approaches changed after 1994. With the introduction of the Bill of 
Rights and the abolition of the death penalty, a perception was created in the 
public that the government had become too soft on criminals. (One should 
remember that in S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) the Constitutional 
Court held that the death penalty was unconstitutional because it infringed 
section 33 of the Interim Constitution Act which safeguarded the right to life). 
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This view regards the introduction of the Bill of Rights as the reason for the rise in 
crime in South Africa. However, another view of the same problem is that people 
started to accept the police, due to its legitimacy, and started reporting crimes 
without fear. This can be illustrated by the increase in population of inmates from 
111 798 in 1993 to 181 944 in 2002 (http://www.dcs.gov.za). The continued 
public confidence in the police resulted in a number of crimes being reported, 
and has been interpreted in many quarters of South African society as the 
escalation of crime. For the first time in South Africa, the police’s authority has 
been included in the Constitution, down to the South African Police Act 68 of 
1995.  
 
This arrangement also culminated in a shift in policing, from police force to police 
service (Cawthra, 1993:204). As a major focus of maritime trade and air traffic 
between Asia, Europe and the Western Hemisphere, South Africa also emerged 
as a significant hub of criminal activity.  
 
The lifting of international trade sanctions with the end of apartheid has made 
South Africa readily accessible to international criminals whose operations take 
place within the framework of legitimate commercial business activities. South 
Africa’s modern airports and harbours, including the container ports at Durban, 
Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and East London, are attractive to criminals 
smuggling narcotics and other contraband. For criminal organisations South 
Africa also has the advantage of a modern financial system linked to financial 
markets worldwide, which facilitates money laundering (Redpath, 2004:12).  
 
And, as happened in Russia, criminals recruit professionals with skills well suited 
to competing in the modern business environment, who were pushed aside or 
sidelined by the political and economic changes taking place in South Africa.  
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Foreign organised groups, primarily Nigerians, Russians, Italians and Chinese 
syndicates, have established bases of operations since the mid-1990s for a 
variety of illegal activities, including drug trafficking, poaching, arms smuggling, 
trafficking in endangered species, human trafficking, vehicle theft, money-
laundering and other financial crimes (http://www.saps.gov.za).  
 
Due to all these problems, the government also initiated a number of crime 
combating initiatives including the National Crime Prevention Strategy of 1996, 
the National Crime Combating Strategy of 1998, the White Paper on Safety and 
Security of 1998-2003, the Integrated Justice System (IJS), the adoption of the 
Prevention of Organised Crime Act (POCA) 121 of 1998, the adoption of the 
National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, and the National Prosecuting 
Authority Amendment Act 61 of 2000, as well as other initiatives. All these 
transformational arrangements have resulted in changes in the investigation of 
crime.  
 
Before 1994, the investigation of crime was the sole responsibility of the South 
African Police Service (SAPS), but with the introduction of various initiatives, a 
number of institutions within the Criminal Justice System (CJS) have joined the 
investigative fraternity. The concern in this arrangement is the lack of uniformity 
with regard to different mandates.  
 
There seems to be a lot of confusion as to who does what, because various 
legislative arrangements are silent about specific functions for a specific 
institution, including the guidelines on cooperation and communication among 
various institutions. The investigative powers of the investigators were also 
affected, and changed as a result of these transformational initiatives which in 
turn affected the crime rate in South Africa.  
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Now the challenge facing the government is whether all these institutions are 
legally authorised by the Constitution, since the Constitution is the supreme law 
of the land. Furthermore, one needs to highlight the inconsistencies between 
sections 205 (3) and 179 of the Constitution. Section 205 (3) prescribes the 
duties or objects of the police as: to protect and secure the inhabitants of the 
Republic and their property, maintain public order, uphold and enforce the law, 
combat and investigate crime, as well as the prevention of crime.  
 
These functions filter down to the South African Police Service Act, especially 
section 16 which is about the investigation of organised crime. On the other 
hand, section 179 focuses on the institution of criminal proceedings as the 
function of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA). Instituting criminal 
proceedings is not the same as investigating an alleged crime. 
 
These functions are also contained in the National Prosecuting Authority Act as 
well as the National Prosecuting Authority Amendment Act. Surprisingly, the 
National Prosecuting Authority Amendment Act makes provision for the 
establishment of an Investigative Directorate known as the Directorate of Special 
Operations (DSO), or Scorpions, which is entrusted with the investigation of 
organised crime. This directorate is not covered in section 179 of the 
Constitution.  
 
In addition to this confusion, the Prevention of Organised Crime Act (POCA) 
makes no provision for the establishment of a Directorate within the NPA to deal 
with the investigation and seizure of assets obtained through organised crime. 
Surprisingly, the SAPS, the DSO and the Asset Forfeiture Unit (AFU) all use the 
same Act to conduct investigations on organised crime. Neither the AFU nor the 
Scorpions are covered by section 179 of the Constitution which governs the 
workings of the NPA.  
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The establishment of another institution known as the Special Investigating Unit 
(SIU) which does not form part of the NPA but provides services to the SAPS, 
NPA as well as the Departmental Investigation Unit (DIU) of the Department of 
Correctional Services (DCS), adds to the current confusion. The SIU and the DIU 
are not covered in the Constitution nor in the National Prosecuting Authority Act 
or the National Prosecuting Authority Amendment Act.  
 
From the above assessment an impression can be formed that since the 
investigation of crime, particularly organised crime, is covered by section 205 (3) 
of the Constitution and the South African Police Service Act, there is no need to 
create other institutions which are not ‘blessed’ by the Constitution to duplicate 
the functions of the SAPS.  
 
1.2 RATIONALE OF RESEARCH 
 
Leedy (1993:5,47-49) explains a research problem in the following way: 
Research demands a clear statement of the problem. Successful research 
begins with a clear, simple statement of the problem. The perplexing and 
unanswered questions that the researcher finds indigenous to the research 
situation, must crystallise at the very beginning of the research endeavour in a 
precise and grammatically complete statement setting forth exactly what he 
seeks to discover. The reason for this is obvious: before we begin we must 
understand the problem and look at it objectively. We must see clearly what it is 
we are attempting to research. 
 
Many students have difficulty understanding the nature of a problem which 
qualifies it to be considered as suitable for research. This is partly because they 
do not understand the nature of research itself. They feel that merely ‘doing 
something’ that terminates in a written ‘paper’ is research.  
 6
They are thinking primarily of activity as a prime ingredient. As long as they are 
doing something - for instance, finding a correlation, gathering data, or matching 
groups and comparing their achievement - that is research. None of these is, in 
fact, research, and a problem built entirely around such activities is not a 
researchable problem. Research as a refined aspect of the scientific method is 
more than motion. It is inseparable from the individual engaged in it. It requires 
an inquiring mind which seeks facts and, after finding them, synthesises the 
meaning of such facts into accurate conclusions.  
 
Each word should be expressive, sharp, and definitive. A problem should be 
stated so well, in fact, that anyone anywhere could read it and react to it without 
the benefit of researchers’ presence. Since the establishment of the Scorpions, 
the AFU and the SIU, a perception exists in the community that the three form 
part of the SAPS. This perception is created inter alia, by, the Constitution, the 
media, and other pieces of legislation.  
 
In various instances the Scorpions are reported as the police, whereas in some 
other instances the AFU and the SIU are referred to as the Scorpions. On the 
other hand, the DIU is also referred to as the SIU, due to the fact that most of 
their operations are conducted jointly. The following issues are the reasons why 
this research has been undertaken. 
 
1.2.1 Legislative ambiguities 
 
1.2.1.1 The Constitution 
 
Section 179 of the Constitution stipulates that “there shall be a single National 
Prosecuting Authority in the Republic, structured in terms of an Act of 
Parliament”.  
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The prosecuting authority has the power to institute criminal proceedings on 
behalf of the State, and to carry out any necessary functions incidental to 
instituting criminal proceedings. In plain language, the NPA is the AG’s office. 
The functions of the NPA are the same as those of the former AG, even though 
this is governed by a different Act. 
 
However, section 179 of the Constitution makes no mention of the functions of 
the Directorate of Special Operations. On the other hand, section 205 (3) of the 
same Act makes provision for the objects of the police as “to prevent, combat 
and investigate crime, maintain public order, protect and secure the inhabitants 
of the Republic and their property, uphold and enforce the law”. This section 
clearly outlines what the functions of the police are and what is expected from 
them. 
 
It is understood that the DSO is a component of the NPA. The NPA as a 
prosecuting agency in South Africa is covered by section 179 of the Constitution. 
On the other hand, the same section does not mention any investigative authority 
or directorate which may be called the DSO. As a result of this confusion, one 
can deduce that the DSO is unconstitutional. 
 
1.2.1.2 The South African Police Service Act 
 
This Act is an enabling legislation in terms of section 205 of the Constitution. 
Furthermore, section 16 of the South African Police Service Act explains clearly 
what the functions of the police are with regard to organised crime, as well as 
various classes of what may be regarded as organised crime.  
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On the other hand, section 20-29 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act does 
not explicitly specify crimes that need to be investigated by the DSO, except to 
use the word ”organised fashion”. This is not even covered by the National 
Prosecuting Authority Amendment Act. 
 
1.2.1.3 Prevention of Organised Crime Act (POCA) 
 
This legislation deals with the classification of offences which fall under the 
definition of organised crime and the proposed penalties. The Act covers 
offences relating to racketeering activities, offences relating to proceeds of 
unlawful activities, civil recovery of property, and criminal assets recovery 
account. What is surprising in this Act is that there is no demarcation of functions 
between the SAPS and the DSO. 
 
What makes matters worse is the fact that it is alleged that both organisations 
use the same Act. If that is the case, there is excessive duplication of functions. 
As a result of these uncertainties, one can ask the following questions: Is the 
DSO an extension of the SAPS? Is the DSO a unit of the SAPS? Who owns the 
clients or the playing field between the two organisations? It is also not clear how 
the functions of AFU differ from the SIU, because both use civil and criminal 
forfeiture of assets. 
 
1.2.1.4 The Criminal Procedure Act 
 
The Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 has a great impact on the topic under 
discussion. Sections 20 to 59 clearly outline the functions and procedures to be 
followed by the SAPS with regard to the following:  
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seizure of certain articles by the state, article to be seized under search warrant, 
circumstances in which article may be seized without search warrant, search of 
arrested persons and seizure of article, search of premises, power of police to 
enter premises in connection with state security or any offence, entering of 
premises for purposes of obtaining evidence, resistance against entry or search, 
wrongful search an offence, and award of damages, disposal by police official of 
article after seizure, forfeiture of article to the state, powers in respect of prints 
and bodily appearance of accused, powers of arrest, use of force after arrest, 
procedure after arrest, fingerprinting of suspects and the keeping of fingerprint 
records as prima facie evidence of previous conviction.  
 
1.2.1.5 The National Prosecuting Authority Act and the National Prosecuting Authority 
Amendment Act 
 
These two Acts do give powers to the DSO to investigate, prosecute, detain and 
search with or without warrant. However, the Acts do not give direction to the 
DSO as to what happens during arrest and after arrest.  
 
The fact that the DSO has no detention centres - which might create problems for 
detention of suspects by the DSO - is not outlined by the two Acts. In addition, 
the Acts do not outline what the functions of the AFU and the SIU are.  
 
The Acts also fail to give guidance as to what the DSO must do after conviction 
of the accused, as far as the criminal record of the accused is concerned. This is 
a matter of concern. 
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1.2.2 Media reporting 
 
When the activities of the DSO are reported by the print and electronic media, 
the use of expressions such as the “elite police unit”, “Scorpion's crime busting 
police unit”, and “Scorpion's crime fighting police unit” for example, are prevalent. 
The media is meant to be the medium through which the public is educated.  
 
At this stage it is not known whether the media is confused, due to the reasons 
already given above. It is then the duty of the media to conduct proper research 
so that the public can be provided with the right information. As it is now, the 
media is very confused and the public is becoming more confused by the way the 
media reports the activities of the DSO, AFU, DIU, SIU and the SAPS. 
 
This research is intended to critically analyse the investigative functions of the 
five institutions within the Criminal Justice System that are mandated to 
investigate crime, in order to come with proposed models for South Africa.   
 
1.2.3 Standards 
 
There are various discrepancies between the different investigative institutions as 
far as standards are concerned. In South Africa, every crime that is committed is 
reported to the SAPS. On the other hand, other institutions have an opportunity 
to pick and choose cases for the purpose of investigation.  
 
The DSO in particular, is located within the NPA, which makes it easier for them 
to pick cases which are sent by the police for prosecution and guidance 
(http://www.news24.com).  
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This means that the police normally do the ‘dirty work’, and once the NPA 
realises that, the case may attract media attention, they ‘highjack’ it for the DSO. 
As a result of being able to pick and choose, the DSO is in a better position to 
secure a conviction and they may therefore be seen by the public as effective 
and efficient in solving crimes. This process raises a question of doubt regarding 
the ability of the DSO to investigate cases.  
 
The use of the troika system by the DSO where the investigator sits with the 
prosecutor and the intelligence/analyst right from the beginning of the 
investigation, puts them in an advantageous position. This means that the 
prosecutor has inside knowledge of the case, making it easy to secure a 
conviction; hence the so-called high conviction rate is achieved.  
 
This is different from what the SAPS do. The police receive the case from the 
complainant and then they start gathering evidence. After the completion of the 
investigation, the case is taken to NPA for guidance and prosecution. On the 
other hand, the DIU of the DCS conducts investigations within the DCS 
concerning alleged corruption and other offences, with the purpose of taking the 
case either to the SAPS, the DSO or the SIU.  
 
This kind of investigation done by the DIU may raise questions of objectivity in 
the investigation process, because the unit is meant to investigate its own 
members. The fact that the investigative functions of the DIU are sanctioned by 
the Correctional Services, may create an impression that the DCS is usurping the 
functions of the SAPS because such authority does not come from the 
Constitution. It is also of concern to see that the SIU, which perform functions 
almost similar to those performed by the AFU, reports to the Standing Committee 
on Justice and not to the NPA. This kind of arrangement creates a lot of 
independence which may result in abuse of power.  
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According to the Public Service Commission (PSC), August (2001:69) the 
statistics of the five institutions were as follows:  
 
Units  Cases reported  Amount 
involved  
Cases finalised Convictions 
/Amount 
recovered 
AFU 81 R225million 
 
Not supplied R 200million 
SIU 67 R168million  Not supplied  R 112million 
 
DSO 87 R4 970 97million 
 
25 7  
 
SAPS 1102 R44888 55million 750 R480123 000 
millions 
 
DIU  400 Not supplied 270 200 
Table 1.1: Statistics of work done by the five agencies as provided by the Public Service 
Commission, August 2001 
 
As for the amount recovered, such recovery is done by AFU and SIU. This 
means that the amounts shown under AFU and SIU also include amounts 
resulting from the investigations undertaken by the SAPS and the DIU.  
 
Judging from Table 1.1, it looks as if the AFU and the SIU seem to be doing the 
same thing while the SAPS seem to have the same functions as the DSO. If this 
is a true reflection of the work done by these institutions, there is no reason to 
have them as separate and independent entities. 
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1.2.4 Privilege between the client and legal advisor 
 
Privilege is the personal right to refuse to disclose admissible evidence (Hoffman 
& Zeffertt, 1997:236). This definition is in line with section 14 of the Constitution, 
which outlines four categories of rights, namely: the person and home, property, 
possessions and privacy of communications. This means that any confidential 
communication made directly between a client and their legal advisor, or made 
by means of an agent, is privileged, and a person cannot be compelled to 
disclose such communication (Joubert, 1999:403). Neither are they compelled to 
disclose any communication that was obtained with a view to litigation.  
 
The relationship between legal practitioner and client is deemed so important by 
the South African legal system, that section 201 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
specifically prohibits disclosure to the court of any communications between the 
accused and their legal representative. The leading case is S v Safatsa 1988 (1) 
SA 868 (A) where the court ruled that legal professional privilege is a fundamental 
right that is essential to the proper functioning of the legal system (Joubert, 
1999:405). It has come to the researcher’s attention that this rule was respected 
even during the apartheid era in South Africa.  
 
Recently, the DSO raided the offices of the legal advisor of Mr. Jacob Zuma, 
where documents were seized for the purpose of an investigation into alleged 
corruption charges (http//:www.news24.com). Subsequent to these events, the 
courts ruled in favour of the legal advisor. This was a direct violation of section 
201 of the Criminal Procedure Act. This shows that the DSO have now become a 
‘law unto themselves’. The manner which the Zuma case has been handled by 
the DSO creates a suspicion that there could be other cases where individuals’ 
rights have been violated. 
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1.2.5 Training 
 
Training in South Africa is governed by the Skills Development Act 97 of 1998, 
the South African Qualifications Authority Act 58 of 1995, and the National 
Qualification Framework (NQF). This means that whatever training is provided by 
any service provider must be in line with these Acts. In the SAPS it is compulsory 
for all entry level recruits to attend the twelve months’ basic police training which 
is at NQF Level five (5). After the completion of basic training, recruits are posted 
to various units where they receive further training under the supervision of Field 
Training Officers (FTO).  
 
For detectives, it is compulsory to attend a fourteen weeks’ basic detective 
course for any new recruit or a member who has been transferred from another 
unit. In addition to this course, recruits also attend specialised training in line with 
their functions. Those who are attached to the Organised Crime Unit also attend 
five weeks’ intensive training (http://www.saps.gov.za). With regards to the DSO, 
the first batch of recruits - when the DSO was established - attended a four 
months’ course in the United States of America (USA) (FBI Academy). This 
group was followed by another which was trained by Scotland Yard in England. 
The length of their course was two months.  
 
Subsequent to these groups, there had been various intakes where training took 
place in the Boot Camp Military Camp north of Pretoria, where training was 
offered by various training providers, including retired detectives from the SAPS, 
as well as from Tshwane University of Technology (NPA Annual Report 
2005/2006:36). As for the AFU, SIU and the DIU, qualified and experienced 
investigators and lawyers are recruited from, inter alia, the SAPS. Regular 
training does take place – this is provided by various service providers.  
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Surprisingly, a substantial number of the investigators within the DSO and SIU 
are from the SAPS. Most of the newly recruited DSO members are mentored by 
their senior investigators of whom the majority happen to come from the SAPS. 
Therefore, the fact that there is a difference in the level of training for institutions 
within the Criminal Justice System, poses a serious problem. The fact that the 
SAPS spends a great deal of money training its members, only to lose them to 
other institutions, hampers progress in the fight against crime, let alone 
organised crime.  
 
1.2.6 Cooperation 
 
According to the Public Service Commission (PSC) Report of August (2001:4), 
“there are serious problems with regards to cooperation between the DSO and 
the SAPS”. These problems stem from fight over territory, glory, as well as 
mandates. Although section 31 (1) of the National Prosecuting Authority 
Amendment Act makes provision for the establishment of a Ministerial 
Coordinating Committee (MCC) to determine policy guidelines, procedures to 
coordinate activities of the DSO, communication and transfer of information, and 
referring and assigning of any investigation to the DSO, this committee has never 
met (Public Service Commission (PSC) Report of August 2001:4).  
 
This problem was confirmed during the sitting of the Khampepe Commission of 
Enquiry (2005). If this is the case, then the fight against crime will fail. In general, 
the cooperation between the SAPS, AFU and the SIU is fine. However, according 
to Malatjie (2006), whenever a criminal case is reported by the DIU to the SAPS, 
it takes some time before such a case can be properly investigated by the police. 
This tends to hamper many investigations by the DIU. One of the commonest 
problems in this regard is that the SAPS priorities are not in line with those of the 
DIU.  
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As a result of this, the DIU feels that it is being overlooked by the SAPS. This is 
one the reasons why the DIU prefers to complete the investigation and then hand 
over the docket to the SAPS for prosecution. As for the DSO, there is good 
cooperation with the DIU, AFU and SIU. 
 
1.2.7 Communication 
 
The level of communication between the SAPS and the DSO does not seem to 
be good at all. There seems to be an over-sensationalisation of the work of the 
DSO, as opposed to the work done by the SAPS and other agencies. This kind of 
reporting creates an impression that the DSO is better than the other agencies.  
 
It is clear that the fact that each and every arrest or raid by the DSO is covered 
by both the print and electronic media has created a perception that the DSO is 
better than the police. This kind of reporting may be seen as a way of discrediting 
the work done by the police. As a result of this popularity by the ‘new kid on the 
block’, relations with the SAPS seem to be tenuous.  
 
This may be seen as a way of trying to win the support of the politicians and the 
public at large. However, there seem to be fairly good relations between the 
SAPS and the DIU, SIU and AFU. Such a rift among law enforcement agencies 
poses a serious problem which South Africa does not need at this stage. 
 
1.2.8 Intelligence gathering 
 
In terms of Chapter 11 of the Constitution, security institutions are identified as 
the SAPS, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), the National 
Intelligence Agency (NIA), and the South African Secret Service (SASS). 
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In this instance, the DSO, AFU, SIU and DIU are excluded. The reality is that the 
DIU plays a vital role with regard to security matters, and there seems that there 
is no justification to this exclusion. On the other hand, the DSO does perform 
intelligence functions in the execution of their duties.  
 
This is contrary to the fact that the DSO is not included in Chapter 11 of the 
Constitution, nor the Intelligence Services Act or the National Strategic 
Intelligence Act. This arrangement of the intelligence community is also in line 
with the White Paper on Intelligence of 1995. Both the White Paper and the 
legislation created control structures which are used to ensure that power is not 
abused by the institutions.  
 
Such oversight institutions include the National Intelligence Coordinating 
Committee (NICOC), Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence, Cabinet 
Committee for Security and Intelligence Affairs and the Inspector General of 
Intelligence. The fact that the DSO is not covered by these oversight institutions 
creates a vacuum and a possibility of abuse of power.  
 
This is true, because in terms of the legal mandate, the DSO have no intelligence 
functions. As it stands, South Africa has an institution which is performing 
functions that do not fall within its mandate, thereby usurping the functions of 
other institutions.  
 
This not only poses a serious risk to the security of the State, but also a possible 
abuse of human rights. There is no concern with regard to the functions of the 
AFU, SIU and the DIU, because their investigations do not involve covert and 
overt operations.  
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1.2.9 Accountability and civilian oversight 
 
In terms of section 50 of the South African Police Service Act, the Independent 
Complaints Directorate (ICD) has the power to investigate alleged deaths in 
police (SAPS) custody, including the Metropolitan Police Services/Municipal 
Police Services. This was done to ensure that these agencies do not misuse their 
powers of carrying/using firearms indiscriminately.  
 
On the other hand, the DSO do carry firearms in terms of section 7 (4) (a) and 
chapter 5 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act, section 5 of the National 
Prosecuting Authority Amendment Act and section 45 (1) of the Arms and 
Ammunition Act. Therefore, the likelihood of causing death to suspects by 
members of the Scorpions is great. As it stands at the moment, neither the ICD 
nor any institution has any oversight functions over the DSO.  
 
This can be seen as either a way of giving too much power to the DSO or merely 
a miscarriage of justice and democracy. South Africa cannot afford to have 
institutions that have too much power, especially where lives of people are at 
stake. According to Malatjie (2006), if there is a problem of misuse of power by a 
member of the DIU, such a case is referred to the Public Service Commission for 
investigation.  
 
The researcher is of the opinion that this explanation is not convincing, because 
such an arrangement is not covered by the Correctional Services Act or by any 
other formal agreement. As for the AFU and the SIU, there is no mechanism 
available to deal with abuse of power except that if there are such cases, 
members are either dealt with in terms of internal discipline regulations, or 
charged criminally.  
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This is of great concern because it is clear that there is no uniformity in ensuring 
accountability and oversight over the five institutions within the South African 
Criminal Justice System. 
 
1.2.10 Excessive use of consultants 
 
All five institutions do make use of consultants. However, the DSO with a staff 
complement of less than one thousand personnel, have exhibited excessive use 
of the services of consultants. Most of their auditing investigations are done by 
KPMG, Deloite and Touche, PricewaterhouseCoopers and others. In addition to 
these institutions, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) is one 
of the beneficiaries. According to the NPA Annual Report (2003/2004:60), about 
R120 million was spent on consultancy functions, as opposed to R8.374 482 
allocated to the Commercial Crime Unit of the SAPS. This amount includes the 
500 pages of testimony which was presented by KPMG on behalf of the DSO 
which cost the taxpayer R1.2 million (http://www.news24.com). This in itself may 
create an impression that the DSO may not possess the kind of skills they think 
they do. If this is the case, then the DSO is not doing their job as they profess to, 
and are mere post offices who simply collect information and pass it to another 
institution for analysis.  
 
According to the PSC (August 2001:73), the budget for consultancy work for the 
SIU and the AFU was R35 million. Although this figure might have risen in 
2004/2005, the fact is that the DSO’s budget is far higher than that of the other 
two institutions. According to Malatjie (2006), the DIU does not use consultants 
because they prefer to hire experienced investigators. The only way they come 
across consultants is when the case has been handed over to the SIU. If the 
DSO can use so much money for consultancy work, surely public funds are not 
being used fruitfully, as prescribed by the Public Finance Management Act. 
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1.2.11 The doctrine of separation of powers 
 
The doctrine of the separation of powers was expounded by Montesquieu, a 
French philosopher who believed that government power should not be 
concentrated in one body (Devenish, 1999:13). The central thesis of this 
celebrated doctrine is that a constitution must provide effective checks and 
balances in relation to the exercise of power.  
 
In South Africa the Constitution prescribes the separation of power into legislative 
authority, executive authority and judicial authority. According to Du Toit and Van 
der Waldt (1997:208) the legislative authority formulates and adopts policy, while 
the executive authority is responsible for the execution of policy. The judicial 
authority passes judgment in all cases before the courts.  
 
An excessive concentration of power in a single organ or person is an invitation 
for abuse or maladministration. The investigation of crime by prosecutors in 
South Africa is a violation of tripartite doctrine, as prosecutors are expected to be 
impartial in the prosecution of crime. 
 
 In France, where an inquisitorial approach is used, the judge, who actively 
conducts and even controls the search for the truth by dominating the 
questioning of the witness and accused, clearly violates the separation of 
powers. The inquisitorial system is broadly centered in Europe. In this system the 
judge is a much more active participant in the proceedings. After arrest, the 
accused is questioned primarily by the investigating judge and not by the police. 
In the trial, the presiding judge primarily does the questioning and not the counsel 
for the prosecution or the defence. In this way, the judges have the task of 
determining the truth of the matter by whatever means they feel necessary to 
use.  
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The judges are not bound by the evidence which the parties have provided, but 
are instead free to utilise their own enterprise to locate appropriate information 
which could assist them in ascertaining the veracity of the matter and thus do 
real justice to the parties concerned.  
 
In doing so, the judges are seeking the truth in a much more objective way. 
Indeed, judges may look behind the specific facts and issues of the case if they 
feel that the information they find may help to discover the truth of the matter. 
The only ostensible circumscription is that the evidence which the judges seek 
must be relevant, although relevance is given a much broader definition than 
might be obtained in the adversarial system (Geldenhuys & Joubert, 1996:14).  
 
In terms of an accusatorial approach, the judge is in the role of detached umpire, 
who should not enter the arena of the fight between the prosecution and the 
defence for the fear of becoming partial or losing focus as a result of all the dust 
caused by the fray (Geldenhuys & Joubert, 1996:14). The police are the primary 
investigative force in the sense that that they pass the collected evidence on to 
the prosecution in a dossier or docket format, which then becomes dominis litis. 
The prosecution decides on the appropriate charges, the appropriate court, and 
etc.  
 
In court the trial takes the form of a contest between two theoretically equal 
parties, namely, the prosecution and the defence, who do the questioning, in turn 
leading their own witnesses and cross-examining the opposition’s witnesses. As 
has been pointed out, no real life system conforms exactly to a specific model. 
South African criminal procedure has basically been accusatorial, but in certain 
circumstances judges may call witnesses of their own. The procedure of 
questioning that may take place under section 115 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
contains inquisitorial elements, in the same way as part of section 112 of the 
same Act.  
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On the other hand, the fact that an accused can be found guilty of an offence 
solely on his plea of guilty without the judge doing any questioning to investigate 
the truth is a strong accusatorial element, even though it can happen only in the 
case of relatively minor offences. 
 
In South Africa the DSO, AFU and the SIU are inclined to a more inquisitorial 
approach because the three role players - the investigator, an analyst and 
prosecutors - are involved from the beginning to the end of the case. As it stands, 
the actions of the three institutions amounts to ‘player and referee’, thereby 
compromising the doctrine of separation of powers. An impression is created that 
the so-called high conviction rate is a result of having prosecution and 
investigation in the same team. This amounts to a player and a referee 
playing/performing the same functions.  
 
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THIS RESEARCH 
 
The objectives of doing this research are to alert the politicians to the legislative 
ambiguities with regard to the investigation of crime within the Criminal Justice 
System. The researcher has been a police official for eleven years and has first 
hand experience with the stated problems, such as cooperation, communication, 
standards, training, accountability and others.  
 
By means of this research, the researcher intends coming up with solutions to 
the stated problems. In addition, the researcher wants to:  
• Do a comparative study between South Africa and other countries 
(Botswana, Hong Kong, Malawi and Nigeria); 
• Develop a model for South Africa to fight corruption, fraud, organised 
crime, and economic and financial crimes; 
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• Make a contribution to crime investigative systems that will assist the 
community of South Africa; and 
• Make a contribution to the study field of Criminal Justice System. 
 
The last objective of the research is to contribute to the criminal justice field of 
study, especially the investigation of crime, in order to contribute to development 
of skillful investigators within the Criminal Justice System. This contribution will 
assist the legislators/managers to remedy the stated problems.  
 
1.4 HYPOTHESES 
 
A hypothesis is a non-obvious statement that makes an assertion (Guy, Edgley, 
Arafat & Allen, 1987:116). The assertion may simply describe some phenomenon 
or specify a relationship between two or more phenomena. Such a statement 
becomes the basis for research that is designed to prove the truth of the 
statement. However, hypothesis implies that the true statement is not certainly 
known, or is hidden beneath appearances.  
 
The aim of a hypothesis, then, is to establish a testable base about a doubtful or 
unknown statement. A test of this statement discloses whether the hypothesis is 
tenable. According to Guy et al. (1987:121), a hypothesis should be objectively 
worded.  
 
This means that the researcher should constantly strive to exclude personal 
values, hopes, and wishes from the wording of a hypothesis. Hypotheses must 
be specific and precise. This means that the elements in research hypotheses 
should be as exact as possible. Ambiguity must be avoided at all times. 
Hypotheses must be testable.  
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This is a way for researchers to measure the variables, and demonstrate 
hypothesised relationships. Hypotheses should provide an answer to the 
research question. The test of a hypothesis should provide a direct answer to the 
research question. This does not mean that the hypothesis is supported. The 
following are the hypotheses of this research:  
 
Hypothesis no.1: The structure of the South African Criminal Justice System 
could be described as an emerging Federated System. 
 
Hypothesis no.2: The processes involved in the South African Criminal Justice 
System are both inquisitorial and accusatorial in nature.  
 
Hypothesis no.3: Divisions within the Criminal Justice System are the 
consequences of differing investigative mandates. 
 
Hypothesis no.4: The investigation of organised crime and collective corruption 
requires a unitary approach.  
 
1.5 DEMARCATION OF THE STUDY 
 
1.5.1 Time 
 
The research is focused from December 1996 when the final Constitution was 
signed into law, until 2006. The reason for choosing this time frame is that the 
current Criminal Justice System was established after the Constitution came into 
effect. The DSO, SIU, AFU and the DIU were all established after 1996. 
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1.5.2 Geographic demarcation 
 
This study is a national study, because the affected departments are at national 
level and the legislation that governs the operation of the affected departments is 
national legislation. The affected departments in this study are: the South African 
Police Service, the Special Investigating Unit, the Department of Correctional 
Services and the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development.  
 
Reference will be made to the Detective Service of the SAPS, the Departmental 
Investigation Unit of the DCS, the DSO and the Asset Forfeiture Unit of the 
National Prosecuting Authority which falls within the Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development, the Anti-Corruption Bureau of Malawi, the 
Directorate on Economic Crimes Commission of Botswana, the Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission of Nigeria and the Independent Commission 
Against Corruption of Hong Kong. As for the EFCC, ACB, and DCEC, no specific 
individual was interviewed. Information was obtained via the Internet and e-mails, 
through the intervention of the offices of the South African High Commission.  
 
1.5.3 Conceptual demarcation 
 
South African Criminal Justice System: In this study, the South African 
Criminal Justice System refers to the following three departments: the South 
African Police Service, the Department of Correctional Services and the 
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development. Currently, the 
demarcation of the South African Criminal Justice System is problematic. The 
researcher chose the SAPS, SIU, DSO (Scorpions), AFU and DIU because they 
are manageable and they are key role players within the Criminal Justice 
System. 
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Investigative systems: The study will focus on the different investigative 
systems used by the investigative institutions within the Criminal Justice System 
(Attention is paid to the SAPS Detective Service, NPA’s Directorate of Special 
Operations or Scorpions and the Asset Forfeiture Unit, the Departmental 
Investigating Unit of the DCS, as well as the Special Investigating Unit). 
 
Criminal investigation: Dowling (1992:4) defines criminal investigation as a 
systematic process of identification, collection, preservation and evaluation of 
information for the purpose of bringing the criminal to justice. In this research the 
focus is on the approaches used by the five identified institutions which use 
different approaches.  
 
The DSO, AFU and the SIU use a project-based approach which is more 
inquisitorial in nature, while the DIU combines both the accusatorial and 
inquisitorial approaches (Malatjie, 2006). As for the SAPS, their approach is more 
accusatorial in nature. Here the researcher is of the opinion that the lack of 
uniformity within the Criminal Justice institutions is problematic.  
 
According to Davids (2006), the SIU does not have powers to arrest suspects, 
but if it becomes clear that criminal acts are discovered during their 
investigations, such investigations will either be completed by the SIU before 
being referred to the SAPS.  
 
The DIU completes the investigation and then hands over the docket to the 
SAPS for prosecution. As for the SAPS and the DSO, each institution follows its 
own procedures and approaches until the case is finalised. The researcher finds 
the use of these different procedures and approaches to be unacceptable.  
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1.5.4 Investigative powers 
 
The study will focus on the Constitutional mandate of the investigative institutions 
within the South African Criminal Justice System, with regard to crime 
investigation. For the purpose of this research, the study will focus on the 
following investigative authorities: the Constitution, the South African Police 
Service Act, the Criminal Procedure Act, the National Prosecution Authority Act, 
the National Prosecution Authority Amendment Act, the Prevention of Organised 
Crime Act, the Special Investigations Unit and Tribunals Act, the Drugs and Drug 
Trafficking Act and the Correctional Services Act. The purpose of this 
demarcation is to show that there is no uniformity in the investigative mandates 
within the Criminal Justice System.  
 
Due to the fact that there is no proper definition and demarcation of the Criminal 
Justice System in South Africa, the research will exclude institutions such as the 
Metro/Municipal Police, the Auditor General, the Traffic Department, the Public 
Service Commission, the Office of the Public Protector and the Local 
Government Security Departments. The ICD will feature almost throughout the 
discussion on the role of a civilian oversight. 
 
1.6 PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED DURING RESEARCH 
 
The inaccessibility of certain documents from the SAPS, which are considered to 
be classified, had been a major problem. Securing appointments for interviews 
with relevant stakeholders had also been difficult. The lack of documented 
information on the Directorate of Special Operations had been problematic to 
obtain, because the organisation was still young.  
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The available literature on the DSO is based on secondary sources. Information 
on the functioning of the Departmental Investigation Unit of the Department of 
Correctional Services was not made available because it is regarded as 
confidential.  
 
Generally, people who could shed more light on the subject within the three 
departments, have not been helpful. One of the most unpleasant experiences 
that the researcher had was the arrogance from the office of the National Director 
of Public Prosecution (NDPP). Documentary proof of such arrogance is available. 
 
1.7 ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS  
 
Chapter 1: General Orientation 
Chapter 2: The Qualitative Approach to this Research 
Chapter 3: The Evolution of the South African Criminal Justice System 
Chapter 4: Crime Investigation in South Africa 
Chapter 5: Processes in the Investigation Functions  
Chapter 6: International Experience 
Chapter 7: An Investigation Model for the South African Criminal Justice System  
Chapter 8: Findings and Recommendations 
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1.8 DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS  
 
1.8.1 Accusatorial system 
 
In terms of an accusatorial approach, “the judge is in the role of detached umpire, 
who should not enter the arena of the fight between the prosecution and the 
defence for the fear of his becoming partial or losing focus as a result of all the 
dust caused by the fray” (Geldenhuys & Joubert, 1996:14). The police are the 
primary investigative force in the sense that they pass the collected evidence on 
to the prosecution, who then becomes dominis litis.  
 
The prosecution decides on the appropriate charges, the appropriate court, and 
others. In court the trial takes the form of a contest between two theoretically 
equal parties, namely, the prosecution and the defence who do the questioning, 
in turn leading their own witnesses and cross-examining the opposition’s 
witnesses. 
 
1.8.2 Inquisitorial system 
 
The inquisitorial system is broadly centered in Europe. In this system the judge is 
a much more active participant in the proceedings. This means that the judge 
actively conducts and even controls the truth by dominating the questioning of 
the witnesses and the accused (http://www.members.ozemail.com).  
 
 
 
 
 30
1.8.3 Troika system 
 
This is the investigative methodology used by the DSO which integrates 
analysis/intelligence, investigation and prosecution, which is based on the FBI 
model (NPA Annual Report, 2005/2006:50). 
 
1.8.4 Case determination 
 
This is the process used by the DSO to determine whether the DSO or the SAPS 
can investigate the case (http://www.npa.gov.za). 
 
1.8.5 Criminal Justice System 
 
According to Cilliers, Smit and Van Vuuren (1999:2-30) Criminal Justice System 
refers to the police, the courts and the correctional services. The National Crime 
Prevention Strategy (NCPS) describes the Criminal Justice System as the police, 
the courts, the prosecution authority and the social development.  
 
Because of this lack of a clear definition of the South African Criminal Justice 
System, the researcher decided to choose and focus on the Detective Service of 
the South African Police Service, the Directorate of Special Operations (DSO) 
and the Asset Forfeiture Unit of the National Prosecuting Authority, the Special 
Investigating Unit and the Departmental Investigating Unit of the Department of 
Correctional Services. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE QUALITATIVE APPROACH TO THIS RESEARCH 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Qualitative research is research that involves analysing and interpreting text and 
interviews in order to discover meaningful patterns descriptive of a particular 
phenomenon. The qualitative approach to research leads to studies that are quite 
different from those designed using the more traditional approach.  
 
Research follows a particular line, and the approach that the researcher adopts 
determines the method and the method determines the technique. A method is 
a procedure or way of doing something in an orderly manner (Oxford English 
Dictionary, 1981:324), whereas a technique is a method of doing something. The 
literature study formed the basis of this research. Unstructured interviews were 
conducted with a few individuals, but the majority of this research was done by 
means of a literature study.  
 
2.2 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
 
In this study the researcher followed a qualitative approach. A literature study 
and interviews were used as data collection techniques. Qualitative methodology 
refers to research which produces descriptive data, generally people’s own 
written or spoken words (Brynard & Hanekom, 1997:29). Qualitative research 
entails discovering novel or unanticipated findings and the possibility of altering 
research plans in response to accidental discoveries. Qualitative research takes 
an interpretive and naturalistic approach to its subject matter. 
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Qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make 
sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings that people bring to 
them (De Vos, 1998:240). Qualitative methodologies allow the researcher to 
know people personally and to see them as they are and to experience their daily 
struggles when confronted with real-life situations  
 
Qualitative research begins by accepting that there is a range of different ways of 
making sense of the world, and is concerned with discovering the meanings seen 
by those who are being researched, and with understanding their view of the 
world rather than that of the researcher’s (http://www.bmj.bmjjournals.com).  
 
2.2.1 Advantages of qualitative research 
 
Qualitative research provides people with a means of attempting to understand a 
world that cannot be understood in terms of numbers and objectivity. Qualitative 
approaches provide ways of transcribing and analysing the discursive 
construction of everyday events and of exploring the historical nature of life within 
a social group or local setting (De Vos, 1998:240). 
 
In theory, it seems that qualitative research is the best route to take in every 
research situation, because it provides people with an understanding that takes 
into account the fact that each person is an individual with a different perspective 
on the world (De Vos, 1998:240). Qualitative research is flexible and inexpensive 
to administer (http://www.mapnp.org). 
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2.2.2 Disadvantages of qualitative research 
 
In terms of qualitative research, it is largely impossible to escape the subjective 
experience, even for the most seasoned researchers. If a researcher is working 
with one person, or even a small group, the results are likely to be valid for that 
particular person or focus group (http://www.wilderdom.com). Therefore, one 
could not make a generalisation from the results as one could with the results of 
a quantitative research study.  
 
Another disadvantage of qualitative research is the accuracy of the 
interpretations of the researcher (http://www.okstate.edu). Because the 
researcher is a person, like the participants, it is possible that the researcher has 
personal biases to overcome or consider when carrying out inductive reasoning 
processes.  
 
2.3 RESEARCH METHODS 
 
2.3.1 Literature study 
 
The basis of this research is going to be the literature study. A thorough literature 
study is an indispensable component of all research. It familiarises the 
researchers with research which has already been done in their field, as well as 
with current research.  
 
According to Leedy (1993:87) a literature study provides background to the new 
research, justifies the need to conduct new research and seeks to do one or 
more of the following: interpret, clarify and integrate another’s research.  
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A literature study makes the researcher aware of what the current train of thought 
is, as well as the focus of existing and acceptable thought regarding a specific 
topic. It also helps them to demarcate the boundaries of their research themes.  
 
According to Leedy (1993:87), a literature study has the following benefits: it can 
reveal investigations similar to your own, and it can show you the collateral 
researchers handled in these situations; it can reveal to you sources of data that 
you may not have known existed; it can provide you with new ideas and 
approaches that may not have occurred to you and it can help you evaluate your 
own research efforts by comparing them with the similar efforts of others.  
 
2.3.1.1 The role of a literature study 
 
A literature study helps the researcher to select a research problem or theme. 
Relevant literature enables the researcher to discover where inconsistencies, 
wrong designs and incorrect statistical conclusions occur.  
 
According to Hoepfl (1997:16), research reports are concluded with 
recommendations regarding research which still needs to be done. The 
researcher’s thinking can be shaped in this way, which in turn will enable him to 
establish the size and extent of the research, to consider the procedures and 
instruments which are to be used in the research and to avoid unnecessary 
repetition of research already undertaken (http://www.petech.ac.za/robert/data.htm). 
 
2.3.1.2 Types of literature  
 
According to Hoepfl (1997:16) there are two types of literature sources, namely, 
comprehension literature and research literature.  
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Comprehension literature refers to books and articles by experts in which they 
state their opinions, experiences, theories and ideas on concepts and constructs 
within a specific problem area, as well as their opinions on what is good or bad, 
desirable or undesirable, valuable or worthless regarding insight into specific 
concepts or constructs (www.petech.ac.za/robert/data/htm).  
 
Research literature includes reporting in respect of research already undertaken 
in the field, and gives the researcher a good indication of successes and 
problems in respect of research procedures, design, hypotheses, techniques and 
instruments. The results of studying these two types of literature lead the 
researcher to a greater awareness of those matters within the field which have 
already sufficiently been demonstrated and proved, as well as those matters still 
requiring more in-depth research. 
 
2.3.1.3 Primary and secondary sources 
 
Sources of information are generally categorised as primary, secondary or 
tertiary, depending on their originality and their proximity to the source or origin. 
Primary sources of a specific type of information are the original works, books, 
magazines, articles, films and sound recordings which reflect the information first 
hand (http://www.bergen.cc.nj.us). Primary sources are usually the first formal 
appearance of results in print or electronic literature. The information contained in 
primary sources is presented in its original form, neither interpreted nor 
condensed or evaluated by other writers. 
 
Common examples of primary sources also include proceedings of meetings, 
conferences and symposia, technical reports, dissertations and theses, works of 
literature, diaries, autobiographies, interviews, newspaper articles, government 
documents, Internet communications, letters and CD-ROMs (Leedy, 1993:94).  
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In this research the researcher used literature, interviews, newspapers, articles, 
government documents such as Acts of Parliament and policies, and Internet 
communication. Government policies, annual reports, government legislation and 
different types of Internet communication will play a major role in this research. 
These primary sources are available and accessible to the researcher, and are 
reliable (http://www.petech.ac.za.robert/data/.htm). 
 
However, there are a few problems which can be experienced by researchers 
when primary sources are consulted, including the following: the source may be 
out of print, destroyed or unobtainable, or the source may be in a foreign 
language, rendering it inaccessible to the researcher.   
 
However, this should not discourage researchers from using primary sources, 
because they provide valuable practice in examining information carefully, 
reasoning inductively, and developing a claim. Secondary sources are accounts 
written after the fact, with the benefit of hindsight, or they are accounts written by 
people who were not at the scene. They are interpretations and evaluations of 
primary sources. Secondary sources comment on and discuss the evidence 
provided by primary sources. Examples of secondary sources include 
biographical works, monographs and commentaries.  
 
Secondary sources are prepared based on the information contained in primary 
sources, and often explain or comment on the primary source material 
(http://www.bergen.cc.nj.us). Besides the primary and secondary sources, there 
are also tertiary sources which refer to the works which list primary and 
secondary sources in a specific subject area. For the purpose of this research, 
the researcher used monographs and journals. The reason for using these 
sources is that the majority of the chosen institutions are new establishments, 
and primary sources are not readily available. 
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2.4 RESEARCH TECHNIQUES 
 
The most frequently used techniques of data collection within qualitative and 
quantitative research methods are: review of relevant literature, interviews, 
questionnaires and observation. In this study, the researcher will make use of 
unstructured interviews. 
 
2.4.1 Interviews 
 
Face-to-face interviews are a direct communication and primary research 
collection technique. If relatively unstructured, but in-depth, they tend to be 
considered as part of qualitative research. The opportunity for feedback to the 
respondent is a distinct advantage in personal interviews. Not only is there the 
opportunity to reassure respondents, should they be reluctant to participate, but 
the interviewer can also clarify certain instructions or questions. The interviewer 
also has the opportunity to probe answers by asking the respondent to clarify or 
expand on a specific response. According to Brynard and Hanekom (1997:32), 
interviewers can also supplement answers by recording their own observations.  
 
2.4.1.1 Unstructured interviews 
 
The unstructured or nondirective interview is less structured than the life history 
interview or the focused interview. The chief feature of the nondirective interview 
is its almost total reliance upon neutral probes that are designed to be as neutral 
as possible (Bailey, 1994:194). These interviews amount to an informal 
conversation about the subject.  
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The advantage of unstructured interviews is that the respondents are 
encouraged to talk freely about the subject, but are kept to the point on issues of 
interest to the researcher. Respondents are encouraged to reveal everything that 
they feel about the subject. This method also allows the respondents to tell their 
own stories in their own words, with prompting from the interviewer. Properly 
conducted informal interviews can give the researcher an accurate feel for the 
subject to be researched (http://www.onevision.co.uk). In general, the 
unstructured interview may be able to provide a relaxed and unhurried 
atmosphere that is not stressful to the respondent.  
 
There may be just a single question that the interviewer asks and the interviewee 
is then allowed to respond freely, with the interviewer simply responding to points 
that seem worthy of being followed up. Bailey (1994:194) is of the opinion that 
unstructured interviews can sometimes be more valid than highly structured 
interviews, even though the latter are more commonly used and probably thought 
to be more valid. More complex issues can be probed.  
 
The disadvantage of unstructured interview is that the gathering of data is time 
consuming and difficult to collect and analyse. There are greater opportunities for 
interviewer bias to intervene, and, because it is a time consuming method, it is 
expensive and only feasible with small samples (Hoepfl, 1997:6). 
 
2.4.2 Observation 
 
Observation means that a researcher studies or observes a specific situation. 
This is a primary technique for collection of data on non-verbal behaviour. 
Although observation most commonly involves sight or visual data collection, it 
could also include data collection via the other senses such as hearing, touch or 
smell (Bailey, 1994:242).  
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The use of observational methods does not preclude simultaneous use of other 
data-gathering techniques. Observations are often conducted as a preliminary to 
surveys, and may also be conducted jointly with document study or 
experimentation.  
 
2.4.2.1 Advantages of observation 
 
Observation is decidedly superior to survey research, experimentation, or 
document study for collecting data on nonverbal behaviour. Another advantage 
of observation is that behaviour takes place in its natural environment.  
 
Unlike the interviewer, who must compete with the respondent’s everyday 
activities and obligations for a valuable hour of their time for the interview, or the 
experimenter who must constrain their subjects for the duration of the experiment 
in an alien and sometimes hostile or uncomfortable laboratory environment, the 
observer is able to conduct their study in the subject’s natural environment, and 
is thus usually able to study over a much longer time period than with either the 
survey or experiment (Bailey, 1994:244). In this study, observation was used by 
the researcher while conducting the interviews.  
 
This technique was used to observe things like the office setup, resources 
available to the five institutions in South Africa - and one in Hong Kong, 
atmosphere in the workplace as well as the behavioural response when a 
particular question was asked. In some instances, the researcher observed that 
certain respondents were uncomfortable with certain questions. A classical 
example was observed when a question was posed to the deputy head of the 
SIU about the duplication of functions and the oversight accountability. Instead of 
giving straight answers, the respondense was slow and unconvincing. 
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2.4.2.2 Disadvantages of observation 
 
According to Bailey (1994:245) there are five disadvantages when observation is 
used as a research technique, namely, lack of control, difficulties of 
quantification, small sample size, gaining entry and lack of anonymity. Lack of 
control means that in a natural environment the researcher often has little control 
over extraneous variables that may affect the data. Measurement in 
observational studies generally takes the form of the observer’s unquantified 
perceptions, rather than the quantitative measures often used in surveys and 
experimentation.  
 
Rather than specifying a characteristic in advance and preparing a scale to 
measure it, the observer is much more likely to simply observe and record events 
as they occur. In theory, observational studies could use thousands or millions of 
subjects if there were enough observers. However, because observational 
studies are generally conducted in depth, with data that are often subjective and 
difficult to quantify, the data gathered by two or more observers may not be 
readily comparable, and there are no easy checks and balances on reliability in 
unstructured observations (Bailey, 1994: 2460).  
 
Many times the observer has had difficulty in receiving approval for the study. In 
some instances the study can be conducted without the knowledge of the 
management of an institution, which may result in the researcher using their 
memory, instead of taking notes during the course of the daily activities. 
 
In this instance, researchers are forced to trust their memory, or write field notes 
at night, or use some secret recording device such as a hidden tape recorder. In 
sensitive studies, the interview becomes less reliable than the survey because it 
is difficult to maintain a respondent’s anonymity in observational study. 
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2.5 RESEARCH SAMPLE 
 
A research sample is a portion or group of population selected for the purpose of 
a particular research project (Brynard & Hanekom, 1997:43). A sample of 
population is used to simplify the research, save time and cut costs. In this 
project the following individuals were chosen as the research sample: Divisional 
Commissioner Johan De Beer; the head of the SAPS Detective Service, Mr 
Sipho Ngwema; the former spokesperson for the National Prosecuting Authority, 
Dr Ruben Richards; the former divisional head of the Directorate of Special 
Operations, Mr Matome Malatjie; a director and deputy head of the Departmental 
Investigating Unit of the DCS, Advocate Richard Chinner; Senior State Advocate 
within the Asset Forfeiture Unit, Mr Mike Chen; Independent Commission Against 
Corruption Liaison Officer, and Mr. Faek Davids, the deputy head of the Special 
Investigating Unit.  
 
The reason for choosing these people as the research sample is because they 
have been involved directly or indirectly in the establishment of their agencies. By 
selecting these respondents, the researcher exhausted the analytical potential of 
information. The respondents were selected because of their positions within 
their respective organisations. These people were involved in the policy making 
and policy formulation within their respective institutions. 
 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
 
Due to a lack of information, especially on the DSO, the AFU, SIU and the DIU, 
the researcher decided to conduct qualitative research so that available literature 
could be supplemented by the results of the unstructured interviews. The 
researcher also visited the ICAC in Hong Kong to interview the liaison officer, 
and observe how things are done in that institution.  
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CHAPTER 3: THE EVOLUTION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter pays attention to the distinction between federal and unitary states. 
The purpose of this distinction is to indicate whether South Africa is a federal or 
unitary state and whether these systems have an influence on the criminal justice 
system. An overview of the chronology of South African history is given. Attention 
is also paid to the development of the South African legal system which is 
derived from Roman-Dutch law and English law.  
 
3.2 DEFINITIONS 
 
3.2.1 Federalism 
 
The term “federal” is derived from the Latin word foedus, which means, 
“covenant” or “pact” and is related to fides which means “trust” or “faith” (Elazar, 
1997:5).  
 
Taken together, therefore, foedus and fides represent an agreement that has 
been freely entered into or consented to, whereby each party to the agreement or 
contact gives up some degree of autonomy in return for some advantage.  
 
Federalism is an ideology that combines shared rule with self-rule (Sindani, 
1999:18). Examples of federal states or countries are the United States of 
America (USA), Canada, India, Ethiopia and Nigeria. 
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3.2.2 Confederation 
 
In a confederation, several pre-existing polities join together to form a common 
government for strictly limited purposes, usually foreign affairs and defence, and, 
more recently, economics, which remains dependent upon its constituent polities 
in critical ways, and must work through them (Elazar, 1997: XVI).  
 
According to Sindani (1999:24) confederations are an arrangement of separate 
countries that form a common government for certain limited purposes such as 
trade. The common government is dependent on the constituent government that 
retains a large measure of sovereignty. Examples of a confederation include the 
European Union and the Association of the South East Asian Nations. 
 
3.2.3 Unions 
 
A union is a polity compounded in such a way that its constituent entities 
preserve their respective integrities primarily or exclusively through the common 
organs of the general government rather than through dual government 
structures (Elazar, 1997:XIV).  
 
An example of a union is the United Kingdom, which is a legislative union with 
Scotland, Wales, England and Northern Ireland (Ulster). The autonomy of such 
countries can always be withdrawn by the central government. A union is also 
referred as a group of countries or states with the same central government.  
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3.2.4 Unitary 
 
The Oxford Dictionary (1989:78) defines “unitary” in generic terms as “of or 
pertaining to, characterised by, based upon, or directed towards unity”. Unity 
must be distinguished from union which is a condition for the establishment of a 
federation. As a political application, although not frequently used, the word 
“unitary” may refer to the form of state (government), (Napier, 1997:32). Some 
examples of unitary states include Botswana, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Mozambique 
and Mauritius.  
 
3.3 ANALYSING FEDERAL SYSTEMS 
 
3.3.1 Written Constitution 
 
Every existing federal system possessing a written constitution should by itself 
demonstrate the importance of written constitutions in federal systems (Sindani, 
1999:26). Most federal scholars regard written constitutions as the first 
requirement of a federal system, even though this idea is vague, because there 
are various unitary states which believe that a written constitution is a vital step 
towards the establishment of a unitary state.  
 
However, Elazar (1997:157) is of the opinion that a written constitution is a 
product of federalism. This is linked with the fact that the relationship that must 
be established or confirmed in a federal system must be established through a 
perpetual compact of a union, usually, if not inevitably, embodied in a written 
constitution. The importance of a written constitution is to specify the division of 
authority between the central government and its constituent units.  
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A written constitution is necessitated by the need to outline the terms of power 
division and power sharing and the need to ensure that the relevant terms will not 
be unilaterally altered by any of the established spheres of government (Sindani, 
1999: 27). The supremacy of a constitution means that the constitution, and not 
legislation by parliament, is the supreme law. In some instances this view is 
confusing.  
 
3.3.2 Judicial arbitration 
 
Judicial arbitration is another element to which many proponents of federalism 
attach great importance. It derives its importance from the necessity to have a 
guardian of the constitutional division of power and an independent interpretation 
of the supreme constitution, in the event of a dispute over the constitutionality of 
constituent units within a federal government (Napier, 1997:18). Furthermore, all 
countries with federal systems have chosen the option of judicial arbitration. 
Institutions of judicial arbitration vary from country to country.  
 
For instance, the ‘last word’ in Canada regarding constitutional disputes, lies with 
the Supreme Court, in Australia with the High Court, in the USA with the 
Supreme Court, in Switzerland with the Federal Tribunal, and in India, Latin 
America and Malaysia with the Constitutional Court (Sindani, 1999:28). In South 
Africa the latter is applicable, although the Constitution does not describe South 
Africa as a federal state.  
 
Several federal countries allow their constituent units to write their own 
constitutions. This arrangement is similar to what exists in South Africa, although 
South Africa is not a federal state. These include countries such as the USA, 
Switzerland and Germany. The only condition is that the constituent units adhere 
to a republican form of government (Sindani, 1999:30). 
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According to De Villiers (1996:14), in countries such as India, Canada, Belgium 
and Nigeria, the constituent units do not have a right to write their own 
constitution. In South Africa, provinces have the right to write their own 
constitutions as long as they do not infringe the National Constitution. Federalists 
generally argue that federation function is a form of empowerment.  
 
In effect, it creates the opportunity for regional voices to be heard, and within 
multi-ethnic federations enables ethno-regional groupings more opportunities for 
negotiating the territorial distribution of power and more representative 
institutions. Canada, for example, has a single legal system jointly administered 
by the Federal Government and the provinces. The Canadian Constitution of 
1982 grants the provinces the power to establish courts in civil and criminal 
matters.  
 
The administration of justice, in the first instance, is also a provincial 
responsibility, giving the office of the provincial Attorney-General the power to 
prosecute criminal behaviour under the Canadian Criminal Code of 1982, and the 
overall responsibility for the administration of the judicial hierarchy within the 
province, with a provincial supreme court on top (Elazar, 1997:62).  
 
As for law enforcement machinery, only the provinces of Ontario and Quebec 
have their own separate police forces. All other provinces and territories engage 
the service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Local law enforcement is in 
the hands of the local police. Quebec narrowly lost the vote to secede from 
Canada, and the prospects of an independent French province were shattered. 
Yet, the target of Quebec's nationalists is not the United States, but rather 
Canadian federalism or its symbolic equivalent; the so-called “English-Canada” 
(De Villiers, 1996:144).  
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This idea of trying to establish an independent “Volkstaat” (an independent state 
within a state) is one of the problems facing federal countries of the world. Other 
examples include: the Biafran in Nigeria, the Kashmir in India and more recently 
KwaZulu-Natal just before the April 1994 elections (Holiday, 1996:5). 
 
3.3.3 Prerequisites for federal associations 
 
When separate states or communities want to unite on a federal basis, there are 
two basic considerations, apart from the particular circumstances which prompt 
this desire that must be present. According to Kriek (1992:16), there must firstly 
be a strong need and desire to shoulder common interests jointly. Secondly, 
there must be an equally strong need and desire to shoulder domestic interests 
separately.  
 
These two factors are so basic that if the first one does not exist, an association 
will not arise, and if the second one does not exist, something other than a 
federation will emerge. However, various writers express different views in this 
connection. The most significant views are those of Wheare (1963:35-52), such 
as: a feeling of military uncertainty with a consequent need for common defence; 
a common need to act independently of foreign powers; the expectation of 
greater economic advantages from such an association; the existence of one or 
other joint political associations in the past; geographical proximity; and, the 
existence of similar political institutions.  
 
It is clear that federalism or unitarism have nothing to do with the type of criminal 
justice system. Each country is at liberty to implement what is deemed to be 
good for that particular country.  
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3.4 UNITARY OR CENTRALISED STATES 
 
The word ‘unitary’ is used in conjunction with the word ‘state’. A state is defined 
as having a geographic territory extending over a large or small area, a large or 
small population, and having sovereignty - that is, having a political organisation 
and the capacity to make, change and enforce laws (Napier, 1997:32).  
 
‘Unitary’ on the other hand, refers to the constitutional form within the geographic 
state, and it may also be used in conjunction with the constitution when it is taken 
to refer to the actual document establishing institutions and regulating 
relationships (Napier, 1997:32). In terms of this understanding, there are two 
essential qualities of a unitary state and unitary constitution.  
 
The central government or authority must be supreme and there must be an 
absence of subsidiary sovereign bodies. Unitary states should not be equated 
with unitarists. The word unitarist can similarly refer to one advocating, promoting 
or directed towards national unity, union, or centralisation in government and 
administration (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989:77). 
 
In order to make and enforce laws, the state has a supreme authority which is 
referred to as government. Government is that organisation in which authority is 
vested, and which has the right to exercise sovereign powers (Napier, 1997:38). 
A government must also have military power or control over the armed forces, 
legislative power, and the power to tax and spend revenue. 
 
Central authorities or governments can consist of a number of different 
structures, each performing different functions (Napier, 1997:38). Power can be 
highly centralised or decentralised for a state to qualify as unitary.  
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3.5 IS SOUTH AFRICA A FEDERAL OR UNITARY STATE? 
 
3.5.1 The period 1854-1890 
 
The question whether unitarism or federalism is good for African governments is 
a difficult one. In South Africa a federation was regarded by the British 
Government or its representatives as the best possible solution for the region. In 
1854 Sir George Grey, who had come from New Zealand, was appointed 
Governor of the Cape Colony.  
 
He struggled for eight years to establish a federal constitution, although his ideas 
failed as a result of a combination of several factors, including the policy of the 
British Government and the absence of a central driving force (Kriek, 1992:122). 
 
3.5.2 Rhodes’ and Milner’s ideas 
 
The discovery of gold in the Transvaal and the resultant economic boom led 
Rhodes to believe that the Transvaal should be entrusted to more docile hands 
and should be incorporated in a federation under the Union Jack. The plot which 
became known as the Jameson Raid was a failure.  
 
The attempt to coerce the Transvaal by force of arms to enter into a federation 
therefore failed (Kriek, 1992:28). In 1905 Lord Milner also tried to establish a 
closer cooperation among the different regions, including the Boer Republics, but 
this came to naught as well. 
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3.5.3 The National Convention of 1908-1909 
 
Before the National Convention started, proposals in favour of a federation and 
those in favour of a strong unitary state were circulated among various 
Republics. By the time the National Convention finally ‘kicked off’, the argument 
in favour of a union gained momentum and it became clear that South Africa 
needed a strong and supreme parliament to draw together and unite the Whites 
(Holiday, 1991:7).  
 
At the end of the Convention there was no winner, because the idea of a pure 
union and the idea of a pure federation were never achieved. This led to a 
compromise among the delegates, and many regarded the constitutional system 
established in South Africa by the National Convention as a worthless exercise. 
 
3.5.4 Race Federation in South Africa 
 
The period 1934 to 1939 marked the birth of the United Party. When General 
Hertzog came to power, he began implementing his racial segregation policy 
when he introduced the so-called “native laws”. These laws made the social, 
political and economic segregation of races the official government policy (Kriek, 
1992:150).  
 
This was interpreted by many as the United Party’s race federation. Between 
1961 and 1991, political parties such as the Progressive Party, the Progressive 
Reform Party, the Labour Party, the Federal Party, the Democratic Party, the 
National Party as well as the Inkatha Freedom Party advocated federalism as the 
best option for South Africa (Kriek , 1992:150). 
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3.5.5 The new South Africa: why South Africa is not a federal state 
 
When the then state president F W De Klerk released Nelson Mandela and other 
political prisoners in 1990, South Africa took a new political direction. This was 
followed by the unbanning of political parties such as the ANC, PAC, AZAPO as 
well as the UDF (Kriek, 1992:272). This new political dispensation paved the way 
for negotiations for the future of South Africa. 
 
When negotiations started, two aspects came to the picture, namely, a federal 
state and a unitary state. The then ruling National Party pushed for a federal 
state whilst the ANC and its partners pushed for a strong unitary state which 
could unify South Africa by incorporating the bantustans (self-governing states 
and the so-called independent states).  
 
The events in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the former 
Yugoslavia added more value to the ANC’s argument not to favour a federation. 
The debates continued until a compromise was reached where a system was 
adopted which consisted of federal characters and unitary characters. 
 
This compromise led to the establishment of the Transitional Executive Council 
(TEC) and the passing of the Interim Constitution which was adopted on 27 April 
1994. Since 1994, after the first democratic elections, South Africa has been a 
country which has strong federal and unitary characteristics. 
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3.5.6 South Africa today 
 
Since the adoption of the Interim Constitution as well as the final Constitution, 
South Africa subscribes to the Tres Politica concept. The Constitution divides the 
government institutions into the legislative authority, the executive authority and 
the judiciary. Each of these institutions has clear functions as stipulated by the 
Constitution.  
 
In terms of sections 165 and 166 of the Constitution, parliament is the legislative 
authority entrusted with the law-making function, whereas the executive executes 
the laws and the judiciary adjudicates the disputes. The sovereignty of 
Parliament has been abolished, and now the Constitution is the supreme law of 
the land. The judicial authority of the Republic is vested in the courts.  
 
The courts are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, 
which they must apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice. Organs of 
state, through legislative and other measures, must assist and protect the courts 
to ensure the independence, impartiality, dignity, acceptability and effectiveness 
of the courts.  
 
3.6 THE CONFUSION ABOUT THE PROPER DEFINITION OF THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
Criminal Justice System is a system of law enforcement, the bar, the judiciary, 
corrections and probation that is directly involved in the apprehension, 
prosecution; defence, sentencing, incarceration, and supervision of those 
suspected of or charged with criminal offences (http://www.answers.com).  
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According to Chamelin, Fox and Whisenand (1999:1), 
the criminal justice system is, in reality if not in appearance, a 
system. A system is a series of component parts that possess 
common interrelationships. You are most likely to accept the 
criminal justice system as a system if you recognize that society is 
in a process of imposing the system concept on an existing criminal 
justice apparatus that for years has been loosely tied together. 
 
This definition is in line with the notion that statutes are enforced by various 
government agencies including the police, prosecution, court and post-
adjudication process (which refers to imprisonment). This means that the state 
has a legal obligation to prevent criminal behaviour, reduce crime, apprehend 
and arrest offenders, protect life and property and regulate criminal conduct. 
These are functions of the law enforcement agencies. 
 
In South Africa these functions are almost similar to those that are listed in 
section 205 (3) of the Constitution, namely, “to prevent, combat and investigate 
crime, to maintain public order, to protect and secure the inhabitants of the 
Republic and their property, and to uphold and enforce the law”. Cilliers et al. 
(1999:3) indicate that in addition to the law enforcement agencies, the 
components of the criminal justice system include the courts and the correctional 
services.  
 
They add that the functions of the courts are to protect the rights of the accused, 
to determine by all available legal means whether a person is guilty of a crime, to 
dispose properly of those convicted of crimes, to protect society and to prevent 
and reduce criminal behaviour. In addition to this, the functions of the correctional 
services are to maintain institutions, to protect law abiding members of society, to 
reform offenders and to deter crimes (Cilliers et al., 1999:5).  
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However, these authors do not mention the role of the prosecution which is an 
integral part of the Criminal Justice System. In reality it is practically impossible to 
have the police, the courts and the correctional services without the prosecution 
agency. On the other hand, Cilliers et al. (1999:41), list the components of the 
South African Criminal Justice System as the law enforcement component, 
prosecution component, court component, and correctional component. If the 
views raised by Cilliers et al. (1999:3), and those outlined by the authors on page 
41, are compared, conflicting explanations of the meaning and functions of the 
Criminal Justice System arise. 
 
To add to the confusion, Nesser, Van der Hoven and Maree and Swart 
(2001:118), outline role-players in the Criminal Justice System as: the courts, the 
director of public prosecution, the state prosecutor and the presiding officer. The 
researcher is of the opinion that this explanation/outline is that these institutions 
should have been referred to as role-players in the prosecution of crime and not 
role-players in the Criminal Justice System.  
 
Although, this is also not complete, because one cannot prosecute crime without 
the presence of the police. Maree and Swart (in Nesser et al., 2001:146) focus 
on the police and the correctional services as role-players in the Criminal Justice 
System. The National Crime Prevention Strategy of 1996 lists institutions within 
the South African Criminal Justice System as police, courts, justice, prosecution, 
correctional services and the Department of Social Welfare.  
 
Therefore, with all these various explanations of the Criminal Justice Systems, it 
has become clearer to the researcher why South Africa does not have a proper 
definition of the Criminal Justice System. This is a recipe for confusion and 
disaster. 
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3.7 THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE 
 
In 1910 the Union Constitution (an Act of the Imperial Parliament) was passed by 
the British Parliament, and proclaimed the Union of South Africa. Section 59 (1) 
of the South Africa Act prescribed that the parliament was the sovereign 
legislative authority in South Africa. In terms of this arrangement, the police, the 
prosecution, the courts and the correctional services (prisons) reported to one 
minister, namely, the Minister of Justice.  
 
According to section 1 of the Police Act and section 1 of the Prisons Service Act, 
the “Minister” referred to is the Minister of Justice, and the powers of the police 
were located in section 7 of the Police Act. At that stage the criminal justice 
institutions, namely the police, the prison services and the prosecutions were 
directorates of the Department of Justice. During this time the parliament was still 
supreme (htt://www.answers.com). 
 
Parliamentary sovereignty contrasts with most notions of judicial review, where a 
court may overturn legislation deemed unconstitutional. Parliamentary 
supremacy continued to exist even after until South Africa became a democratic 
state in April 1994. 
 
3.7.1 The De Witt Commission  
 
The South African Police has undergone various forms of transformation since its 
formation in 1914. From being a British Union Police to a Republican Police 
force. All these changes had an impact in the total transformation from a police 
force to a police service respected and accepted by the people of South Africa.  
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However, in the mid-1980s the South African Police realised that it was 
necessary to undergo transformation. In 1988 the De Witt Commission was 
established to conduct an investigation into the restructuring of the police. The 
major recommendations of the De Witt Commission centered on the 
decentralisation programme of the police. This restructuring was also motivated 
by changes to the political environment which followed the then State President 
FW de Klerk’s landmark speech on 2 February 1990 (Rauch, 1991:18).  
 
These changes, which took place in August 1991, were aimed at improving 
police community relations by improving the SAPS’ image, service and 
organisational efficiency. The changes brought by the Commission need to be 
understood as responses to the profound crisis of legitimacy which the police 
continued to experience. One landmark recommendation of the Commission was 
the merging of the Security Branch with the Detective Service to form the Crime 
Combating and Investigation Division (De Witt Commission, 1988:50).  
 
However, a major stumbling block to these recommendations was the rigid 
hierarchies and militaristic style of policing which continued to ‘derail’ real 
improvements in the service delivery. Therefore, changes in police or any 
government department is not something new in South Africa. However, it is 
important that change or restructuring has a purpose and a goal to be achieved. 
 
3.7.2 The National Peace Accord 
 
The National Peace Accord was a multiparty agreement created in September 
1991 to address high levels of political violence in the early transition period. The 
Peace Accord introduced a range of structures and procedures to prevent and 
deal with inter-group conflict. Many of these structures and procedures focused 
on policing.  
 57
It was suggested that a “police board”, made up of equal numbers of police 
generals and civilian experts on policing matters, nominated by the signatory 
parties to the Peace Accord, be established. The board was to advise the 
Minister of Law and Order on policy matters (http://www.answers.com).  
 
A code of conduct for the police was drafted in order to reduce police 
misconduct. This led the parties to engage in further negotiations, which led to 
the proposal to establish a statutory body to be called the “Independent 
Complaints Directorate.” This was realised when the Interim Constitution and the 
new South African Police Service Act were promulgated. These changes had a 
great effect on crime investigation, especially the use of torture as an 
investigation method. 
 
3.7.3 The Interim Constitution Act 200 of 1993 
 
On 27 April 1994 (Election Day) the Interim Constitution was adopted, and its 
main purpose was to introduce a new Constitution for the Republic of South 
Africa and to provide for matters incidental thereto. The most important chapters 
of this Constitution, for the purpose of this discussion, were: Chapters 3, 7 and 
14. Chapter 3 dealt with human rights, especially the rights of the accused, the 
arrested and the detained.  
 
This chapter played a major role in the functioning of the police. One needs to 
highlight that the issue of human rights was one of the burning issues during the 
signing of the National Peace Accord in September 1991, hence sections dealing 
with the rights of the accused, the arrested and the detained were taken from the 
National Peace Accord (http://www.answers.com).  
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Chapter 7 dealt with the administration of justice, including the roles of various 
courts and the establishment of the Constitutional Court which would then 
become the highest court of the land. Chapter 14 dealt with matters relating to 
the police and the Defence Force. The most important milestone in policing in 
South Africa was brought about by section 221 which provided that:  
 
(1) the Act in section 214 (1) shall provide for the establishment of 
community-police forums in respect of police stations; (2) The 
functions of community-police forums referred to in subsection (1) 
may include the promotion of accountability of the Service to local 
communities and co-operation of communities with the Service; the 
monitoring of the effectiveness and efficiency of the Service; 
advising the Service regarding local policing priorities; the 
evaluation of the provision of visible police services, including the 
provision, sitting and staffing of police stations; the reception and 
processing of complaints and charges; the provision of protective 
services at gatherings; the patrolling of residential and business 
areas; the prosecution of offenders; and requesting enquiries into 
policing matters in the locality concerned. 
 
3.7.4 Structural amalgamation of different policing agencies 
 
Prior to 1995, South Africa was divided into the so-called TBVC States (Transkei, 
Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei), Self-Governing Territories (homelands) and 
Development Regions or “old” South Africa. The TBVC States had independent 
status but were not widely recognised by the international community. The Self-
Governing Territories were also referred to as Homelands and included: 
Gazankulu, Kangwane, Kwandebele, Kwazulu, Lebowa and Qwaqwa.  
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Every homeland had its own policing agency, bringing the total number of 
policing agencies in the country to eleven (six homelands, four TBVC states and 
the old South African Police). All eleven policing agencies had different uniforms, 
rank structures and conditions of service, and were established under different 
pieces of legislation (http://www.answers.com). With the adoption of the Interim 
Constitution in 1994, the Homelands, TBVC states and old development regions 
were abolished and integrated into a united South Africa with nine provinces.  
 
The new Constitution established a single National Police Service for South 
Africa under the executive command and control of a National Commissioner 
appointed by the President (http://www.en.wikepedia.org). On 1 December 1995, 
the South African Police Service Act was promulgated. The Act paved the way 
for the amalgamation of the eleven police agencies and non-statutory forces from 
uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the armed wing of the ANC and the Azanian People’s 
Liberation Army (APLA)-the Pan African Congress (PAC) armed wing 
(http://www.saps.gov.za).  
 
In addition to the above innovations, Chapter 10 of the Act made provision for the 
establishment of a Civilian Oversight with a mandate to investigate deaths in 
police custody and police ill-treatment of suspects. Furthermore, the SAPS Act 
also made provision in section 16 with regard to the investigation of organised 
crime activities, including: circumstances amounting to criminal conduct or an 
endeavour thereto, as set out in subsection (2), shall be regarded as organised 
crime, crime which requires national prevention or investigation, or crime which 
requires specialised skills in the prevention and investigation thereof. 
Circumstances contemplated in subsection (1) comprise criminal conduct or 
endeavour thereto by any enterprise or group of persons who have a common 
goal in committing crimes in an organised manner. 
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3.7.5 Independent control of the police  
 
During the drafting of the National Peace Accord, one of the most significant 
contributions that was made in terms of policing was to “create new procedures 
for the handling of actual or potential political violence, and to introduce the 
notions of independent monitoring of police action and of multi-agency problem-
solving”. This proposal was carried and inserted into the Interim Constitution as 
well as into Chapter 10 of the South African Police Service Act.  
 
The Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) was established in April 1996. In 
terms of section 53 of the South African Police Service Act, the functions of 
directorate are: [The principal function of the directorate shall be the achievement 
of the object contemplated in section 222 of the Constitution. The Executive 
Director shall be responsible for the performance of the functions of the 
directorate and the management and administration of the directorate]. 
 
 In order to achieve its objects, the directorate may mero-motu or upon receipt of 
a complaint, investigate any misconduct or offence allegedly committed by any 
member, and may, where appropriate, refer such investigation to the police 
action; and shall mero-motu or upon receipt of a complaint, investigate any death 
in police custody or as a result of police action; and may investigate any matter 
referred to the directorate by the Minister or the member of the Executive Council 
(http://www.icd.org.za). As it stands at the moment, the ICD’s mandate covers 
the Police and the Metro Police/Municipal Police agencies. Therefore, institutions 
such as the DSO, the Asset Forfeiture Unit, the Special Investigating Unit and the 
Departmental Investigation Unit of the Department of Correctional Services are 
excluded. The danger is that these institutions that are not covered by the ICD 
may abuse their powers and there is no one who can police them. 
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3.7.6 The Constitutional mandate of the South African Police Service 
 
Section 205 (1) (2) (3) of the Constitution deals with the establishment of the 
police and provides the functions or objects of the police as follows: “to prevent, 
combat and investigate crime, to maintain public order, to protect and secure the 
inhabitants of the Republic and their property, and uphold and enforce the law”. 
From section 205 (3) it is clear that the police have an inherent Constitutional 
function or responsibility to fight crime. 
 
Furthermore, the Constitution places a safety valve where, if the police fail to 
discharge their duties, they will be subject to public scrutiny. However, the 
Constitution fails to indicate that the police have the “exclusive rights” to fight 
crime.  
 
On the other hand, the Constitution does not mention that here shall be other 
agencies or law enforcement agencies that will investigate, combat and enforce 
the law. This gap might be the reason the government has established various 
law enforcement agencies such as the DSO, SIU, DIU and AFU which do not 
conform to the Constitutional prescripts.  
 
From a former police official’s point of view, it is the researcher’s submission that 
the police are recognised by the Constitution, which is the supreme law of the 
land. This is an indication that the SAPS is the only recognised institution which 
has constitutional powers to fight crime, because none of the above institutions 
are covered anywhere in the Constitution (Bukurura, 1995:5).  
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3.7.7 The Bill of Rights 
 
The Bill of Rights contains detailed provisions concerning civil, political, social 
and economic rights. These rights are subject to limitations set out in section 36, 
which stipulates that limits on rights must be reasonable and must have an 
important objective.  
 
Limits should also be "less restrictive." Security of the person and a "right to 
freedom" in section 12 are defined broadly as including a right to trial, freedom 
from cruel and unusual punishment, psychological security, reproductive control, 
and rights against forced scientific experiments (De Waal, Currie, & Erasmus, 
2001:6).  
 
Before 1994, effective protection of human rights through the courts was virtually 
impossible. Constitutional law was dominated by the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty. According to this doctrine, Parliament could make any law it wished 
and no person or institution, including the courts, could challenge the laws of 
Parliament.  
 
This doctrine came from Britain where parliamentary sovereignty can be justified 
by the fact that the parliament is the representative of the branch of the State and 
it derives its power from the electorate (De Waal et al., 2001:6).  
 
South Africa had been an undemocratic state since the Union Constitution was 
established in 1909, which excluded the Black majority from their right to vote. 
This has been the opposite of what was practised in Britain where parliamentary 
sovereignty originated (De Waal et al., 2001:6).  
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3.7.7.1 Constitutionalism 
 
Constitutionalism is the idea that the government should derive its powers from a 
written constitution and that its powers should be limited to those set out in the 
constitution (De Waal et al., 2001:7). The fundamental problem that is addressed 
by the writing of a constitution is to establish a government with enough power to 
govern but where that power is structured and controlled in such a way as to 
prevent it being used oppressively.  
 
Furthermore, constitutional supremacy dictates that the rules of the Constitution 
are binding on all branches of the government and have priority over any other 
rules made by the government. “Any law or conduct that is in conflict or is not in 
line with the Constitution will therefore not have force of the law” (De Waal et al., 
2001:8). Section 2 of the Constitution gives expression to the principle of 
constitutional supremacy.  
 
3.7.7.2 The rule of law 
 
The rule of law is entrenched in section 1 of the Constitution. The purpose of the 
rule of law is to protect basic individual rights by requiring the government to act 
in accordance with pre-announced clear and general rules that are enforced by 
impartial courts in accordance with fair procedures. This means that the 
“branches of the state must obey the law and that the state cannot exercise 
power over anyone unless the law authorises the state to do so” (De Waal et al., 
2001:0). This expression is important to the current situation in South Africa. The 
Prevention of Organised Crime Act is silent as to which state institutions must 
investigate and seize assets which are deemed to be proceeds of crime, yet the 
SAPS, the DSO and the AFU use this piece of legislation to conduct their 
business.  
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As for the police, one would understand their actions because they are 
constitutionally bound by section 205 (3) of the Constitution, to deal with crime. 
As for the AFU, DSO, SIU and the DIU, the Constitution does not mention them. 
If this is the situation in South Africa, one tends to ask: Where is the rule of law in 
South Africa? Therefore, one can assume that the AFU, DSO, SIU and the DIU 
are actually performing unlawful functions, something the South African 
Constitution cannot permit.  
 
The behaviour of the DSO in the case of Jacob Zuma is a classical example of 
the lack of a rule of law, where documents were seized from his legal 
representative’s office, thus violating the privilege between a client and his legal 
representative.  
 
3.7.7.3 Democracy and accountability 
 
Apart from observing the rule of law, the Constitution also requires the 
government to respect the principle of democracy. The principle of democracy is 
referred to in several places in the Constitution. Indeed, section 1 of the 
Constitution provides that the Republic of South Africa is one sovereign, 
democratic state, founded on, inter alia, the value of “universal adult suffrage, a 
national common voter’s roll, regular elections and a multi-party system of 
democratic government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness” 
(De Waal et al., 2001:20).  
 
The current state of affairs in South Africa, where the DSO, AFU, SIU and the 
DIU are not subject to any public scrutiny, leaves much to be desired. 
Accountability is one of the most important building blocks in democratic society. 
Section 205 of the Constitution and the South African Police Service Act provide 
clear mechanisms for police accountability.  
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3.7.7.4 Separation of powers and checks and balances 
 
The doctrine of separation of powers requires the functions of the government to 
be classified as legislative, executive or judicial, and that each separate function 
is performed by separate branches of government (De Waal et al., 2001:20). This 
means that the functions of making laws, executing the law and resolving 
disputes through the application of the law, should be kept separate, and, in 
principle, they should be performed by different institutions and persons. The 
purpose of separating functions and personnel in this manner is to prevent the 
excessive concentration of power in a single person or body. 
 
The history of South Africa shows that between 1910 and1983 the police and the 
prisons were both entities of the Department of Justice, including the Attorney 
General’s Office (Heymans, 2006). This was abolished when the police was 
given its ministry of police which later became the Minister of Law and Order in 
1983, after the Potgieter Commission of Inquiry of 1972 recommended a 
rationalisation of security forces (Heymans, 2006).  
 
However, this arrangement did not subscribe to the principle of separation of 
powers, because the prisons were still part of the Department of Justice until the 
Ministry of Correctional Services was established in 1994. Nevertheless, this 
arrangement did not solve the lack of the separation of powers in South Africa, 
because the DSO and AFU are part of the NPA which reports to the Department 
of Justice and Constitutional Development. Therefore, it is clear that the current 
government did identify the issue of the separation of powers; hence the 1996 
Constitution was established. However, the establishment of the Scorpions, DIU, 
SIU and AFU is a clear indication of defeating the intention of creating a distinct 
constitutional state with clear separation of powers. 
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3.7.7.5 Sections 33 and 35 of the Constitution 
 
There are two fundamental aspects that are addressed by sections 33 (1) and 
(2), namely, that “everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair”, including the mechanism for everyone whose 
rights are affected by the administrative action. Now that the mandate and 
powers of the DSO, AFU, SIU and the DIU are not spelt out anywhere in the 
Constitution, is this not a creation of institutions whose functions are an indirect 
violation of section 33?  
 
Currently there is no provision where if any of the four institutions violates 
individual rights, such an individual may obtain recourse. The fact that there is no 
oversight over these bodies is an indication that such institutions are given super-
powers and such powers are vulnerable to abuse. Section 35 deals with the 
rights of the “arrested, detained and accused persons”. From the literal meaning 
of this section, the “arrested, detained and accused persons” refers to the people 
in the custody of the police.  
 
If one considers the fact that the Constitution was adopted in 1996 after the 
police service was formally established in 1995, but before the establishment of 
the AFU, SIU, DSO and the DIU, it is an indication that this section refers to the 
rights that have been infringed by the police. (The DSO, the AFU and the SIU 
have no detention centres). However, section 35 is vaguely formulated in that it 
does not specify or define what is meant by “arrested, detained and accused”. 
Therefore, this section is open to different interpretations.  
 
For example, section 35 (3) © states that “every accused person has a right to a 
fair trial, which includes the right to a public trial before an ordinary court”. The 
SIU uses a Special Tribunal which is based in East London.  
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This court is not an ordinary court as it is referred to in section 35 (3). The 
provision of the Special Tribunal is contained in the Special Investigation and 
Tribunals Act. This arrangement is an indication that the SIU is player and 
referee at the same time. This may lead to serious violations of individual rights 
in relation to the notion of a “fair trial”. 
 
3.7.8 The National Crime Prevention Strategy of 1996 
 
The National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) was adopted by Cabinet in May 
1996. Since then, the NCPS has moved a long way from being a strategic 
document to an operational programme. Various structures and processes have 
been put in place to make the NCPS a reality.  
 
The Department of Safety and Security was assigned, by Cabinet, the role of 
coordinating other departments. The growing weakness of the Criminal Justice 
System has not escaped Government intervention. The National Crime 
Prevention Strategy (NCPS) has, as its central task the bringing together of 
departments involved in crime control and prevention and the coordination of 
their activities.  
 
The development of the strategy involved six core government departments: 
Department of Correctional Services, Department of Defence, National 
Intelligence Agency, Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, 
Department of Safety and Security, and Department of Social Welfare. This is in 
itself an important development, representing a holistic (as opposed to sectoral) 
approach to crime prevention, which has been lacking. What is also clear from 
the document is the reorientation of the intelligence community, which now 
assumes an increased crime combating role for specific types of crime. 
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At a different level, the strategy indicates another significant shift in the discourse 
on safety and security in South Africa. The focus changed from 'community 
policing' (which is barely mentioned in the document) to 'crime prevention' and 
the building of 'partnerships', both between government agencies and with 
outside organisations in business and civil society, in an effort to stem the tide of 
crime. 
 
The document provides a detailed analysis of reasons for the growth of crime in 
the country - seen (correctly) as a complex intermeshing of a diversity of factors - 
and outlines steps under way in various government departments to counter 
crime. Outside of the repair of the criminal justice process, three key issues - 
environmental design, education and transnational crime - are identified as being 
critical areas for intervention to reduce crime. 
 
In addition, the strategy lays down seventeen nationally driven programmes to be 
implemented. These are diverse, ranging from the improvement of information 
systems (poor information transfer is at the heart of the system's problems), 
victim empowerment and support, and mechanisms to counter organised crime. 
What seems notably absent from the list of new programme is specific preventive 
strategies related to drug use, the proliferation of small arms and the gang 
problem in certain parts of the country. 
 
While all are covered either directly or indirectly within various sections of the 
document, it would be well worth consolidating current initiatives and developing 
specific strategies to form two or three additional (and high profile) prevention 
programmes. These areas are of increasing concern, given that they hold the 
potential to spawn wider forms of criminality. 
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The issue of increasing drug usage, for instance, is a critical one. Government 
response to the drug problem has historically been fragmented and poorly 
funded with no coordination between reactive and proactive programmes. What 
needs to be explored is the establishment of a law enforcement body, separate 
from the current police and intelligence structures that would provide leadership 
in the areas of prevention and enforcement. 
 
Equally, while the NCPS calls for more research into expenditure on private 
security, no special initiative is identified to allow an in-depth investigation of the 
industry and its role (if any) in crime prevention. The key to the success of the 
strategy is coordination. Without this, it simply becomes a reflection of a wide 
variety of programmes which may eventually, in any event, have occurred in one 
form or other. A related problem with such a large and complex initiative is that it 
is virtually immune to measurement at a national level. There is a danger that 
success will simply be equated with a flurry of activity rather than any real 
decreases in crime. 
 
Given the number of players involved, the complexity of the strategy should not 
be underestimated. Apart from, and in conjunction with, the seventeen 
programmes initiated through the strategy, there are various initiatives in line 
function departments and the seeking of partnerships with outsiders.  
 
While the document makes allowance for monitoring at departmental and 
programme level, the extent to which the whole enterprise will be subject to 
review is not clear. It would be inappropriate, in the light of the difficulties in 
interpreting crime statistics, to suggest that the crime rates should be cut by a 
given percentage by the year 2000. Realistic programme deliverables need to be 
outlined more clearly.  
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It is thus of concern that the strategy - despite the fact that it is a framework for 
implementation - contains virtually no time frames for the completion of the 
various programmes, although in some cases it appears that these will still be 
determined. The success of the strategy is critical. Failure will bring growing 
disillusionment with conceptions of proactive crime prevention which is central to 
the long term solution of disorder in South African society.  
 
Instead, there will be a continued growth in reactive, self-help and increasingly 
violent solutions to crime. The NCPS also fails to indicate the establishment of 
investigative institutions/agencies such as the Special Investigating Unit, the 
Departmental Investigating Unit, the Asset Forfeiture Unit and the Directorate of 
Special Operations. 
 
3.7.9 The de-specialisation of the SAPS’s investigative units 
 
3.7.9.1 Rationale for reorganisation 
 
In January 2001 the SAPS announced that the specialised units as they existed 
at the time would be dissolved. This was done in accordance with government’s 
strategy to have an integrated approach to fighting crime. In addition, the 
National Commissioner of the SAPS was reported as saying that the police’s 
capacity to deal with organised crime syndicates should be coordinated in an 
integrated manner (Maistry & Redpath, 2001:12).  
 
Furthermore, there was a feeling that local police stations should be empowered 
to effect expert policing. This would ensure that serious and violent crime was 
adequately addressed by those with the necessary expertise.  
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Moreover, it was felt that by dissolving the specialised units the police would be 
able to address the crime phenomenon more effectively. The intention with the 
dissolution of the specialised units was to create more generalists than 
specialists.  
 
A key motivation underlying the restructuring is that it provided an opportunity for 
removing detectives who were under-performing, from the specialised units. Part 
of the problem with specialised units is that given the nature of detective work, it 
was relatively easy for under-performing and under-motivated detectives to 
operate at sub-optimal level and escape unnoticed (Maistry & Redpath, 2001:13). 
 
3.7.9.2 Transfer of skills to station level 
 
A major theme of the official motivation for redeploying detectives at station level 
is that a large volume of skills would be transferred to station level. With the 
uncontrolled proliferation of units across the country, eventually amounting to 503 
such units, more and more detectives were lost to police stations. Very often 
these were the most skilled persons (Maistry & Redpath, 2001:13). With more 
detectives now based at station level, it is envisaged that detectives will be able 
to arrive at a crime scene sooner than was possible in the past. 
 
Where units were located some distance from stations, very often some time 
would pass before a docket ended up in the hands of a unit. There is some 
optimism that there will be a sharing of skills and expertise at station level. It is 
hoped that existing station level detectives will benefit from the expertise and 
experience of their colleagues who were previously based at specialised units. 
(Maistry & Redpath 2001:13). 
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More importantly, there is an expectation that crimes investigated at station level 
will be more thoroughly investigated, and ultimately the conviction rate will 
improve, given the added capacity. In this way the community living in that police 
station area may reap the benefits of the dissolution and concomitant re-
organisation of the specialised units.  
 
3.7.9.3 Reduction in administrative costs 
 
Prior to restructuring, a ratio of just over two police stations for every specialised 
unit existed. Each unit had its own office, its own administrative staff and its own 
vehicles and equipment. Clearly, a large amount of unnecessary duplication of 
resources and administrative costs resulted (Maistry & Redpath, 2001:13). This 
was particularly so in the case of small units consisting of fewer than ten 
persons. These resources were to be redistributed to station level, further 
boosting the capacity of police stations.  
 
It is clear from the SAPS strategy that a multi-skilled team approach to 
investigations would yield better results. Similarly, it is rather too early to assess 
whether or not investigators from specialised units transferred to station level 
have made a significant contribution to the success rate (Maistry & Redpath, 
2001:15). It is clear that the transformation of the police has brought different 
results, both positive and negative.  
 
From the researcher’s point of view, it was good to close the security branch and 
integrate it to the intelligence structures. It was also good to bring the culture of 
human rights and police civilian oversight to the SAPS, because of South African 
history (torture, confessions, admissions and pointing out). However, there are 
those who believe that the de-specialisation of the police was not a good idea.  
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The researcher is of the view that there was nothing wrong with this exercise, as 
long as proper procedures were followed. People who were in comfort zones are 
the ones who are disillusioned because it is not easy to adjust in a new 
environment. 
 
3.8. TRANSFORMATION OF THE CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
3.8.1 The early 1990s 
 
The early part of the 20th century saw the prison system regulated mainly by 
various Provincial Ordinances. The Prisons Reformatories Act 13 of 1911, 
introduced shortly after the Union Government of 1910, saw the prison system 
also becoming responsible for the management of reformatories. Courts started 
playing an increasing role in the development of prison law. For example, it was 
unlawful to detain awaiting-trial offenders in solitary confinement, and those who 
felt that they had been unfairly treated had the legal right to approach the courts 
for recourse. 
 
This period also saw the introduction of a system that allowed for the remission 
of part of a prison sentence subject to good behaviour on the part of the inmates, 
and the system of probation that allowed for the early release of inmates, either 
directly into the community or through an interim period in a work colony or 
similar situation (White Paper on Corrections in South Africa, 2005:20).  
 
Punishment for transgressions within correctional centres was harsh and it 
included whippings, solitary confinement, dietary punishment and additional 
labour. Racial segregation within correctional centres was prescribed by 
legislation and it was vigorously enforced throughout the country.  
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3.8.2 The Lansdowne Commission of 1945 
 
The Lansdowne Commission on Penal and Prison Reform found that the Prison 
and Reformatories Act had not introduced a new era in South African prisons, but 
that it had in fact been a vehicle for maintaining the previous harsh and 
inequitable prison system that preceded it. According to the White Paper on 
Corrections in South Africa (2005:20), the Landsdowne Commission made the 
following findings: offenders should not be hired to outsiders; emphasised the 
need for rehabilitation and the need to extend literacy among offenders - in 
particular Black offenders; and it was critical of the government’s decision to 
reorganise the prison service on full military lines, which was seen to be an 
attempt to increase the control it had over prison officials.  
 
The Commission further warned the government that such a militarised system 
would not be conducive to the “various rehabilitative influences which modern 
views deemed essential”. Nothing much resulted from the Lansdowne 
Commission Report which was submitted in 1947. 
 
3.8.3 Prisons in the 1960s and 1970s 
 
New prison legislation in the form of Prisons Act 8 of 1959, was introduced. The 
new Act continued and even extended racial segregation within prisons in line 
with the national policy of differential development, abandoned the nine pennies 
a day prison labour scheme and replaced it with a system of parole; it closed the 
prison system off from inspection by outsiders by prohibiting reporting and 
publishing of photographs.  
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Although the new Act took cognisance of the United Nation’s Standard Minimum 
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (1958), as far as the emphasis on 
rehabilitation was concerned, it ignored other crucial aspects, such as the 
prohibition of corporal punishment for prison offences (White Paper on 
Corrections in South Africa, 2005:20). The period 1960-1970 was famous for 
mass detention of political prisoners, and the prison authorities were widely 
challenged by the detainees and also condemned by the international 
community. 
 
3.8.4 The Prisons Department in the 1980s 
 
In 1984 the Judicial Inquiry into the Structure and Functioning of the Courts 
reported that the incarceration of prisoners as a result of influx control measures 
was a major cause of overcrowding in prisons, and it condemned these 
measures. As a result of the findings of the Inquiry, progressive changes started 
taking place, with the closing down of prison outstations and a general decline in 
the use of prison labour for agricultural purposes (White Paper on Corrections in 
South Africa, 2005:20). The system of paroling prisoners under paid contracts 
was also phased out.  
 
These marginal changes in the prison system were, however, soon 
overshadowed by the declaration of the State of Emergency on 21 July 1985, 
which lasted until 1990. During 1988 important amendments were made to prison 
legislation. By excluding all references to race, a reversal of the almost total 
racial segregation of the prison population was brought about, although it took 
some years before it was finally implemented. The infamous prison regulation 
that ruled that White staff members automatically outranked all non-White staff 
members was also repealed. 
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3.8.5 Prison reforms in the early 1990s 
 
Late in 1990 the government announced that it planned to introduce extensive 
reforms to the prison system. The Prison Service was separated from the 
Department of Justice and renamed the Department of Correctional Services 
(White Paper on Corrections in South Africa, 2005:22). This triggered important 
changes to prison legislation. An important milestone in this period was the 
introduction of the concept of dealing with certain categories of offenders within 
the community, rather than inside prison. This system was named “correctional 
supervision” and was introduced as a more cost-effective way of doing 
corrections and a response to overcrowding.  
 
The release policy and the automatic system of remission were revisited, and a 
system of credits which prisoners could earn for appropriate behaviour, was 
introduced. At the same time, in the face of rising challenges to the racial barriers 
on promotion of Black members into the officer ranks in the Department, the 
Prisons Act was amended to make it illegal for warders to become union 
members without the permission of the Commissioner, and also made it an 
offence to strike (White Paper on Corrections in South Africa, 2005:22).  
 
The introduction of the Public Service Labour Relations Act in 1993 brought 
another transformation in this regard. This Act was subsequently replaced by the 
Labour Relations Act of 1995, and introduced aspects such as bargaining, 
abolishment of unfair discrimination and the use of the Labour Appeal Court, 
Labour Court, Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) 
and Bargaining Councils by the members of the Department of Correctional 
Services. 
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3.8.6 Transformation of Correctional Services in the democratic South Africa 
 
The Interim Constitution, introduced in 1993, embodied the fundamental rights of 
the country’s citizens, including that of offenders. This resulted in the introduction 
of a human rights culture into the correctional system in South Africa, and the 
strategic direction of the Department was to ensure that incarceration entailed 
safe and secure custody in humane conditions (White Paper on Corrections in 
South Africa, 2005:22).  
 
On 21 October 1994, a White Paper on the Policy of the Department of 
Correctional Services recognised the fact that the legislative framework of the 
Department should provide the foundation for a correctional system appropriate 
to the constitutional state, based on the principles of freedom and equality.  
 
Therefore, the transformation of the Department in the first five years of the new 
democracy entailed: 
 
• Significant changes in the representivity of the DCS personnel and 
management; 
• The de-militarisation of the correctional system in order to enhance the 
Department’s rehabilitation responsibilities, on 1 April 1996; 
• Progressive efforts to align itself with correctional practices and processes 
that have proved to be effective in the international correctional arena; and 
• The introduction of independent mechanisms to scrutinise and investigate 
its DCS activities, such as the appointment of an Inspecting Judge (White 
Paper on Corrections in South Africa, 2005:22).  
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All these initiatives were followed by the introduction and subsequent adoption of 
the National Crime Prevention Strategy and the Integrated Justice System 
introduced by the SAPS and the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development respectively. Parallel to this was the passing of the Constitution in 
1996, which provided the overall framework for governance in democratic South 
Africa, enshrined the Bill of Rights, and obliged government departments to align 
their core business with the Constitution.  
 
As a result, the Department embarked on a massive legislative reform by 
enacting the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998. This legislation represented 
a total departure from the 1959 Act and embarked on a modern, internationally 
acceptable correctional system, designed within the framework of the 
Constitution.   
 
The most important features of the Correctional Services Act are: 
• The entrenchment of the fundamental rights of offenders; 
• Special emphasis on the rights of women and children; 
• A new disciplinary system of offenders; 
• Various safeguards regarding the use of segregation and of force; 
• A framework for treatment, development, and support services; 
• A refined community-involved release policy; 
• Extensive external monitoring mechanisms; and 
• Provision for public and private sector partnerships in terms of the building 
and operating of correctional centres.  
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3.8.7 Demilitarisation 
 
The Department of Correctional Services became a militarised institution in the 
1950s. To aid transformation, it was demilitarised in 1996, as a militarised 
approach was considered counter-productive to the goals of prisoner 
rehabilitation. 
 
Demilitarisation involved changing the structure, ranks systems and mode of 
address, and scrapping uniform insignia and daily militarised parades. This move 
was not received without criticism and a good deal of insecurity on the part of 
staff members who had grown to appreciate their military-like status. Central to 
the demilitarisation process was the creation of a new civilian structure and mode 
of discipline.  
 
However, demilitarisation was unfortunately conceptualised in a narrow and 
mechanistic manner, and has not resulted in extensive change to the culture of 
the Department (White Paper on Corrections in South Africa, 2005:22). Although 
prison staff are no longer assigned ranks and wear no visible insignia, 
hierarchical identities remain. For example, prisoners often still refer to prison 
staff by their military rank; some prison staff also refer to themselves in this way. 
 
3.8.8 Strategic realignment of the Department of Correctional Services since 2000 
 
The period 2000-2003 has been marked by consistent engagement with the 
strategic direction of the Department, as role-players have striven to interpret the 
purpose of the correctional system and unpack the policy direction necessary for 
successful delivery on rehabilitation and the prevention of recidivism.  
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To this end the Department identified the enhancement of rehabilitation services 
as a key starting point in contributing towards a crime-free society. The strategies 
developed towards the enhancement of rehabilitation were: 
• Development of individualised need-based rehabilitation programmes; 
• Marketing of rehabilitation services to increase offender participation; 
• Promotion of a restorative justice approach to justice to create a platform 
for dialogue for the victim, the offender and the community, facilitating the 
healing process; and 
• Increase of training facilities for the development of skills (White Paper on 
Corrections in South Africa, 2005:22). These initiatives were followed by 
the introduction of the division of correctional centres into smaller 
manageable units.  
 
3.8.9 Challenges 
 
According to the White Paper on Corrections in South Africa, 2005:26), 
throughout all of these periods of transformation the Department has faced a 
range of challenges, some of which are inherent in correctional systems all over 
the world, and some have particular South African or time-specific dimensions. 
These challenges are due to both inherent risks in correctional systems and 
dimensions due to the societal transformation that South Africa has gone through 
over the past decades, including overcrowding, institutional ‘prison culture’ and 
corruption.  
 
Out of the three challenges, corruption has caused much damage to the 
Department’s image. The Department of Correctional Services appears to be 
plagued by endemic corruption that interferes with its ability to meet its legal 
objectives.  
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The Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons was initially charged with investigating 
corruption and dishonest practices in the Department, but has since refused to 
undertake this task because it felt it was neglecting its legislative mandate. It has 
been argued that accomplishing the latter would require far more resources than 
it presently has at its disposal that such investigations require an approach 
different to that used to investigate the treatment of prisoners and that such an 
activity would take up too much of its time.  
 
There were also concerns about compromising the good relationships with 
personnel, which the Judicial Inspectorate relies on in order to do its work. The 
Department of Correctional Services then decided to establish its own anti-
corruption unit by establishing the Departmental Investigating Unit.  
 
This responsibility was removed from the Judicial Inspectorate when the 
Correctional Services Act was amended by Parliament at the end of 2001. It is 
problematic that the investigation of corruption is left solely in the hands of the 
Department of Correctional Services.  
 
Despite a few high profile arrests and convictions, the Department has so far 
been unable to deal with it. Corruption, intimidation and nepotism clearly affect 
the ability of its staff members to investigate their own colleagues. It is, however, 
difficult to separate the treatment of prisoners from corruption, because of the 
integral relationships between staff and prisoners.  
 
The two often go hand in hand, and the Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons will most 
likely find it impossible to completely ignore the issue of corruption, although it 
falls outside their jurisdiction. 
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3.8.10 Independent oversight of prisons 
 
The promulgation of the Correctional Services Act led to the establishment in 
1998 of independent oversight of prisons through the Independent Judicial 
Inspectorate, which is headed by an inspecting judge. This office is mandated to 
inspect prisons and report on the treatment of prisoners and conditions in prison.  
 
The law has been amended so that a person awaiting trial, who is unable to pay 
the bail amount, can be released if the head of the prison is satisfied that 
overcrowding threatens the human dignity, physical health or safety of prisoners 
(Judicial Matters Amendment Act 42 of 2001). The new provisions making 
allowance for plea bargaining also have the potential to reduce the number of 
awaiting trial prisoners.  
 
The Judicial Inspectorate is also charged with the appointment of Independent 
Prison Visitors (IPVs) from the community. One or more, IPVs are appointed for 
each prison. They make regular visits, interview prisoners and deal with their 
complaints by reporting these to the head of the prison, and monitoring how they 
are dealt with. A shortcoming of this initiative is that IPVs are limited to making 
recommendations to the heads of prisons and cannot actually solve problems 
themselves. 
 
They cannot ensure that their recommendations are actually implemented. Also, 
many of the complaints relate to conditions in prison, which are systemic and 
cannot be resolved by the IPVs or even the Judicial Inspectorate. Another 
shortcoming of this system is that these oversights do not have powers such as 
those possessed by the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) which can 
investigate abuse of power by prison officials and deaths in prison custody. 
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3.9 TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUDICIARY 
 
The Judiciary of South Africa is an independent branch of government, subject 
only to the South African Constitution and the laws of the country. The Judiciary 
interprets the laws of South Africa, using as the basis of its interpretation the laws 
enacted by the South African Parliament, as well as explanatory statements 
made in the legislature during the enactment.  
 
The Judiciary is divided into Court Services and the National Prosecution 
Authority (see Chapter 4). In addition, institutions such as the Public Protector, 
the Special Investigating Unit (see Chapter 4) and the Human Rights 
Commission also form part of the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development. 
 
3.9.1 The Judiciary before 1994 (during apartheid government) 
 
The judicial system was headed by the Supreme Court, the decisions and 
interpretations of which were considered an important source of the law. The 
Supreme Court comprised an Appellate Division and six provincial divisions. 
Each provincial division encompassed a judge president, three local divisions 
presided over by judges, and magisterial divisions presided over by magistrates. 
Separate traditional courts were there to administer African traditional law and 
custom; they were presided over by traditional leaders, often chiefs or respected 
elders (http://www.dojcd.gov.za). The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court 
was the highest court in the country, seated in Bloemfontein, the country's judicial 
capital. The Appellate Division was composed of the Chief Justice and the judges 
of appeal, whose number varied as determined by the President 
(http://www.dojcd.gov.za). Supreme Court members could be removed only on 
grounds of misbehaviour or incapacity.  
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The Appellate Division's decisions were binding on all lower courts, as were the 
decisions within their areas of jurisdiction of the provincial and the local divisions. 
Lower courts, which were presided over by civil service magistrates, had limited 
jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases. In 1995 there were 309 district magistrates' 
offices, presided over by 1,014 magistrates, 1,196 prosecutors, and 3,717 
officers (http://www.dojcd.gov.za). 
 
3.9.2 Post-1994 Judicial System 
 
The post-apartheid legal system, introduced by the Interim Constitution, 
embodies the supreme law of the land and is binding on all judicial organs of the 
state. It establishes an independent judiciary, including a Constitutional Court 
with the power to review and abolish legislation inconsistent with the Constitution. 
It includes provisions not found in apartheid-era laws, such as a prohibition on all 
forms of discrimination and an emphasis on individual rights.  
 
These rights include "equality before the law and equal protection of the law", 
freedom of expression, assembly, demonstration, petition, and association; the 
right to "choose a place of residence anywhere in the national territory"; the right 
not to be deprived of citizenship without justification; full political rights; full 
access to the courts; and fair and lawful administrative justice mechanisms, 
including rights concerning detention, arrest and accusation.  
 
Other provisions provide for specific rights in areas such as economic activity, 
labour relations, property, environment, children, language and culture, 
education, and conditions under which a state of emergency can be declared 
(http://www.dojcd.gov.za). In 1994 the Government established the new 
Constitutional Court and a Human Rights Commission (http://www.dojcd.gov.za).  
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Legislation in 1994 also set forth operating procedures for these bodies and 
established the Office of the Public Protector (public defender). Prior to 1994 
South Africa had eleven departments of justice. Courts were run by an Executive 
Member of Parliament or administrator, and functions within courts were 
centralised with magistrates and prosecutors.  
 
They were burdened with administrative and transactional procedures, 
undermining the quality of services. Duplication at the national and regional level 
was common, and case backlogs grew - in some courts numbering in the 
hundreds. In an effort to decentralise courts and improve efficiency, regional 
court offices were introduced to take over selected operational and policy 
functions.  
 
As a result of all these problems, the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development, in conjunction with the United States of America International 
Development Aid (USAID), the Re Aga Boswa programme was established. Re 
Aga Boswa, which means “we are rebuilding” in the Sotho language, is a 
comprehensive effort to transform court services, redefining the court 
environment as the nucleus of service delivery (http://www.dojcd.gov.za).  
 
The new Court Support Services Model eliminates regional court offices. A single 
national level office retains policy, strategic planning, and budget functions. Main 
courts are clustered with smaller courts. A professional court manager ensures 
that administrative functions run smoothly across a cluster. A Court Support 
Service Centre handles procurement, financial administration, human resources 
and auxiliary services for all courts within a cluster.  
 
 
 86
By separating the administrative and technical functions of courts and supporting 
court administration through a Shared Support Service Centre, prosecutors, 
judges and court clerks have been able to rededicate focus entirely on case 
quality, jurisdiction and service (http://www.dojcd.gov.za). Every case is 
assessed for its processing time and cost when it enters a court, and 
benchmarks are carefully held to by all members of the court. No court is 
permitted a backlog of more than 100 cases (http://www.dojcd.gov.za).  
 
Clear lines of accountability and reporting have been established between the 
Judiciary, the Prosecution, and Court Services (http://www.dojcd.gov.za). In 
terms of the Re Aga Boswa project, the following initiatives have been 
established: 
• Court Interpretation Services: This is meant for the illiterate. 
• Rationalisation of the High Courts: This is intended to do away with the 
former homeland high courts. 
• Development of Court Shared Services Centre: This is aimed at 
performing administrative transactions on behalf of the courts within a 
province. 
• Appointment of court managers at local court level, area court level, 
regional and national level: The aim of this process is to empower court 
managers to procure, and also the general management of the courts. 
• Establishment of Court Shared Services Centres: These centres handle 
and capture data emanating from the courts and therefore operate as 
back office support for the courts. 
• Information Management System (IMS): The mandate of this unit is the 
translation of government policy on e-government into e-justice program 
and the modernisation of justice process (http://www.dojcd.gov.za).  
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3.9.3 The courts in South Africa 
 
Chapter 8 of the Constitution of South Africa defines the structure of the South 
African judicial system. This chapter also guarantees the independence of the 
courts and requires other organs of the state to assist and protect the courts in 
order to ensure their independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility and 
effectiveness (http://www.dojcd.gov.za).  
 
In addition, Chapter 2 of the Constitution guarantees every person the right to 
have a dispute or trial heard by a fair, impartial and independent court. The South 
African court structure consists of: The Constitutional Court; The Supreme Court 
of Appeal; High Courts; Magistrates’ Courts; Circuit Courts; Special Income Tax 
Courts; Labour Courts and Labour Appeal Courts; Divorce Courts; Land Claims 
Courts; Specialised Commercial Courts, The Water Tribunal; Small Claims 
Courts; Community Courts and Courts for Chiefs and Headmen. 
 
3.9.3.1 The Constitutional Court 
 
This Court has a final say on all matters relating to the Constitution of South 
Africa. Its decisions on the Constitution are binding on all other courts. This court 
came into existence in 1994 and has jurisdiction as the court of final instance 
over all matters relating to the interpretation, protection and enforcement of the 
provisions of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court also has jurisdiction in 
respect of any alleged violation of any fundamental right entrenched in the Bill of 
Rights (Geldenhys & Joubert, 1996:29). One of the most significant findings of 
this court was the case of S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC), where the 
death penalty was declared unconstitutional because it violated the right to life as 
entrenched in the Bill of Rights. This finding had a huge effect on the whole 
Criminal Justice System in South Africa (http://www.dojcd.gov.za).  
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3.9.3.2 The Supreme Court of Appeal 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal is the court which has the final say on all matters, 
except those that involve the Constitution. For example, all criminal appeal cases 
from the High Court end up in this court, unless the appeal relates to a point of 
constitutional law, in which case the Constitutional Court has the final say. The 
Supreme Court of Appeal used to be called The Appellate Division, as it only 
hears cases on appeal. Decisions of the Supreme Court of Appeal are binding on 
all courts of a lower order (http://www.dojcd.gov.za).  
 
3.9.3.3 The High Court 
 
The next of the “superior courts” is the High Court of South Africa, which used to 
be called “The Supreme Court”. The High Court divisions have “jurisdiction” – the 
right to hear a case – over defined geographical areas in which they are situated, 
and the decisions of the High Courts are binding on magistrates’ courts within 
their areas of jurisdiction (http://www.dojcd.gov.za).  
 
The High Court divisions have jurisdiction over all matters in their geographical 
area, but they usually only hear civil matters involving more than R100 000, and 
serious criminal cases (http://www.dojcd.gov.za). They also hear any appeals or 
reviews from lower courts (magistrates’ courts) which fall in their geographical 
jurisdiction. The High Court usually hears any matter involving a person’s status 
(e.g. adoption, insolvency). There are, at the moment, ten “provincial divisions” of 
the High Court and three “local divisions” (which have concurrent geographical 
jurisdiction over an area within a division). These courts still use names which 
relate to the old provincial and homeland structure of South Africa before 1994 
(http://www.dojcd.gov.za).  
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3.9.3.4 Circuit Courts 
 
Circuit Courts are also part of the High Court. They sit at least twice a year, 
moving around to serve more rural areas. They can be contacted through the 
High Court (http://www.dojcd.gov.za).  
 
3.9.3.5 Special Income Tax Courts 
 
The Special Income Tax Courts sit within divisions of the High Court and consist 
of a judge of the High Court, assisted by an accountant of not less than ten 
years’ standing, and a representative of the business community.  
 
This court deals with any disputes between a taxpayer and the South African 
Revenue Service, where the dispute involves an income tax assessment of more 
than R100 000. Appeals against its decisions are made directly to the Supreme 
Court of Appeal (http://www.dojcd.gov.za).  
 
Tax disputes involving an assessment of less than R100 000 go to the Tax 
Board. The Tax Board is chaired by an attorney, advocate or accountant who 
works in the private sector and is specifically appointed by the President to assist 
as chairman of the Board. One can contact the Special Income Tax Court 
through the High Court, and the Tax Board through the South African Revenue 
Service (http://www.dojcd.gov.za). 
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3.9.3.6 Labour Courts and Labour Appeal Courts 
 
At present there also exist Labour Courts and Labour Appeal Courts which have 
jurisdiction over labour matters and are on the same level as the High Court. 
However, the Superior Courts Bill will abolish the Labour Courts and they will be 
absorbed into the High Court (http://www.dojcd.gov.za). 
 
3.9.3.7 Divorce Courts 
 
Since 1998 Divorce Courts have been able to hear any divorce matters. Prior to 
that these courts dealt only with divorces between Black people. There are three 
such courts - the Central, North Eastern and Southern Divorce Courts, and they 
are designed to deal with less complicated divorces quickly and inexpensively. 
The Southern Divorce Court is the divorce court that has jurisdiction in the 
Western Cape, and it has offices at the Family Court Centre in Cape Town and a 
satellite office in Mitchell’s Plain (http://www.dojcd.gov.za). 
 
3.9.3.8 Land Claims Court 
 
The Land Claims Court is on the same level as the High Court, but is 
independent of the High Court. It was established in 1996 and hears cases 
dealing with the return of land taken away during apartheid (land reform cases). 
The Land Claims Court has its own rules and is allowed to conduct its 
proceedings informally and inquisitorially (where the judge asks witnesses 
questions directly, rather than through lawyers) and the court can sit wherever it 
needs to, although its main office is in Randburg, Gauteng. Appeals go to the 
Supreme Court of Appeal, unless the appeal is on a constitutional question, in 
which case they go to the Constitutional Court (http://www.dojcd.gov.za).  
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3.9.3.9 The Water Tribunal  
 
The Water Tribunal is an independent body which has jurisdiction in all the 
provinces, and consists of a chairperson, a deputy chairperson, and additional 
members. It has jurisdiction over water disputes. Members of the Water Tribunal 
must have knowledge in law, engineering, water resource management or 
related fields of knowledge (http://www.dojcd.gov.za). They are appointed by the 
Minister on the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission - the body 
which chooses judges. The Water Tribunal replaced the Water Court in 1998.  
 
3.9.3.10 The Magistrates’ Courts 
 
The Magistrates’ Courts are the lower courts which deal with most matters. They 
are divided into regional courts and district courts. There are more than 400 
magistrates’ courts in South Africa. They do not have jurisdiction to deal with civil 
matters dealing with more than R100 000 (unless both the person suing and the 
person being sued agree to limit the claim to less than R100 000) 
(http://www.legal-aid.co.za). 
 
With criminal cases, more serious criminal matters are heard in the regional 
courts. This is because district courts cannot pass a sentence of more than three 
years on conviction of an accused. The most serious criminal matters are heard 
in the High Court. There are also a number of magistrates’ courts that are 
specialised to be better able to deal with certain types of matters, such as the 
rape court in Wynberg (http://www.legal-aid.co.za). 
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3.9.3.11 Small Claims Court 
 
Small Claims Courts have jurisdiction to hear any civil matter involving less than 
R3000 (unless both the person suing and the person being sued agree to limit 
the claim to less than R3000). The judge in the Small Claims Court is called a 
commissioner and is usually a practising advocate, attorney or a legal academic 
who acts as a commissioner, free of charge. Neither the plaintiff (the person 
suing) nor the defendant (the person being sued) are allowed to have lawyers in 
the case. The commissioner’s decision is final and there is no appeal to a higher 
court (http://www.legal-aid.co.za). 
 
3.9.3.12 Community and Courts for Chiefs and Headmen 
 
Community Courts and Courts for Chiefs and Headmen also have jurisdiction to 
hear certain matters on the level of magistrates’ courts. They are designed to 
deal with customary disputes in terms of customary law. An authorised African 
headman or his deputy may decide cases, using indigenous law and custom, 
brought before him by an African against another African, within his area of 
jurisdiction (http://www.legal-aid.co.za). 
 
These courts are commonly known as chief's courts. A person with a claim has 
the right to choose whether to bring a claim in the chief’s court or in a 
magistrate’s court. The use of these is in line with the Re Aga Boswa project 
which seeks to empower these courts through a process called Alternative 
Dispute Resolution (ADR) (http://www.legal-aid.co.za). 
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3.9.3.13 Equality Courts 
 
These courts are aimed to implement the Promotion of Equality and the 
Prevention of Discrimination Act. Most of the disputes are handled by the South 
African Human Rights Commission (http://www.legal-aid.co.za). 
 
3.9.3.14 Special Commercial Courts 
 
Special Commercial Crimes Courts were established in 1999 and their aims were 
to prosecute commercial crimes. They now operate in all nine provinces. The 
establishments of these courts play a major role in the fight against crime, 
especially commercial crimes, in the sense that commercial cases do not have to 
queue in any ordinary court for processing (http://www.legal-aid.co.za). 
 
3.9.4 Important officers of the court 
 
The Court Manager: The duties of a court manager are: to coordinate, manage 
the financial and human resources of the office, manage the strategic and 
busines planning processes, provide case tracking services to the judiciary and 
prosecuting authority, and analyse court statistics to show performance and 
trends (http://www.legal-aid.co.za).  
 
The Registrar keeps all the official court documents, and the Family Advocate 
must be consulted on all matters involving children, as the High Court is the 
upper guardian of all children in South Africa (http://www.legal-aid.co.za).  
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The Master of the High Court keeps all the records relating to people’s estates 
(deceased or insolvent). The Sheriff delivers certain documents to the parties in a 
civil case, and also attaches property when a warrant is issued. The Director of 
Public Prosecution, who used to be called the Attorney-General, is responsible 
for criminal prosecutions by the State (http://www.legal-aid.co.za). The State 
Attorney is the lawyer who represents the state in civil actions (where the State is 
suing or being sued. 
 
3.9.5 Important legislation 
 
3.9.5.1 Investigation of Serious Economic Offences Amendment Act 46 of 1995 
 
This Amendment Act brings the investigation, search and seizure provisions in 
line with the draft Constitution.  
 
3.9.5.2 The South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995 
 
This Act seeks to legitimatise the South African Police Service by amalgamating 
the eleven police agencies, creating the Independent Complaints Directorate, 
regulations on the establishment of Community Police Forums, Community 
Police Boards, power to investigate crime - including organised crime, and public 
order policing (http://www.legal-aid.co.za). 
 
3.9.5.3 The Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 
 
According to Heymans (2006), the Criminal Procedure Act repealed the Criminal 
Procedure Act 55 of 1956 and brought the end of the jury system in South Africa. 
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Before the Criminal Procedure Act came into operation, the South Africa legal 
system was based on a jury system which was influenced by the British system. 
The jury system consisted of a judge and a jury as well as an assessor. In 
serious cases, the Criminal Procedure Act 55 of 1956 made provisions for the 
preliminary investigations which had more accusatorial aspects. The two 
procedures were abolished when the new Criminal Procedure Act was 
implemented (Heymans, 2006). The Criminal Procedure Act also brought in 
police prosecutors, which ended in the early 1990s. 
 
From 1977 onwards, the Criminal Procedure Act has been amended by the 
following Acts: Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 56 of 1979, Criminal 
Procedure Amendment Act 64 of 1982, Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 33 
of 1986, Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 26 of 1987, Criminal Procedure 
Amendment Act 8 of 1989, Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 5 of 1991, 
Criminal Procedure Second Amendment Act 75 of 1995 (the provisions of the 
Criminal Procedure Act of 1977 relating to bail, were amended to bring them in 
line with Chapter 3 of the draft Constitution and to make improvements to 
existing bail provisions), Criminal Procedure Second Amendment Act 85 of 1996, 
Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 86 of 1996, Criminal Procedure Amendment 
Act 76 of 1997, Criminal Procedure Second Amendment Act 85 of 1997, Criminal 
Procedure Second Amendment Act 17 of 2001, Criminal Procedure Second 
Amendment Act 62 of 2001, and the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 42 of 
2003 (http://www.legal-aid.co.za). 
 
3.9.5.4 Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act 74 of 1996 
 
The object of this Act is to provide for mechanisms through which allegations of 
serious corruption, maladministration or misappropriation of State funds and 
assets can be investigated. It makes provision for the establishment of Special 
Investigating Units and Special Tribunal, with wide powers of investigation. 
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3.9.5.5 International Cooperation in Criminal Matters Act 75 of 1996 
 
The International Co-operation in Criminal Matters Act of 1996 facilitates the 
provision of evidence and the execution of sentences in criminal cases, and 
deals with the confiscation and transfer of the proceeds of crime between South 
Africa and foreign States. It introduces a new procedure to obtain evidence from 
foreign States (http://www.legal-aid.co.za). 
 
3.9.5.6 Extradition Amendment Act 77 of 1996 
 
This Amendment Act brings the Extradition Act, 1962 in line with the 
requirements of the Commonwealth Scheme for Extradition. The Commonwealth 
Scheme for the Rendition of Fugitive Offenders is a policy guideline to regulate 
extradition between members of the Commonwealth. South Africa currently has 
extradition agreements with the following countries: Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Swaziland, United States of America, Canada, Australia, Israel, Egypt, Algeria, 
Nigeria, and China (http://www.legal-aid.co.za). These extradition treaties have 
been signed in terms of SADC and UN Protocols on Extradition and Mutual Legal 
Assistance in Criminal Matters, as well as the African Convention on Extradition  
 
3.9.5.7 Proceeds of Crime Act 76 of 1996 
 
This Act provides for the recovery of the proceeds of crime and for the prohibition 
of money laundering and it makes the reporting of certain information obligatory 
in certain circumstances. This Act was incorporated into the Prevention of 
Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (http://www.legal-aid.co.za). 
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3.9.5.8 Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 86 of 1996 
 
The primary aim of the Act is to eliminate delays in the finalisation of criminal 
trials.  
 
3.9.5.9 Criminal Procedure Second Amendment Act 85 of 1997 
 
This Act further regulates the provisions in the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 
relating to bail, in order to ensure a more effective bail system. These 
amendments will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 (http://www.legal-
aid.co.za). 
 
3.9.5.10 Rationalisation of Justice Laws Act 18 of 1996 
 
This Act brings most of the legislation administered by the former Departments of 
Justice in the self-governing territories and TBVC States in line with the 
legislation administered by the Department of Justice (DOJ) in the Republic of 
South Africa. Now the DOJ is called the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development (DOJCD) (http://www.legal-aid.co.za). 
 
3.9.5.11 Judicial Matters Amendment Act 104 of 1996 
 
This Act gives the Office for Serious Economic Offences the power to conduct 
prosecutions which will eliminate duplication of work, in that the person who 
conducts the investigation of a particular case will also be able to prosecute the 
case (http://www.legal-aid.co.za).  
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3.9.5.12 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998 
 
The Act provides for the establishment of a single uniform prosecuting service for 
the first time in the history of South Africa. The implementation of the Act will 
have far-reaching consequences for the administration of justice in the 
government's efforts to combat crime, in that the Act also provides for the 
development of a coherent and uniform prosecuting policy to be applied 
throughout the country (http://www.dojcd.gov.za). 
 
3.9.5.13 The Magistrates’ Courts Amendment Act 67 of 1998 
 
This Act regulates the appointment of lay assessors in criminal trials in the 
Magistrates' Courts, so as to increase community involvement in the 
administration of justice. It addresses some practical problems regarding the 
involvement of assessors, such as the refusal or non-availability of assessors 
before a matter is finalized (http://www.legal-aid.co.za). 
 
3.9.5.14 Witness Protection and Services Act 112 of 1998 
 
The Act addresses problems experienced in the present Witness Protection 
Programme and also provides for the protection of witnesses of commissions of 
enquiry and inquest proceedings, as well as proceedings of special tribunals 
established under the Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act, 1996 
(http://www.legal-aid.co.za). 
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3.9.5.15 Judicial Matters Amendment Act 34 of 1998 
 
This Act contains numerous ad hoc amendments to various Acts of Parliament. 
Provision is made for: the increase of the penal jurisdiction of the lower courts (in 
the case of district courts from one to three years' imprisonment, and in the case 
of regional courts from ten to fifteen years' imprisonment); the prohibition of 
certain acts connected with military, paramilitary or similar operations and 
weapons, ammunition, explosives or other explosive devices; and the 
amendment of section 49 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, to bring these 
provisions relating to justifiable homicide into line with the Constitution 
(http://www.dojcd.gov.za). 
 
3.9.5.16 Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 
 
Sections 51, 52 and 53, as well as Schedule 2, which provide for the imposition 
of minimum sentences, were implemented on 1 May 1998. These provisions 
provide that a High Court or Regional Court, on conviction of a person of an 
offence listed in Schedule 2, must impose a prescribed minimum sentence. 
Although this is a temporary measure (section 53), it is anticipated that it will play 
an important role in combating crime (http://www.dojcd.gov.za). 
 
3.9.5.17 Criminal Matters Amendment Act 68 of 1998 
 
This Act deals with the declaration and detention of persons as State patients in 
terms of the Criminal Procedure Act 1997, and the release of such persons in 
terms of the Mental Health Act, 1973, including the onus of proof regarding the 
mental condition of an accused or convicted person (http://www.dojcd.gov.za). 
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3.9.5.18 Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 
 
The Act aims at giving the police and prosecutors new powers to help them deal 
effectively with organised crime. It creates the new offence of participation in the 
affairs of any criminal organisation. It also allows the State to seize assets which 
have been used to commit crimes, or which are the proceeds of crime, through a 
civil action. It criminalises certain activities of street gangs, such as the 
recruitment of members (http://www.dojcd.gov.za).  
 
This is the Act used by the SAPS, the AFU and the DSO to investigate organised 
crime. The Act, however, does not give clear guidelines on which acts of 
organised crime must be investigated by the SAPS and which acts must be 
investigated by the DSO. On the other hand, the Act give powers to the Asset 
Forfeiture Unit (AFU) to seize assets obtained through criminal activities. The 
AFU gives service to both the SAPS and the DSO (http://www.dojcd.gov.za). 
 
3.9.5.19 Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 42 of 2003 
 
The aim of this Act is to regulate the detention of juvenile offenders. 
 
3.9.5.20 Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act127 of 1992 
 
This Act seeks to regulate the monitoring of conversations and communications 
between or among suspects (http://www.dojcd.gov.za). 
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3.9.5.21 Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 
 
This is intended to provide for the strengthening of measures to prevent and 
combat corruption and corrupt activities; to provide for the offence of corruption 
and offences relating to corrupt activities; to provide for investigative measures in 
respect of corruption and related corrupt activities; to provide for the 
establishment and endorsement of a register in order to place certain restrictions 
on persons and enterprises convicted of corrupt activities relating to tenders and 
contracts; to place a duty on certain persons holding a position of authority to 
report certain corrupt transactions; to provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction in 
respect of the offence of corruption and offences relating to corrupt activities; and 
to provide for matters connected therewith (http://www.dojcd.gov.za). 
 
3.9.6 The Office of the Public Protector (OPP) 
 
Section 181 of the Constitution and the Public Protector Act, the Office of the 
Public Protector, is independent of the government and is responsible for 
investigating the following: 
 
• Maladministration in connection with Government affairs at any level; 
• The abuse or unjustifiable exercise of power or unfair, capricious, 
discourteous or other improper conduct or undue delay by a person 
performing a public function; 
• Improper or dishonest acts, or omissions, or corruption, with respect to 
public money; 
• Improper or unlawful enrichment, or receipt of any improper advantage 
or promise of enrichment or advantage; and 
• Acts or omissions by a person in government employ or performing a 
public function, which result in unlawful or improper prejudice to 
another (http://www.psc.gov.za). 
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Any person can submit complaints to the Public Protector. These complaints can 
be either written or oral declarations. The Public Protector submits yearly and 
half-yearly reports to Parliament on the findings of a serious nature. If necessary, 
the Public Protector may, at any time, submit a report to Parliament on the 
findings of a specific investigation.  
 
No government institution or official may hinder the Public Protector in the 
execution of his or her duties. The Public Protector does not investigate court 
decisions, matters occurring before 1 October 1995 or cases where the 
complainants failed to follow the prescribed grievance procedure of the offending 
institution (http://www.psc.gov.za).  
 
3.9.7 The Human Rights Commission 
 
The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) was launched on 21 
March 1996. The powers and functions of the SAHRC are found in section 184 of 
the Constitution, including the power to: 
• Investigate and report on the observance of human rights abuses; 
• Take steps to secure appropriate redress where human rights have been 
violated; and 
• Carry out research and educate people about human rights. 
 
3.10 THE IMPACT OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM ON THE ENTIRE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
After analysing the three departments within the South African Criminal Justice 
System, the researcher wishes to highlight the impact of the transformation on 
the entire Criminal Justice System: 
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• The introduction of the Bill of Rights brought many changes in the 
investigation of crime, especially the admissibility of confessions, pointings 
out and admissions. 
• The separation of the police, prisons and intelligence from the Department 
of Justice, paved the way for a proper separation of powers. 
• The adoption of the NCPS paved the way for the introduction of the 
Integrated Justice System. 
• The de-specialisation of the SAPS investigation units paved the way for 
the empowerment of the stations in terms of skills and logistics. 
• The demilitarisation of both the police and correctional service created a 
culture of service delivery. 
• The introduction of the parole system and correctional supervision 
introduced a system of reducing overcrowding. 
• The adoption of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act brought a system 
where the state can seize assets obtained through criminal activity. 
• The adoption of the Constitution signalled the end of segregation in South 
Africa. 
• The introduction of the Re Aga Boswa project paved the way for the 
appointment of court managers at local, area, provincial and national level, 
to manage courts. 
• The amalgamation of eleven police agencies paved a way for the 
establishment of one National Police Service. 
• The abolishment of the death penalty in terms of S v Makwanyane 1995 
(3) SA 391 (CC). 
• In S v Zuma 1995 (1) SACR 568 (CC) the aspect of the presumption of 
innocence had a great impact on the interpretation of the right to a fair 
trial. 
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3.11 THE BIRTH OF THE DSO (SCORPIONS) AND OTHER INVESTIGATIVE UNITS 
 
In October 1997 the South African Cabinet noted that there were serious 
problems with regard to the coordination of anti-corruption agencies. A year later 
the Public Sector Anti-Corruption Conference resolved that Government should 
explore the need for a “coordination structure while improving and strengthening 
the role of existing agencies” (Public Service Commission, August 2001:7). As a 
result of this parliamentary debate, an Anti-Corruption Strategy of 2001 was 
introduced by the Minister of Public Service and Administration, Mrs. Geraldine 
Frazer-Moleketi. The Strategy recommended that each department needed to 
have structures to deal with corruption. 
 
By this time, institutions such as the Special Investigating Unit and the DSO were 
already in place. The idea of de-specialising the police investigative units had 
already begun. One of the reasons that led to the establishment of the DSO, SIU, 
DIU and AFU is that the government might have realised the existence of 
corruption as a problem as well as the lack of good judgment, because some 
institutions were already in existence. Although the Public Service Commission 
was given a mandate to conduct research and review all the Anti-Corruption 
Agencies in 2001, the Commission failed to stamp its authority by not coming up 
with clear recommendations.  
 
Although the Commission admitted in its findings that there was “duplication of 
functions” among agencies within the criminal justice cluster (PSC, August 
2001:3), it failed to recommend a closure of some agencies, or amalgamation. In 
June 1999 President Thabo Mbeki announced that a "special and adequately 
staffed and equipped investigating unit will be established urgently to deal with all 
national priority crimes, including police corruption”. 
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These challenges include corruption among some police officials, the murder of 
police officers on duty, unsatisfactory standards of investigation, resulting in low 
conviction rates, and the general lack of an efficiently coordinated attack on 
organised and syndicated crime by the investigation, intelligence and prosecution 
authorities (PSC, August 2001:3). A discussion on DSO and other investigative 
agencies will follow in Chapter 4.  
 
3.12 CONCLUSION 
 
Parliamentary sovereignty was a dominant theme of South African constitutional 
history from 1910 until it was replaced by constitutional supremacy in 1993. After 
analysing the history of South Africa, it is clear that our legal system has gone 
through various stages. It is evident that South Africa derives its legal system 
from Roman-Dutch law as well as English law. These influences played a major 
role in the administration of justice. They are a result of the colonisation of this 
country by both Britain and Holland. It is clear that the European influence 
resulted in what can be called a mixed system. However, the mixed system has 
nothing to do with federalism or unitarism.  
 
The fact that the jury system was abolished in 1977 after the promulgation of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 is a clear indication that South Africa has 
been influenced by the European systems including English and Roman-Dutch 
law. From the 16th century up to 1994 there has been much debate about a 
system or form of government that South Africa could adopt. A country is at 
liberty to choose any system, as long as the system addresses the needs of its 
citizens. However, it should be pointed out that colonialism played a major role in 
the adoption of particular criminal justice systems. Many African countries have 
either adopted or modified a criminal justice system that was used by their 
colonial masters. From the analysis of federalism and unitarism it is clear that 
South Africa has a mixture of both federal and unitary characters.  
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CHAPTER 4: CRIME INVESTIGATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this chapter is mainly to discuss the mandate and legislative 
powers of the different investigative institutions within the Criminal Justice 
System. Different countries use different methods to investigate crime. Normally, 
the methods of investigation are influenced or determined by the Criminal Justice 
System employed by a particular country. Furthermore, one needs to mention 
that in S v Botha and others (1) 1995(2) SARC 598 (W) the presiding judge 
ruled that crime investigation is not the sole mandate of the SAPS. He also said 
that the fact that a corporation’s internal investigation unit had conducted an 
investigation was not improper, and referred to the fact that various institutions 
conduct their own investigations and then hand over the evidence to the police 
for the institution of a prosecution.  
 
The findings in the above case indicate that the courts have interpreted section 
205 (3) of the Constitution by looking at the fact that the Constitution in this 
section does not give the police “exclusive powers” to investigate and combat 
crime, but it provides the objects or functions of the police service as to prevent, 
combat and investigate crime, to maintain public order, to protect and secure the 
inhabitants of the Republic and their property, and to uphold and enforce the law.  
 
Therefore, it may be interpreted that the fact that the Constitution is vaguely 
formulated might be the reason why the government decided to establish various 
agencies without looking at the constitutional requirements. In this chapter, 
statistics will be provided. However, due to the fact that these institutions were 
not established at the same time, the statistics refer to different periods. 
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4.2 DEFINITIONS 
 
4.2.1 Criminal investigation 
 
Criminal investigation can be defined as the discovery of relevant facts, the 
making of inferences from these facts, the reconstruction of the crime scene, the 
identification and apprehension of the offender, and the preparation of the case 
for prosecution and trial of the suspect(s) (Van der Westhuizen, 1996:354).  
 
4.2.2 Organised crime 
 
According to Palmiotto (1998:509), organised crime is the continuing criminal 
enterprise that rationally works to profit from illicit activities that are in great public 
demand. From this definition it is clear that organised crime is a process where 
criminals, through conspiracies, work to gain control over specific fields of 
activity, both legitimate and illegitimate, such as drug sale, gambling, loan 
sharking and prostitution. 
 
4.2.3 Criminal proceedings 
 
Section 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act stipulates that criminal proceedings 
include a preparatory examination under Chapter 20 of the Act. This concept is 
not defined in section 1 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act or in the 
National Prosecuting Authority Amendment Act. However, section 179 (2) of the 
Constitution and section 20 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act states that 
members of the prosecuting authority have powers to institute and conduct 
criminal proceedings on behalf of the state. This does not mean criminal 
investigations. 
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4.2.4 Special investigator  
 
Section 1 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act defines “special investigator” 
as a special investigator appointed under section 19A of the Act and section 2(d) 
of the National Prosecuting Authority Amendment Act.  
 
Section 22 [(2)(b)] of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, 
states that “[a] special investigator shall be construed as to include a police 
official”. This is really confusing, because a police official who investigates cases 
is called a “detective”. 
 
4.2.5 Justice of the peace 
 
A justice of the peace refers to a public official who decides cases brought before 
a court of law in order to administer justice (http://www.answers.com). This 
definition is not covered either by the Justices of Peace and Commissioners of 
Oaths Act or by the Criminal Procedure Act.  
 
4.2.6 Police official 
 
According to section 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act, a police official means any 
member of the SAPS as defined in section 5 of the South African Police Service 
Act. This definition is the same one outlined in section 1 of the Prevention and 
Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (http://www.answers.com). 
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4.2.7 Peace officer  
 
According to section 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act, a peace officer includes 
“any magistrate, justice, police official, or correctional official, as defined in 
section 1 of the Correctional Services Act, and in relation to any area, offence, 
class of offence or power referred to in a notice issued under section 334 (1), or 
any person who is a peace officer under that section”. The Criminal Procedure 
Act is silent on whether members of the NPA and SIU are included in this 
definition (http://www.answers.com). 
 
4.2.8 Oath 
 
An oath is a solemn declaration that the statement is true 
(http://www.answers.com). An oath must be taken before a Commissioner of 
Oaths. Oaths are often used to confirm a written statement known as an affidavit, 
for use in court, estate or land title transactions. In South Africa, neither the 
Justices of Peace and Commissioners of Oaths Act nor the Criminal Procedure 
Act define the meaning of an oath. The Justices of Peace and Commissioners of 
Oaths Act has been amended many times, and in various amendments it has 
included magistrates, members of the NPA, the Postmaster or CEO of various 
parastatals, members of the SAPS and DCS members.  
 
A Commissioner of Oaths is an individual who can administer oaths, take and 
receive affidavits, statutory declarations and affirmations 
(http://www.answers.com) According to Item 49 of Government Notice Number 
905 of 10 July 1998, “all public servants above Salary Level 2 are Ex Officio 
Commissioners of Oaths”. This therefore means that members of the NPA are 
Commissioners of Oaths because they are employed in terms of the Public 
Service Act 103 of 1994.  
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However, Item 61A of Government Notice Number 905 of 10 July 1998 further 
states that “directors of companies or any other person can apply to become a 
Commissioner of Oaths by completing a J5 form which can be obtained at any 
Magistrate office”. According to Ms D. Mahlangu (10.07.2007), the SIU members 
are Commissioners of Oaths because they have been granted such status by the 
court.  
 
4.3 THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (TREIS POLITIQUE) 
 
The treis politique was advocated by the French philosopher Montesquieu with a 
view to dividing the state authority into legislative, executive and the judiciary 
(Botes, 1995:24). This is in line with the view that the general principles of 
democracy prevent power from being vested in a single body. In South Africa, 
the Constitution divides power into the executive, the legislature and the 
judiciary. The aim of this principle is to ensure that the rights and liberties of the 
individual are guaranteed. This was also done to ensure that sufficient control 
measures would be in place in order to prevent the abuse of power and to ensure 
that each institution of government discharges its functions without fear of 
interference from another institution.  
 
This means that the parliament formulates and adopts policy for South Africa, 
expressed in legislation to be implemented by the executive authority. Executive 
institutions include Cabinet, Ministers, executive councils, government 
departments, directors-general and public officials. This is in line with sections 83 
to 141 of Act 108 of the Constitution which states that “the judicial authority is 
vested in the courts which are independent and subject to the Constitution and 
the law which they must apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice”. 
No person or government institution may interfere with the functions of judicial 
officers (Du Toit & Van der Waldt, 1997:215). 
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This means that according to Chapters 5 and 8 of the Constitution, South African 
government power is divided into the legislature, which makes the laws, the 
executive which executes the laws, and the judiciary, which passes judgment in 
all cases before the courts. The South African system is inclined towards 
Montesquieu’s treis politique (Du Toit & Van der Waldt, 1997:215). 
 
This arrangement has a strong accusatorial element, because the police who fall 
within the executive branch are independent from the judiciary. In this instance 
the police conduct an investigation and forward it to the National Prosecuting 
Authority for prosecution (Du Toit & Van der Waldt, 1997:215).  
 
With the introduction of the DSO, AFU, DIU and the SIU, it seems that the three 
tiers of South African power are compromised. This argument is based on the 
fact that the DSO, the AFU and the SIU fall within the Ministry of Justice and 
Constitutional Development which is also in charge of the judiciary. These 
institutions conduct an investigation and then proceed with prosecution. This is 
more inquisitorial (Du Toit & Van der Waldt, 1997:215). 
 
This therefore means that at the same time the South African system is also 
inquisitorial, because other law enforcement agencies fall within the judiciary. 
This is in line with most European countries such as France, Switzerland and 
Italy, who are proponents of an inquisitorial system.  
 
This is not to say that one system is superior to the other. If, at the end of the 
day, justice is achieved, there is no reason to abandon a system that is working. 
The problem is that the three tiers are prescribed by the South African 
Constitution, which is the supreme law of the land (Du Toit & Van der Waldt, 
1997:215). 
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4.4 INVESTIGATIVE INSTITUTIONS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
4.4.1 The Detective Service of the South African Police Service  
 
Figure 4.1: The logo of the South African Police Service. 
 
4.4.1.1 Legal mandate 
 
The legal mandate of the Detective Service of the South African Police Service is 
found in section 205 (3) of the Constitution which stipulates that the objects of the 
police service are to prevent, combat and investigate crime, to maintain public 
order, protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property and 
to uphold and enforce the law. 
 
Although the Constitution does not prescribe exclusive rights for the SAPS to 
investigate crime, the impression is that the SAPS is constitutionally and 
legislatively mandated to deal with crime. The SAPS’ constitutional mandate 
filters down to the South African Police Service Act and the Criminal Procedure 
Act.  
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4.4.1.2 Power and authority 
 
In terms of section 41 of the Criminal Procedure Act, the police have the power to 
stop and question an individual at any time. The police can ask an individual to 
produce an ID book at any time and such individual must do this. The police can 
question anyone without arresting them.  
 
But, whether a person has to answer the police's questions depends on the 
circumstances. The police may ask individuals to give their full name and 
address if they suspect them of committing a crime, suspect them of trying to 
commit a crime, or think that they might be able to give them some information 
about a crime. Sometimes the police need to collect evidence against criminals. 
The police are therefore allowed to search and seize goods or suspected stolen 
property in terms of sections 20 to 25 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
 
There are two ways of searching and seizing property. These are search with or 
without search warrant. Search with a search warrant (section 22 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act) is the legal permission for a search. It is usually signed by a 
magistrate. It must describe the person or the place to be searched and the 
things which the police will seize.  
 
The police must carry out the search by day, unless the warrant says they can 
search at night. The police can only search the people and property mentioned in 
the warrant and they can only seize the things mentioned in the warrant.  
 
A special type of search warrant can be issued allowing the police to enter any 
place or premises if they think that a meeting held on the premises threatens 
state security, or if they think that any offence was committed or planned on the 
premises.  
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In terms of section 22 of the Criminal Procedure Act, the police do not need a 
search warrant to search if the police have reasonable grounds for thinking that a 
magistrate would issue a warrant, but that the delay in getting the warrant would 
give the offender time to get rid of the evidence”.  
 
The police can also enter the property to question the suspect, but they must 
always first ask for consent to search or enter the property. The police can use 
force to enter premises if the suspect refuses to allow them in. A policeman can 
only search men, NOT women. Women can only be searched by policewomen or 
any other woman that the police ask to do the searching. Powers of the police to 
arrest are found in sections 39 and 40 of the Criminal Procedure Act.  
 
A lawful arrest is executed in terms of section 39 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
There are three things the police must do to make an arrest lawful: they must tell 
the person that such a person is under arrest, and they must have physical 
control over the person when they effect an arrest. A police officer must tell the 
suspect why they are under arrest as well as read them their rights.  
 
The Criminal Procedure Act includes the power of the police to “shoot to kill” in 
certain situations, in terms of section 49 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act. The 
Act deals with the use of force when effecting an arrest. Section 49 (2) states that 
“deadly force” may be used in certain circumstances to carry out an arrest.  
 
The “shoot to kill” clause was challenged in the Constitutional Court, because it 
infringed a person’s right to life (section 11) (as well as their right to human 
dignity (section 10) and bodily integrity (section 12). Parliament has passed a 
new section 49, but this has not yet been put into operation by the President. 
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In addition to these powers, the police have powers to enter premises in 
connection with state security or any offence (section 25), entering of premises 
for purposes of obtaining evidence (section 26), forfeiture of articles to the state 
(section 35), powers in respect of prints and bodily appearance of the accused 
(section 37) and procedure after arrest, (section 50). In addition to the powers to 
forfeit an article to the state in terms of section 35, the state may make use of 
Chapters 5 and 6 of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act.  
 
In terms of section16 of the South African Police Service Act, the police have the 
power to investigate circumstances amounting to criminal conduct or an 
endeavour thereto, as set out in subsection (2), shall be regarded as organised 
crime, crime which requires national prevention or investigation, or crime which 
requires specialised skills in the prevention and investigation thereof. 
Circumstances contemplated in subsection (1) comprise criminal conduct or 
endeavour thereto (a) by any enterprise or group of persons who have a 
common goal in committing crimes in an organised manner; (b) (i) by a person or 
persons in positions of trust and making use of specialised or exclusive 
knowledge; (ii) in respect of the revenue or expenditure of the national 
government; or (iii) in respect of the national economy or the integrity of 
currencies; (c) which takes on such proportions or is of such a nature that the 
prevention or investigation thereof at national level would be in the national 
interest; (d) in respect of unwrought precious metals or unpolished diamonds; (e) 
in respect of the hunting, importation, exportation, possession, buying and selling 
of endangered species or any products thereof as may be prescribed.  
 
Besides the Criminal Procedure Act and the Prevention of Organised Crime Act, 
generally the police have a monopoly on investigating crime. In addition to these 
powers, the police have powers to grant bail to a suspect in terms of section 59 
of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
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4.4.1.3 Methodology 
 
The Detective Service of the SAPS uses a traditional accusatorial system. 
Accusatorial investigations imply that the prosecutor directs a highly informal 
investigation, since, as a rule, the only admissible evidence is that which is 
accepted during public and oral trial proceedings (http://www.answers.com). The 
purpose of the investigation is to obtain information that will convince the 
prosecutor that sufficient proof exists to prosecute and convict the accused.  
 
A criminal case is reported to the police where the detectives conduct an 
investigation. After an investigation had been completed, a case docket is 
forwarded to the National Prosecuting Authority where the state prosecutor will 
decide whether to prosecute or not (http://www.paralegaladvice.org.za).  
 
If the prosecutor is of the opinion that there are still aspects which the police 
need to follow up before he/she can make a decision about the docket, he/she 
will record such an instruction in the docket and refer it to the investigating officer 
for further investigation (Joubert, 2001:210).  
 
Once the prosecutor has made a decision on the docket, it is returned to the 
investigating officer to finalise the matter. If the prosecutor has decided to 
prosecute, he/she will formulate the charge and decide when and in which court 
the trial will be heard (Joubert, 2001:210). The investigating officer is responsible 
for serving the summons on the accused and for ensuring that all the witnesses 
are also subpoenaed to be at the court on the particular day for the trial to take 
place. The following diagram indicates a typical accusatorial system used by the 
Detective Service of the SAPS. 
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Diagram 4.1: This is a chronological arrangement of a criminal case dealt with by the police. 
 
4.4.1.4 Intelligence gathering 
 
Section 199 of the Constitution stipulates that security services of the Republic 
consist of a single defence force, a single police service and any intelligence 
services established in terms of the Constitution.  
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In this case, the Constitution names four government departments as the leading 
departments mandated to deal with the security of the Republic, namely, the 
South African National Defence Force (SANDF), the South African Police Service 
(SAPS), the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and the South African Secret 
Services (SASS).  
 
According to section 3 of the National Strategic Intelligence Act, [it is the duty of 
the SAPS to gather, correlate, evaluate and use crime intelligence, in support of 
the SAPS as contemplated in section 205 (3) of the Constitution, to institute 
counter intelligence measures within South Africa in order to supply crime 
intelligence to the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee]. Crime 
intelligence is carried out by the Crime Intelligence Division.  
 
4.4.1.5 Accountability and civilian oversight 
 
In terms of section 207 of the Constitution, the National Commissioner is the 
accounting officer, and he/she is accountable to the Minister of Safety and 
Security who is the political head. In addition, there is also the Secretariat for 
Safety and Security which is responsible for policy matters.  
 
At provincial level, the Member of the Executive Council is also the political head 
of the police in that particular province. What is important is the role of the 
Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD).  
 
The ICD was established in terms of section 50 of the South African Police 
Service Act. The functions of the ICD are “investigation of police misconduct, 
deaths in police custody or as a result of police action”. These functions are 
extended to the members of the Metropolitan and Municipal Police agencies.  
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4.4.1.6 Code of conduct and ethical behaviour 
 
The SAPS uses two codes of conduct/discipline regulations, namely, the SAPS 
Discipline Regulations of 2006 for police officials and the Public Service 
Bargaining Council Disciplinary Code of 2002 for civilians. This is done to 
minimise confusion.  
 
4.4.1.7 Structures of the Detective Service 
 
The Detective Service consists of four components, namely, General 
Investigation, Serious and Violent Crime, Organised Crime and Commercial 
Branch (http://www.saps.gov.za). This means that there are four main 
investigative components, and within the components there are various 
investigative units, including the stock theft unit and others.  
 
In order to ensure effective investigation, the Detective Service uses the services 
of the Criminal Record Centre, the Forensic Science Laboratory Division and 
Crime Intelligence.  
 
The functions of the Detective Service are: to ensure effective investigation of 
general crime including crime that is not investigated by any other investigation 
unit; to ensure effective investigation of commercial related crimes; to ensure 
effective operational information service, which is dactyloscopically based, and 
also the collection of physical evidence at crime scenes including the 
reconstruction of scenes by means of scientific techniques.  
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4.4.1.6 (a) General Investigation 
 
The main function of the general investigation unit is to ensure the development 
and maintenance of crime stop facilities, occult-related investigations and witness 
protection related matters (Circular 3/1/5/1/155, dated 2001-04-25). The general 
investigation component is made up of operational detectives who investigate a 
broad category of crimes. They normally work from police stations. These 
detectives carry out duties such as gathering evidence, executing warrants of 
arrest or search warrants, preparing case dockets for court proceedings, 
attending crime scenes, tracking and arresting criminals, etc.  
 
4.4.1.7 (b) Organised Crime Unit 
 
Organised Crime in South Africa is governed by the Drugs and Drug Trafficking 
Act; Prevention of Organised Crime Act and section 16 of the South African 
Police Service Act. The functions of the Organised Crime Unit component are: 
investigation of selected organised crime regarding identified individuals and 
syndicates, conducting special intelligence-driven operations or task teams 
regarding organised crime, (especially vehicles, firearms and drugs). 
 
The functions of this unit also include the investigating of corruption cases, and 
managing specialised desks or disciplines in respect of vehicle thefts, cross-
border crimes, endangered species, illegal aliens, drug-related crimes, gold and 
diamond, stock theft, transito theft (heists), family, child and sexual offences 
(Circular 3/1/5/1/155, dated 2001-04-25).  
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4.4.1.7 (c) Serious and Violent Crime Unit 
 
This component deals with the investigation of national priority and other 
identified serious and violent crimes. It also deals with the management of the 
desks of disciplines relating to serious and violent crime. The functions of this 
unit are to investigate murder and robbery related crimes, taxi-related crimes, 
vehicle hijackings, gangsterism, illegal firearm related crimes and crimes against 
the State.  
 
Emphasis is also placed on the project-driven investigation of selected serious 
and violent crimes which are a national priority (Circular 3/1/5/1/155, dated 2001-
04-25). Recently, due to transformation and reorganisation of the SAPS, this unit 
also investigates the following crimes: murders involving important persons such 
as judicial officials, politicians, members of the SAPS, and political violence 
(http://www.saps.gov.za).  
 
4.4.1.7 (d) Commercial Branch 
 
This component deals with the effective investigation of commerce-related 
crimes, as well as the development and maintenance of the strategic direction of 
the following units: Commercial Crime Unit, Syndicate Fraud Unit, Serious 
Economic Offences, Computer Crimes Unit and Custom Law Enforcement Tasks 
Groups (CLETG), (Circular 3/1/5/1/155, dated 2001-04-25). The commercial 
branch investigates offences in terms of statutes regarding the actions of 
accountants and auditors, agriculture, banking and currency, companies, courts, 
debtors and creditors (http://www.saps.gov.za).  
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In practice, the SAPS’s Commercial Branch investigates commercial crime cases 
that are serious enough to be dealt with in a regional court or High Court. The 
commercial branch is also responsible for the investigation of fraud and 
corruption, as well as theft involving assets, money, clone cheques, forgery and 
uttering of credit cards.  
 
Commercial Crimes Reported to the 
SAPS  
2004/2005 
Commercial crimes  53 281 
 
Table 4.2: This table show crimes reported to the SAPS and does not include the cases finalised 
and those where assets have been finalised. Assets recovered fall under the NPA Annual report 
(http://www.saps.org.za). 
 
4.4.2 The Departmental Investigating Unit (DIU) of the Department 
Correctional Services (DCS) 
 
 
Figure 4.2: The South African Coat of Arms used by the Department of Correctional Services as 
its departmental logo.  
 
4.4.2.1 Legal mandate 
 
The DIU conducts investigations in terms of section 95 of the Correctional 
Services Act, read with section 34 of Correctional Services Amendment Act. 
 123
Section 34 of the Correctional Services Amendment Act gives the DIU a mandate 
to “conduct an internal service evaluation by means of internal auditing, 
performance auditing, inspections and investigations of theft, corruption and any 
other dishonest practices or irregularities”. Section 95 suggests “measures to 
combat theft, fraud, corruption and any dishonest practices”.  
 
4.4.2.2 Powers and authority 
 
Section 96 of the Correctional Services Act stipulates that the “powers and 
functions of a correctional officer are the same as those stipulated in the purpose 
of the Act, which is the safe custody of inmates”. This is vague because these 
powers refer to the powers given to general members of the Department of 
Correctional Services, and not those of the DIU.  
 
According to Malatjie (2006) the DIU uses the same powers as those bestowed 
upon all correctional officers in terms of section 96 of the Correctional Services 
Act read with section 34 (b) of the Correctional Services Amendment Act which 
states that “the Commissioner must establish a unit to investigate theft, 
corruption and any dishonest practice or irregularities”.  
 
This unit is responsible for conducting investigations of reported cases of 
corruption, fraud and serious maladministration. The anti-corruption desk is 
tasked with the function of ensuring clean and transparent administration by 
means of pro-active and reactive anti-corruption measures in order to promote a 
corruption-free department. The main responsibilities of this unit are: to identify 
corruption, dishonesty and malpractice by investigating written, verbal and 
telephonic reports, submit findings as well as recommendations to the 
Commissioner, and advise top management on strategies to prevent corruption, 
dishonesty and malpractice (http://www.dcs.gov.za). 
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4.4.2.2 (a) Arrest 
 
Section 100 (1) of the Correctional Services Act states that “in addition to the 
powers of arrest which a correctional officer has in terms of section 40 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act, any correctional officer has the power to arrest without a 
warrant any person whom he/she reasonably suspects of having committed an 
offence defined in the Act”. Again, these powers are general powers of all 
correctional officers and not only members of the DIU. 
 
4.4.2.2 (b) Entry, search and seizure 
 
In addition to the powers conferred on an ordinary correctional officer as a peace 
officer in terms of section 40 of the Criminal Procedure Act, any correctional 
officer has the power to enter any premises to search without warrant any other 
person or place and seize any article, when this is reasonably necessary. This is 
done in terms of section 101 (1) (2) (3) of the Correctional Services Act. These 
powers are more focused on prisoners or inmates. These powers are not linked 
to DIU members specifically, but to correctional officers generally. 
 
4.4.2.2 (c) Use of force 
 
In terms of section 102 (1) of the Correctional Services Act, [the use of force in 
terms of any other provision of the Act or any other Act, which include 
mechanical restraints, non-lethal incapacitating devices, firearms and any other 
weapons, any correctional officer is authorised to use force against any person 
who assists an escapee or who disrupts or threatens to disrupt the operation or 
the enforcement of the conditions of community corrections].  
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Every correctional officer is also authorised to use force in terms of sections 32, 
33 and 34 of the Correctional Services Act. In the case of firearms, such a 
firearm can only be used by a trained correctional officer and sections 49 (1) and 
(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act apply. These powers are in relation to the way 
in which correctional officers should handle inmates or prisoners. 
 
4.4.2.3 Methodology 
 
According to Malatjie (2006), the DIU uses both accusatorial and inquisitorial 
investigative methods. Accusatorial investigations imply that the prosecutor 
directs a highly informal investigation, since, as a rule, the only admissible 
evidence is that which is accepted during public and oral trial proceedings.  
 
The researcher does agree with Malatjie’s view in the sense that certain 
investigations are sent to the police after completion, which uses a more 
accusatorial system. Some cases are also referred to the DSO, AFU and SIU, 
which use a more inquisitorial system.  
 
4.4.2.4 Intelligence gathering 
 
The DIU does not have an intelligence gathering mandate. It is somehow 
surprising that Chapter 11 of the Constitution does not recognise the Correctional 
Services, as part of the security institutions. In addition to the omission in the 
Constitution, the National Strategic Intelligence Act also does not recognise 
Correctional Services, including the DIU, as an institution that is capable of 
gathering intelligence.  
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4.4.2.5 Accountability and civilian oversight 
 
According to section 3 of the Correctional Services Act, Correctional Services is 
accountable to the Commissioner of Correctional Services, who is also the 
accounting officer. The Commissioner reports to the Minister of Correctional 
Services, who is the political head.  
 
Although there are DIU units in the provinces, such units report directly to the 
DIU National Office in Pretoria (Malatjie 2006). The Correctional Services Act 
and the Correctional Services Amendment Act do not make any provision for a 
civilian oversight for the DIU. The Judicial Inspectorate and the Independent 
Person Visitors are only responsible for the inspection of prisons and the 
treatment of prisoners.   
 
4.4.2.6 Structures 
 
The DIU is a unit within the Chief Directorate Legal and Special Operations, 
entrusted with spearheading the implementation of the Department of 
Correctional Services’s anti-corruption strategy.  
 
According to Malatjie (2005), the Directorate Legal and Special Operations has 
three legs, namely, investigation, code enforcement and prevention. The 
investigation arm is known as the Departmental Investigation Unit (DIU). 
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4.4.3 The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) 
 
Figure 4.3: The logo of the National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa 
 
Section 179 (1) of the Constitution provided a mechanism for the creation of a 
National Prosecuting Authority. This led to the promulgation of the National 
Prosecuting Authority Act. The aim of this Act is to simplify the cooperation 
between different government departments within the Criminal Justice System. 
Accordingly, the office of the Attorney-General underwent some changes with the 
enactment of the Act.  
 
Furthermore, the Act creates certain channels that result in closer cooperation 
between the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development and the 
South African Police Service. A National Director of Public Prosecutions heads 
the National Prosecuting Authority (Joubert, 2001:13).  
 
Currently, the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) is divided into six 
components, namely: Directorate of Special Operations (DSO), National 
Prosecuting Services, Assets Forfeiture Unit, Witness Protection, Support 
Services and Corporate Services. For the purpose of this research, the focus will 
be on the Directorate of Special Operations (DSO) and Asset Forfeiture Unit. 
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4.4.3.1 Directorate of Special Operations (DSO) 
 
Figure 4.4: The logo of the Directorate of Special Operations (DSO) 
 
The Directorate of Special Operations (DSO), nicknamed “The Scorpions”, was 
launched in September 1999 in Guguletu near Cape Town. After experiencing 
some problems, the National Assembly amended the National Prosecuting 
Authority Act to establish the Directorate of Special Operations as an 
investigating directorate of the National Prosecuting Authority. This was done in 
terms of the National Prosecuting Authority Amendment Act.  
Before the DSO could be established, there were two units which functioned in 
terms of Presidential Proclamation 102 of 1998: the Investigating Directorate of 
Organised Crime and Public Safety, as well as the Investigating Directorate of 
Serious and Economic Offences. With the passing of the National Prosecuting 
Authority Amendment Act, the two investigating units amalgamated and formed 
the DSO.  
 
4.4.3.1 (a) Legal mandate 
 
The legal mandate of the Scorpions is found in the following pieces of legislation: 
section 43A of the National Prosecuting Authority Act, section 179 of the 
Constitution (it is so alleged), section 7 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act 
and section 2 of the National Prosecuting Authority Amendment Act. The existing 
mandate is ambitious, and this, together with the fact that the DSO was to be 
built ‘from scratch’, made it inevitable that there would be some disappointment 
in its performance in the short-term (Mashele, 2006:3).  
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4.4.3.1 (b) Powers and authority 
 
The legislative aim is to investigate, gather, keep and analyse information, 
institute criminal proceedings, related to offences committed, in an organised 
fashion and categories of offences determined by the President by proclamation 
(NPA Strategic Plan, 2001:49).  
 
In terms of section 7 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act, read with section 
4 of the National Prosecuting Authority Amendment Act, the powers of the 
investigative directorate are: 
 
to investigate, and carry out any functions incidental to 
investigations, gather, keep and analyze information and where 
appropriate, institute criminal proceedings and carry out any 
necessary functions incidental to instituting criminal proceedings. 
 
In terms of section 30 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act, read with section 
14 of the National Prosecuting Authority Amendment Act, the DSO special 
investigators have the powers - as provided for in the Criminal Procedure Act - 
which have been bestowed upon a peace officer or a police official relating to the 
investigation of offences, the ascertainment of bodily features of an accused 
person, the entry and search of premises, the seizure and disposal of articles, 
arrest, the execution of warrants, and the attendance of an accused person in 
court.  
 
According to the wording of the appointment certificates (identification cards) of 
the members of the DSO, investigators have the power to use their official 
firearms in terms of sections 49 (1) and (2) of the Criminal Procedure Act, section 
7 of the National Prosecuting Authority Amendment Act and the Firearms Control 
Act.  
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4.4.3.1 (c) Methodology 
 
The methodology used by the DSO is based on the troika principle which 
integrates the following: analysis/intelligence, investigation and prosecution. The 
DSO investigative team consists of an investigator, a prosecutor and analysts 
who collect intelligence information. This happens from the beginning to the end 
of the case. After completing the investigation, they take the case to court and 
the prosecutor, who was involved in the initial stage, leads the prosecution. This 
is more inquisitorial because of the involvement of the prosecutor who is part of 
the judiciary in terms of the separation of powers doctrine. Intelligence gathering 
will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7, under 7.11. 
 
Investigation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis/Intelligence:                                                                             Prosecution 
Diagram 4.2: This triangle is used in the DSO methodology of investigating its cases 
 
4.4.3.1 (d) Intelligence gathering 
 
Section 199 of the Constitution stipulates that the security services of the 
Republic consist of a single defence force, a single police service and any 
intelligence services established in terms of the Constitution.  
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According to section 1 of the National Strategic Intelligence Act, the DSO is not 
part of the security agencies. On the other hand, the DSO collects and analyses 
crime intelligence, contrary to section 1 of the National Strategic Intelligence Act 
and section 199 of the Constitution.  
 
4.4.3.1 (e) Structures of the DSO (Scorpions) 
 
The DSO consists of four divisions, namely, operational support, crime analysis 
(intelligence), training and investigation. There are five regions situated in the 
following provinces, Gauteng (Pretoria), KwaZulu-Natal (Durban), Eastern Cape 
(East London), Western Cape (Cape Town) and the Free State (Bloemfontein). 
The following is the breakdown of successes of the DSO during the 2004/5 
financial year. 
 
OUTPUT/INDICATOR ACHIEVED  
2004/5 
TARGET 
2004 
ACHIEVED 
2005  
Match between threat analysis 
and targets in focus areas  
24 Targets  30 38  
Pro-activity scope and 
intelligence products  
37  46  77  
Number of investigations 
finalised in focus areas 
205  250  325  
Number of prosecutions 
finalised  
180  250  234  
Conviction rate  94%  80%  88%  
Asset value under restraint  R 132.49 m 250 m CARA  220,1 m 
Money Laundering and 
racketeering cases  
4  Benchmarking aimed at 
reaching 50  
39  
Operative action  656  660  1103 
Contraband Yield  R1.151 Billions  R605 m  R2,46 Billion 
Table 4.3: These are the successes of the DSO for the 2004/2005 financial year. NPA Annual Report for 2004/2005:87. 
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4.4.3.1 (f) Cherry-picking accusations  
 
Almost as soon as successful DSO cases began to be publicised, accusations of 
DSO “cherry-picking” arose. Specifically, the DSO is accused of choosing to 
investigate and prosecute only matters which they are sure to win. Sometimes 
this accusation went further, to suggest the DSO had a tendency to take over 
cases already substantially investigated by the SAPS, taking all the credit for the 
subsequent successful conclusion of the matter.  
 
More generally, there is discomfort as to which cases become “DSO matters” in 
law enforcement language, (Maluleke, 2005:1). It is easy to dismiss the 
accusations as ‘sour grapes’, but the very real uncertainty remains how a matter 
comes to be pursued by the DSO. What then, is the DSO’s mandate?  
 
Given the complexity of the answer to this question, it is not unsurprising that 
uncertainty exists (Redpath, 2004:2). The legislation creating the DSO describes 
a legislative mandate encompassing a broad concept of organised crime – any 
crime committed in an “organised fashion” – which is so wide that just about any 
matter could be argued to fall under the DSO mandate.  
 
Presidential Proclamations 105 and 123 of 1998 do not make things any easier, 
because the lists of offences are very long and vague. The legislation 
furthermore specifically retains all of the police’s powers of investigation, so that 
this mandate is not exclusive to the DSO. Clearly, such a broad mandate is not 
practical for those ‘on the ground’ who must put it into practice (Maluleke, 
2005:2).  
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The legislature appeared to have envisaged that a negotiated operational 
mandate would emerge, and that a Ministerial Committee, consisting solely of 
Cabinet members created by the legislation, would confirm procedures for the 
transferals of matters to the DSO (Maluleke, 2005:1). There are further general 
criteria or factors that must be considered, covering such questions as ‘‘is the 
criminal activity involved complex, and does it comprise at least five persons?’’  
 
4.4.3.1 (g) The Khampepe Commission of Inquiry findings 
 
The President of South Africa appointed the Khampepe Commission in October 
2005 to inquire into the mandate and location of the Directorate of Special 
Operations (DSO) and other matters pertaining to the functioning of this 
institution. The commission has completed its report after a process that entailed 
written and oral submissions from various interested parties. The commission 
asserted that the legal framework regulating the mandate and location of the 
DSO was not in conflict with the Constitution.  
 
The commission found that the Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development did not have practical and effective oversight responsibility in 
respect of the law enforcement functions of the DSO. The commission also 
recommended that the DSO should be retained within the NPA, but in order to 
enhance oversight, it recommended that the President should exercise the power 
conferred on him by section 197(b) of the Constitution by conferring the political 
oversight and responsibility for the law enforcement component of the DSO to 
the Minister of Safety and Security.  
 
In the above framework, prosecutors who work for the DSO would continue to 
receive instructions and be accountable to the National Director of Public 
Prosecutions (NDPP).  
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The NDPP, in turn, would remain accountable to the Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development as currently provided for in the law (Mashele, 
2006:3). The commission further recommended that the capacity of the relevant 
entities within the SAPS should be enhanced, for example, by investing them 
with the same legal powers of the DSO and co-locating prosecutors with its 
investigators and analysts (http://www.info.gov.za). 
 
It was also recommended that the DSO should desist from making public 
announcements on the subject matter of its investigations, where such 
communication could undermine the fundamental rights of affected entities and 
individuals (Mashele, 2006:3).  
 
4.4 3.2 Assets Forfeiture Unit (AFU) 
 
4.4.3.2 (a) Legal mandate 
 
In South Africa, the Asset Forfeiture Unit was established in May 1999 in the 
office of the National Director of Public Prosecution, to focus on the 
implementation of Chapters 5 and 6 of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act. 
Strangely, the Prevention of Organised Crime Act does not mention the 
establishment of an Asset Forfeiture Unit within the NPA.  
 
The Act speaks of the state recovering the proceeds of crime and instruments 
used to commit crime. As to which institution is responsible for the seizure of 
property, the Act is silent. This is a problem, because the legal mandate is not 
spelt out clearly. 
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4.4.3.2 (b) Powers and authority of the Asset Forfeiture Unit (AFU) 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act make provision for 
property tainted by criminal activity to be forfeited to the state by way of a civil 
action.  Commonly called civil asset forfeiture, this allows the state to confiscate 
a suspected criminal’s assets purely through a civil action against the property, 
without the need to obtain a criminal conviction against the owner of the property.  
 
On application by the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP), the High 
Court can make an order forfeiting property to the state that the court, on balance 
of probabilities, finds to be “an instrumentality” of a crime, or is the “proceeds of 
unlawful activities”.  
 
In terms of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act, the Asset Forfeiture Unit 
(AFU) has the following functions: seizure of large amounts of cash associated 
with the drug trade; seizure of property used in the drug trade or other crime; 
investigating corruption; white collar crime; targeting serious criminals; and 
violent crime.  
 
The application of Chapter 5 of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act is 
dependent on the State securing a conviction in a criminal court. After conviction, 
the State may apply to have forfeited, from the convicted person, an amount 
equal to the benefit derived as a result of the commission of the proven offence. 
Chapter 6 of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act permits the State to forfeit 
the proceeds and instrumentalities of crime in a civil process that is not 
dependent on or related to any criminal prosecution or conviction.  
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AFU does not have investigative and arresting powers but provides service to 
both the SAPS and the Scorpions. According to Chinner (2006), the AFU has 
personnel seconded from both the DSO and the SAPS, who are used as their 
investigators.  
 
4.4.3.2 (c) Methodology 
 
According to Chinner (2006), the AFU uses both inquisitorial and accusatorial 
systems, depending on the situation. The inquisitorial and accusatorial systems 
have already been discussed under the methodology of the police and the DSO. 
The researcher’s assessment of the AFU is that the fact that investigators are 
located within the NPA premises makes it more inquisitorial than accusatorial.  
 
4.4.3.2 (d) Intelligence gathering 
 
The Prevention of Organised Crime Act, the National Strategic Intelligence Act, 
The National Prosecuting Authority Act and the National Prosecuting Authority 
Amendment Act do not make provision for the AFU to gather intelligence. 
 
4.4.3.2 (e) Accountability and civilian oversight 
 
The Prevention of Organised Crime Act does not make any provision as to who 
is the accounting officer of the AFU. However, the fact that the AFU is a unit 
within the NPA is an indication that the National Director of Public Prosecution 
(NDPP) is the accounting officer.  
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The NDPP is accountable to the Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development, who is the political head. The Prevention of Organised Crime Act, 
the National Prosecuting Authority Act and the National Prosecuting Authority 
Amendment Act do not make provision for civilian oversight, which looks at the 
activities of the AFU.  
 
4.4.3.2 (g) Structures of the AFU 
 
The AFU consists of a litigation unit and seconded investigators from the SAPS 
and the DSO, advocates and accountants, even though this is not provided for in 
the Prevention of Organised Crime Act.  
 
Indicator Target   Achieved % Target 
achieved 
2003/4 2004/5. Total as of 
31/03/05 
Case load       
Number of 
seizures 
180  160  89%  228  70%  681  
Cases 
completed 
150  148  99%  148  100%  429  
Monetary 
target  
Rm    Rm    
Seizures 250.0  233.8  94%  222.6  105%  958.3  
Cases 
completed 
75.0  171.2  228%  86.7%  197%  331.5  
Funds into 
CARA 
60.0  24.5  41%  35.7  69%  78.5  
Funds to 
victims 
20.0  66.3  332%  15.0  442%  78%  
 
Table 4.4: These are the achievements of the AFU for the 2004/2005 financial year: NPA Annual Report 
2004/2005:78. 
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4.4.4 Special Investigating Unit (SIU) 
 
Figure 4.5: The logo of the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) 
 
4.4.4.1 Legal mandate 
 
The mandate of the SIU is contained in the Special Investigating Units and 
Special Tribunals Act 74 of 1997. The unit carries out investigations as referred 
to it by the President, via publication of a proclamation in the Government 
Gazette. Following the investigation, civil action can be instituted in the Special 
Tribunal for the recovery, savings or prevention of loss of State assets and State 
moneys, should the investigation reveal that such monies or assets were 
misappropriated and unlawfully obtained.  
 
The SIU was first established in 1996 headed by former Judge Willem Heath. 
Judge Heath resigned in June 2001 after a Constitutional Court finding indicated 
that a judge was not able to head an investigating unit. In the Case CCT 27/00 at 
[70], Judge Chaskalson made the following ruling: section 3 (1) of Special 
Investigating Units and Tribunals Act was declared to be inconsistent with the 
Constitution and invalid, and Presidential Proclamation R24 of 1997 and R31 of 
1999 were declared to be inconsistent with the Constitution, and invalid. The SIU 
then formally ceased to exist. The President then established the new SIU by 
Presidential Proclamation R118 on 31 July 2001, and appointed Willie Hofmeyer 
as its head.  
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The SIU works closely with the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) to ensure 
that prosecutions are done as soon as possible. It also works with the Asset 
Forfeiture Unit (Willie Hofmeyer is also the deputy head of the NPA) in cases 
where its powers are more suited to recover the proceeds of crime.  
 
4.4.4.2 Powers and authority  
 
The SIU focus is on civil action, and it does not have the power to make arrests 
or prosecute suspects. The SIU is an investigative body set up by the 
government to investigate corruption and maladministration in the public sector 
and to use civil proceedings to recover losses and secure savings for the State.  
 
Its strength lies in its powers to act speedily to save, recover and protect public 
assets through the Civil Law Procedure and litigate through a Special Tribunal. 
The SIU can, for example, obtain court orders, in terms of section 5 of the 
Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Amendment Act 12 of 2004, to 
compel a person to pay back any wrongful benefit they have received, to cancel 
contracts when the proper procedures were not followed, and to stop 
transactions or other actions that were not properly authorised. 
 
4.4.4.3 Methodology  
 
The SIU employs investigators, lawyers, forensic accountants and analysts in 
multidisciplinary investigations. According to PSC August, (2001:73), the 
activities of the unit are designed to effectively combat maladministration, 
corruption and fraud involving the administration of State institutions, to protect 
assets and public money, and to take civil legal action to correct any wrongdoing.  
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4.4.4.4 Intelligence gathering  
 
According to Davids (2006), the SIU does not have any intelligence gathering 
powers and functions. The Special Investigating Unit and Special Tribunals Act, 
the Special Investigating Unit and Special Tribunals Amendment Act and the 
National Strategic Intelligence Act make no provision for intelligence gathering by 
the SIU. 
 
4.4.4.5 Accountability and civilian oversight 
 
The SIU reports to Mr Willie Hofmeyer who is one of the deputies of the National 
Prosecuting Authority who is also the head of the AFU. This means that the AFU, 
SIU and the DSO are accountable to the NPA. The NPA reports to the Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development as the political head. The Special 
Investigating Units and Tribunals Act does not make any provision for a civilian 
oversight.  
 
4.4.5.6 Structures of the SIU 
 
According to Davids (2006), the SIU consist of three sections, namely, 
investigation section, prosecutors and forensic auditors. These are the main 
sections of the investigating arm of the SIU. The following table indicates the 
work done by the SIU since 2003. 
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Performance  
measures 
2003/2004 
Target  
Actual  2004/2005 
Target  
Actual  2005/2006 
Target  
Savings  R70 m R372.8 m R 500 m R 92 m  R 1 000 m 
Preventions  _ _ _ R3 435 m  _ 
Cash recoveries  R 50 m  R13.7 m R30 m R12 m  R4 m  
Totals  R120 m  R 386.5 m R530 m  R3 539 m  R1 040 m 
 
Table 4.5: These are the successes of the SIU for the 2004/2005 financial year. SIU Annual 
Report 2004/2005:10. 
 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
 
It is important that whenever an agency is established, the government should 
guard against duplication of functions which may result in waste of time and 
resources. It is now an international norm for countries to have agencies 
responsible for crimes such as corruption, fraud, economic crime and organised 
crime. However, such agencies need to have a properly defined mandate and 
jurisdiction.  
 
The researcher has recently (November 2006) visited the Independent 
Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in Hong Kong where he witnessed the 
functioning of that agency and noted why this agency is so successful in fighting 
corruption. It is not only Hong Kong - Nigeria has established an Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Botswana has a Directorate on Economic 
Crimes Commission (DECC), and Malawi has an Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB). 
(These agencies will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6). 
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CHAPTER 5: PROCESSES IN THE INVESTIGATIVE FUNCTIONS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the kind of processes that are currently 
practised in South Africa, and also to determine if the current system is 
consistent with our Criminal Justice System. Crime investigation by any law 
enforcement agency is in essence a systematic and scientifically oriented search 
for facts in the form of direct or indirect evidence.  
 
In this case, law enforcement agencies use either inquisitorial or accusatorial 
investigative systems or, a combination of the two, depending on the type of 
Criminal Justice System used in a particular country. The debate about the use 
of inquisitorial or accusatorial systems in this discussion comes as a result of 
different investigative methods used by the DSO, the SAPS’s Detective Service, 
the AFU, the SIU and the DIU. This discussion will look at which method is used 
by each institution and find out which method conforms to the legal system in 
South Africa. 
 
5.2 DEFINITIONS 
 
5.2.1 Criminal procedure 
 
Criminal Procedure regulates the entire workings of the prosecutorial machinery, 
including the court's structure, the structure of the prosecution, the position of 
suspects or accused person, police powers, pre-trial procedure, detention, bail, 
charge sheets, indictments, pleading, the trial, verdict, sentencing, and post-trial 
remedies (Geldenhuys & Joubert, 1996:4). 
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5.2.2 Due process model 
 
A due process model presupposes that a suspect or an accused is a full legal 
subject with rights and powers, and that State power is circumscribed and limited 
by law. The modern Western European system, for instance, is due process 
inquisitorial systems. In Germany an accused has all the rights that an accused 
has under Anglo-American systems, if not more (Geldenhuys & Joubert, 
1996:15).  
 
5.3 THE INQUISITORIAL SYSTEM 
 
The inquisitorial system is broadly centered in Europe, particularly in France, 
Switzerland and Italy. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the United 
States of America (USA) also use the same system and they were forerunners in 
introducing it to South Africa. This happened around 1997 when the former USA 
Director General of the Department of Justice visited South Africa.  
 
One of the offers given to South Africa at that time was training, hence the first 
DSO intake were trained by the FBI. In this system the judge is a much more 
active participant in the proceedings. This means that the judge actively conducts 
and even controls the truth by dominating the questioning of the witnesses and 
the accused, (http://www.iap.nl.com).  
 
After arrest, the accused is questioned primarily by the investigating judge and 
not by the police. In the trial, the presiding judge primarily does the questioning 
and not the counsel for the prosecution or the defence. In this way the judge has 
the task of determining the truth of the matter by whatever means he feels 
necessary to use.  
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The judge is not bound by the evidence which the parties present to him and is 
free to utilise his/her own enterprise to locate appropriate information which could 
assist in ascertaining the truth of the matter, and thus do real justice to the 
parties concerned.  In doing so, the judge is seeking the truth in a much more 
objective way (Palmieri, undated: 2).  
 
Indeed the judge may look behind the specific facts and issues of the case, if it is 
felt that the information found may help to discover the truth of the matter. The 
only ostensible circumscription is that the evidence which the judge seeks to 
prove must be relevant, although relevance is given a much broader definition 
than might be had in the adversarial system (Geldenhuys & Joubert, 1996:14).  
 
The decision in an inquisitorial criminal trial is made by the collective vote of a 
certain number of professional judges and a small group of lay assessors. 
Neither the prosecution nor the defendant has an opportunity to question the lay 
assessors for bias (http://www.answers.com). Prosecutors in the inquisitorial 
system do not have a personal incentive to win convictions for political gain.  
 
Prosecutors initiate criminal proceedings and then transfer cases to an 
examining magistrate. However, they supervise and control all police and 
gendarmerie (police force under the Ministry of Defence in France) investigations 
before such cases are transferred to the investigating judge 
(http://www.polis.osce.org).  
 
In France, for example, once a case has been transferred and a judicial 
investigation begun, the police and gendarmerie officers act under the authority 
and supervision of the examining magistrate.  
 
 145
5.4 THE ACCUSATORIAL SYSTEM 
 
In this system the judge is in the role of detached umpire, who should not enter 
the arena of the fight between the prosecution and the defence, for fear of 
becoming partial or losing focus as a result of all the ‘dust caused by the frays’ 
(Geldenhuys & Joubert, 1996:14). The police are the primary investigative force, 
in the sense that they pass the collected evidence on to the prosecution, in a 
dossier or docket format, who then becomes dominis litis.  
 
The prosecution decides on the appropriate charges, the appropriate court, etc. 
In court the trial takes the form of a contest between two theoretically equal 
parties, namely, the prosecution and the defence who do the questioning in turn, 
leading their own witnesses and cross-examining the opposition’s witnesses 
(Palmieri, undated:2). As has been pointed out, no real-life system conforms 
exactly to a specific model.  
 
South African Criminal Procedure has basically been accusatorial, but in certain 
circumstances a judge may call witnesses of his own. In terms of section 112 (1) 
(a) (b) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 
when an accused at a summary trial in any court pleads guilty to 
the offence charged, or to an offence of which he may be convicted 
on the charge and the prosecutor accepts that plea – and the 
accused or his legal representative hands a written statement by 
the accused into court, in which the court the accused sets out all 
the facts which he admits and on which he has pleaded guilty, the 
court may in lieu of questioning the accused convict the accused on 
the strength of such statement and sentence him, but the court may 
in its discretion put any question to the accused in order to clarify 
any matter raised in the statement.  
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The discretion to put questions to the accused lies with the presiding judge or 
magistrate. This is an inquisitorial element. If the accused pleads ‘not guilty’ to 
the offence charged at a summary trial, “the presiding judge, regional magistrate 
or magistrate, as the case may be, may ask the accused whether he wishes to 
make a statement indicating the basis of his defence” in terms of section 115 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act.  
 
Therefore, the procedure of questioning that takes place under sections 112 and 
115 of the Criminal Procedure Act contains inquisitorial elements. On the other 
hand, the fact that an accused can be found guilty of an offence solely on his 
plea of guilty, without the judge doing any questioning to investigate the truth, is a 
strong accusatorial element, even though it can happen only in the case of 
relatively minor offences.  
 
Section 112 (b) of the Criminal Procedure Act further states that if the presiding 
judge is satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence to which he has 
confessed or admitted, convict the accused on his plea of guilty of that offence 
and impose any competent sentence.  
 
Furthermore, section 112 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Act states that 
nothing in the Ac prevents the prosecutor from presenting evidence on 
any aspect of the charge, or the court from hearing evidence, including 
evidence or a statement by or on behalf of the accused, with regard to 
sentence, or from questioning the accused on any aspect of the case for 
the purposes of determining an appropriate sentence. 
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5.5 THE JURY SYSTEM 
 
This system is favoured in Common Law countries like Australia, Great Britain 
and the United States of America. The system is minted by the party's legal 
council, whose task is to present their side of evidence and arguments, and thus 
their version of the truth, to the court.  
 
The parties are presumed to be in an equal position with an objective moderator, 
in the form of the judge, to determine relevant points of view and to instruct the 
jury, if there is one in the particular case (http://www.hrschool.org). The jury trial 
was a significant expression of the consent of the people in American history. 
Among the reasons given by the signers of the Declaration of Independence to 
dissolve the political bonds, which connected them to Great Britain, was the 
deprivation of trial by jury.  
 
Trial by jury in criminal cases was incorporated into the constitution itself and the 
grand jury; the criminal petit jury and the civil petit jury were all enumerated in the 
Bill of Rights (http://www.crfc.org). The Anglo American jury is a remarkable 
political institution. It recruits twelve laymen, chosen at random from the widest 
population. It convenes them for the purpose of the particular trial, entrusts them 
with great official powers of decision and it permits them to carry on deliberation 
in secret and to report their judgment without giving reasons for it.  
 
After their momentary service to the State has been completed, it orders them to 
disband and return to private life (Joubert, 1996:14). The jury is thus, by definition 
and experience, in the conduct of serious human affairs that virtually from its 
inception has been the subject of deep controversy. In practice however, not all 
criminal prosecutions require a jury trial.  
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The Supreme Court of America has consistently excluded “petty offences”, as 
distinguished by the punishment of the nature of the offences itself, from both 
state and federal court’s jury, in favour of a trial judge (http://www.opj.usdoj.gov). 
The final phase of a jury's work is also most mysterious. Jury deliberations are 
absolutely secret. There are no prescribed procedures for juries to follow. They 
are left to themselves in a locked room guarded by the court.  
 
To reach a conclusion, the jury is neither required nor allowed to refer their 
reasoning in court, but they are asked only for their verdict. Juries are charged 
today with the responsibility of reaching a verdict based on the facts of the case 
within the law as the trial judge explains it (http://www.opj.usdoj.gov). Almost 
since the beginning of the jury in England, however, jurors have engaged in 
“nullification”, where the jury exercises its discretion in favour of a defendant 
whom the jury nonetheless believes to have committed the act with which he is 
charged.  
 
Jury deliberations are secret, thus nullification is both a convert and controversial 
activity. When people suspect that it has occurred, nullification is seen as a 
fundamental threat to the rule of law, a triumph of democratic government, or 
little or both (Jefferson, 1994:3). 
 
5.6 THE INQUISITORIAL INVESTIGATION 
 
The main feature of the inquisitorial system in criminal justice anywhere in the 
world is the function of the investigating judge or magistrate. The judge or the 
magistrate conducts investigations in the case of severe crimes or complex 
enquiries. It is also the duty of the judge to hear witnesses and suspects in order 
to order searches or other investigations.  
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The goal of the judge is not to prosecute certain people, but the finding of the 
truth, and as such his duty is to look for both incriminating and exculpating 
evidence (http://www.flac.htmlplanet.com). If this judge decides that there is a 
valid case against the suspect, he defers the suspect to a tribunal or court, where 
the proceedings oppose the prosecution and the defence.  
 
The investigating judge does not sit in the court that tries the case, and is, in fact, 
prohibited from sitting on future cases involving the same defendant (Palmieri, 
undated: 2). In France, where this system originates, a suspect is presumed 
guilty until proven innocent. The judge questions the suspect and witnesses, 
arranges a re-enactment of the crime and a confrontation between the accusers 
and suspect (Palmieri, undated: 2).  
 
Every detail, including material favourable to the suspect, goes into a dossier on 
the case. The investigative process itself is written, secret, formal and 
intermittent. The case file is a compilation of chronologically arranged documents 
and affidavits covering a wide range of subjects.  
 
On rare occasions in which a sentence is issued, it becomes just one more 
document in the file, based on the information in the preceding pages. The 
suspect’s lawyer can inspect the dossier at any time and can suggest other lines 
of inquiry (Lawday, 2000:18). This process almost conforms to what the 
prosecutors within the Scorpions do.  
 
During investigation in an inquisitorial system, a case file or dossier remains 
open for an indefinite period, and items are added as information is obtained by 
the police or others involved. Since this evidence does not have to be articulated 
as a formal charge, it does not matter very much if no one is in charge of the 
investigation.  
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In this regard, the individual police officer is rarely identified, nor will s/he testify 
about the events. Instead, the officer’s signature authenticates documents 
introducing evidence into the proceedings, greatly reducing the potential for 
judicial oversight of police activities (http://www.nationmaster.com). 
 
In cases of a serious or complicated nature, the investigation of the case before it 
comes to trial is led by an investigating judge whose functions are not the same 
as the trial judge. The investigating judge does not have to decide upon the guilt 
of the accused. His function is merely to ascertain whether there are sufficient 
grounds for suspicion to warrant an actual trial by a competent court.  
 
These kinds of functions can be compared with preparatory investigations, in the 
South African context. In this instance police services are at his assistance. His 
investigations are carried out strictly within the limits of the processual rules 
governing the criminal procedure, and he carefully keeps a record of all the steps 
he has taken and every investigation he has conducted.  
 
In his search for the truth, one of the principle tasks of the investigating judge is 
to examine and consider all factors which may exonerate the accused 
(http://www.64.233.183.104/search?q). In France, where an inquisitorial system 
is often practiced, the guidelines for investigating judges are governed by 
Chapter I of Title III of the Criminal Code. The situation in France is very 
complicated, because there are various law enforcement agencies with almost 
the same mandate and functions. 
 
These agencies include: the military force or the Gendarmerie Nationale, the 
National Police or Police Nationale, the Municipal Police or Police Municipale, 
Rural Police or Police Rural as well as the Judicial Police or Police Judicial 
(http://enwikepedia.org/wiki/Law-enforcement-in-France). 
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The Judicial Police comprises a variety of actions and functions under the 
direction and supervision of the judiciary. Such functions include: pursuing and 
arresting of suspects, interrogating suspects in some phases of judicial enquiries, 
gathering evidence, and serving search warrants  
 
According to Article 54 of the Criminal Code, “a French Judicial Police official 
who is informed of an offence, informs a prosecutor, goes forthwith to the scene 
of the crime and records any appropriate findings”. This officer ensures the 
conservation of any clues liable to disappear and of any item which may be of 
use in the discovery of the truth (http://www.en.wikepedia.org/wiki/Law-
enforcement-in-France).  
 
Furthermore, the officer seizes any exhibits or instruments which were used to 
commit the crime, as well as any item which appears to have been the product of 
the crime. In terms of Article 72 of the Criminal Code, “where the district 
prosecutor and the investigating judge are simultaneously on the scene of crime, 
the district prosecutor may initiate a regular judicial investigation of which the 
judge present is then seized.  
 
Therefore, it is now clear that criminal enquiries or investigations are conducted 
under the supervision of the public prosecutor or an investigating judge. During a 
preliminary investigation, the police can arrest a person as a suspect for 24 
hours, if necessary. After arresting a suspect, the police must immediately inform 
the public prosecutor, in order to submit the proceeding to judicial control. If this 
is not done immediately, the proceeding is not valid. This process differs slightly 
from the South African process, in the sense that the South African Criminal 
Procedure Act requires that a suspect must appear within 48 hours after arrest.  
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The investigating judge normally invites the accused to cooperate with him in the 
investigation, and he may for this purpose interrogate the accused. It is of the 
utmost importance that the accused is warned by the investigating judge that he 
is no way compelled to speak to the accusation. The accused’s legal 
representative and the prosecutor may only ask questions with the leave 
(permission) of the judge (http://www.64.233.183.104/search?q).  
 
However, the fact that the investigating judge has dual roles, that of a detective 
and that of a judge, compromises objectivity. These two functions of a judge 
contradict each other. In South Africa, the DSO involves the prosecutor, the 
investigator and the analyst right from the beginning of an investigation. This 
process amounts to a clear inquisitorial system.  
 
This allows the prosecutor to know and understand the case right from the 
beginning of the investigation, thus giving him/her an unfair advantage. The 
SAPS do not use this process. When a case is reported, detectives conduct an 
investigation where they use investigation techniques and tactics. After the 
investigation has been completed, the docket is submitted to the NPA for a 
decision whether to prosecute or not to prosecute.  
 
The danger in this process is that the DSO is based within the NPA, and the 
perception is that this arrangement allows the DSO to ‘highjack’ certain 
investigations which the SAPS have already started, or where they have 
completed the investigation.  
 
The fact that there are no clear methods and procedures to control the cases 
done by both the SAPS and the DSO means that there is always room for 
manipulation. According to Malatjie (2006), the DIU uses both inquisitorial and 
accusatorial systems, depending on the complexity of the matter.  
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Malatjie indicates that there are no rules governing the use of accusatorial or 
inquisitorial investigations. The same has been confirmed by Chinner (2006) of 
the Asset Forfeiture Unit. The SIU uses investigators and specialists such as 
forensic auditors, accountants and lawyers/prosecutors. This gives the 
prosecutors an unfair advantage in the case. The fact that the SIU uses the 
Special Tribunal to prosecute their cases is a clear indication of an inquisitorial 
system.  
 
According to Davids (2006), the SIU uses a more inquisitorial system because of 
the nature of their investigations. Malatjie (2006) also believes that the DIU uses 
a more inquisitorial system. However, the researcher believes that the DIU uses 
a more accusatorial system because its investigation teams consist of 
investigators only, and once an investigation is completed, the case is handed 
over to the DSO or SAPS for prosecution.  
 
5.7 THE ACCUSATORIAL INVESTIGATION 
 
Accusatorial investigations imply that the prosecutor directs a highly informal 
investigation, since, as a rule, the only admissible evidence is that which is 
accepted during public and oral trial proceedings. The purpose of the 
investigation is to obtain information that will convince the prosecutor that 
sufficient proof exists to prosecute and convict the accused.  
 
This system is similar to the one used by the SAPS’ Detective Service. In an 
accusatorial investigation, in addition to the prosecutor’s oversight functions, the 
judge also performs an oversight role and does not conduct the investigation 
(Palmieri, undated: 2).  
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Unlike an investigating judge in an inquisitorial system, a presiding officer may 
not call witnesses from the outset, but may only do so in order to bring evidence 
before the court which has been omitted by mistake, or is necessary to cure a 
technical deficiency.  
 
The accusatorial system, on the other hand, is branded as a contest between two 
parties, which seeks to find a winner. The accusatorial systems generally require 
that before a person can even be charged, there must first be in existence and 
available to the prosecutor a body of evidence, gathered by the police, capable of 
establishing beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the person to be charged 
(Barnes, 2004: 2).  
 
The availability of such evidence is achieved by means of a system of criminal 
investigation undertaken by the police. The accusatorial investigation begins 
when a case is reported to the police. Thereafter, an investigator who is a police 
official is appointed to conduct an investigation. During the investigation process, 
covert and overt operations may be used, depending on the nature of the 
offence.  
 
Scientific methods are also used in order to achieve maximum results. Therefore, 
it is clear from the above explanation that the system used by the SAPS 
Detective Service is more accusatorial, as opposed to the troika system used by 
the DSO which is more inquisitorial. The following diagram (Diagram 5.1) 
illustrates various steps in a criminal case which is more accusatorial.  
 
This process is similar to the one used by the SAPS. The DSO follows this 
process after the investigation has been completed. Nothing in the Criminal 
Procedure Act prescribes the manner in which a case should be dealt with.  
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Perhaps this is one of the reasons why the five agencies within the Criminal 
Justice System use different methods. This is problematic, because the law 
creates a vacuum where it does not guide the agencies on how to conduct their 
investigations.  
 
If this is allowed to continue, there will be a stage where every institution will do 
as it pleases. The fact that the Criminal Procedure Act was promulgated to 
actually eliminate the jury system shows that the government wanted to bring in 
some guidelines to law enforcers. However, this has not been fulfilled up to 
today.  
 
5.8 PLEA BARGAINING 
 
A plea bargain is an agreement in a criminal case in which a prosecutor and a 
defence arrange to settle the case against the defendant 
(http://www.nationmaster.com). In terms of this arrangement, the defendant 
agrees to plead guilty, or no contest, in exchange for some concession from the 
prosecutor. This concession can include reducing the original charge or charges, 
dismissing some of the charges against the defendant, or limiting the punishment 
a court can impose on the defendant.  
 
Generally, a plea bargain allows the parties to agree on the outcome and settle 
the pending charge. Plea bargaining in some instances helps the courts and 
prosecutors manage caseloads (http://www.nationmaster.com). In South Africa, a 
number of cases referred/investigated by the Scorpions have been settled by 
plea bargaining. A good example of such cases is the Mark Thatcher case, which 
was highly publicised and was settled by a plea bargain.  
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On the other hand, there have not been many cases that were investigated by 
the police and settled by a plea bargain. Can this be an indication that the DSO is 
not effective in dealing with criminals, or it is an indication that freedom can be 
bought in South Africa? These disparities clearly indicate that there is a lot that 
still needs to be done in order to shape the South African Criminal Justice 
System. 
 
5.9 SHOULD SOUTH AFRICA USE AN INQUISITORIAL OR ACCUSATORIAL 
SYSTEM?  
 
According to the current functioning of South African criminal procedure, it is 
clear that the country subscribes to an accusatorial system. However, various 
investigative institutions use different methods and procedures, because there 
are no clear guidelines outlining and codifying South African criminal procedure 
and its investigations. The lack of proper guidelines allows various institutions to 
use various methods without sanction. 
 
In 1989, the then Minister of Justice requested the South African Law 
Commission to investigate the possibility of simplifying South African criminal 
procedure by looking at introducing more inquisitorial elements into it. This was 
never achieved, but in 2002 the South African Law Commission (2002:xxiii) 
commissioned Project 73 to debate the issue.  
 
The commission made the following suggestion, that section 115 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act be amended to oblige the presiding officer to inform an accused of 
the right to silence, the consequences of remaining silent, that he is not obliged 
to make any confession or admission and to ask him whether he wishes to make 
a statement indicating the basis of his defence.  
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It also obliges the presiding officer to question an accused where the accused 
fails to disclose the basis of his defence (South African Law Commission 
(2002:1). What is lacking in this investigation is the application of these 
proposals. The commission failed to outline whether the proposed changes are 
applicable to the SAPS, the DSO, the AFU, the SIU or the DIU.  
 
From what is known as common practice, these proposals are aimed at the 
police. Another problem is that the commission failed to pinpoint that South Africa 
subscribes to an accusatorial system and now needs to combine both 
accusatorial and inquisitorial systems. These uncertainties are also not properly 
explained by the Criminal Procedure Act.  
 
5.10 CONCLUSION 
 
The question that one needs to ask is: which system is prescribed by South 
African law? Is it inquisitorial or accusatorial? The answer to this question is: 
accusatorial, but in practice it is both accusatorial and inquisitorial. Both the 
accusatorial and inquisitorial systems have advantages and disadvantages in 
obtaining the truth in any given matter. If South Africa applies the inquisitorial 
system, the idealised task of discovering the truth by whatever means necessary, 
then a trial may become expensive and may involve considerable delays or place 
unnecessary demands on people who are only remotely connected with the 
case.  
 
On the one hand it is clear that as things stand, South African criminal procedure 
is both accusatorial and inquisitorial, almost like the French system. In reality 
there is no system in the world today which can claim to be truly accusatorial or 
inquisitorial in nature. All systems throughout the world are derived from each 
other.  
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Opinion is divided as to whether the accusatorial model or inquisitorial system is 
the better for achieving the truth in a particular case, although more evidence is 
apparent for the virtues of the inquisitorial system. Whether the inquisitorial 
system affords a better method of finding the truth within the limits imposed by 
the rights and freedom of the individual than the accusatorial system, has been 
the subject of some considerable debate.  
 
South Africa is a good example of a country which borrowed various systems 
from Europe, due to her historical background. In South Africa, the fact that the 
judge is in the role of detached umpire is an indication of an accusatorial system. 
However, with the establishment of the DSO, which uses the “troika” system 
commonly used by the FBI, the scenario changes altogether.  
 
For example, section 27 of the Criminal Procedure Act is almost the same as 
section 29 (7) (a) of the National Prosecution Authority Act. This is an ongoing 
confusion to officials responsible for the administration of justice, as well as to 
ordinary citizens.  
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CHAPTER 6: INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Corruption and other financial crimes are not limited to any one part of the world. 
It is a reality in industrialised countries as well as in countries in transition and in 
developing countries. Within the Southern African region, corruption is of growing 
concern as a developmental issue. In conjunction with drug trafficking and other 
forms of transnational crime, it undermines the regional capacity to provide for 
economic growth.  
 
On a political and legislative level, the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), in response to corruption, culminated in the adoption and signing of the 
SADC Protocol Against Corruption in 2001. International trends indicate that not 
only corruption is problematic, but fraud, organised crime and other financial 
crimes cannot be left alone to be dealt with by the police agencies. It is now a 
world trend for countries to develop independent agencies to deal with 
corruption, fraud, organised crime and financial or economic crimes.  
 
The following countries have established independent agencies to deal with 
corruption, fraud, organised crime and financial or  economic crime: Angola: High 
Authority Against Corruption (HAAC); Botswana: Directorate on Corruption and 
Economic Crime (DCEC); Lesotho: Directorate on Corruption and Economic 
Offences (DCEO); Malawi: Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB); Zambia: Anti-
Corruption Commission (ACC); Zimbabwe: Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC); 
Tanzania: Anti-Corruption Squad (ACS) - later the Prevention of Corruption 
Bureau (PCB); Swaziland: Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC); Malaysia: Anti-
Corruption Agency (ACA); Mauritius: Central Tender Board (CTB) and the 
Ombudsman; Namibia: Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC); Nigeria: Economic 
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and Financial Crime Commission of Nigeria (EFCC); Singapore: Corrupt 
Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB); and, Hong Kong: Independent 
Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). The following discussion will focus on 
the analysis of the Botswana, Malawian, Nigerian and Hong Kong models, to see 
if South Africa can develop its own model. The reason for focusing on these 
agencies is that they have proved to be effective.  
 
This discussion will focus on the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime 
(DCEC) of Botswana, the Anti-Corruption Bureau of Malawi, the Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) of Nigeria and the Independent 
Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) of Hong Kong. After analysing each 
model, the researcher will develop a model for the South African Criminal Justice 
System.  
 
6.2 DEFINITIONS 
 
6.2.1 Corruption 
 
According to Snyman (1992:277), corruption means the giving or offering of a 
benefit to another with the intention of influencing them to commit or omit to do 
any action relating to their power or duty. Corruption refers to bribery or any 
corrupt act as defined by the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 
12 of 2004.  
 
The crime is committed when giving or offering a benefit to another with the 
intention of influencing them to commit or omit to do anything in relation to their 
power or duty. An agreement to give or to receive a benefit is also sufficient as a 
contravention of the Act.  
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6.2.2 Organised crime 
 
According to Abadinski (1990:227), organised crime refers to those self-
perpetuating, structured associations of individuals or groups, combined together 
for the purpose of obtaining monetary or commercial gain or profit, wholly or in 
part, by illegal means, while protecting their activities through a pattern of graft 
and corruption.  
 
6.2.3 Money laundering 
 
This is a process by which one conceals the existence, illegal source or illegal 
application of income and disguises that income to make it appear legitimate 
(Ryan, 1997:179). De Koker (1997:18) also defines money laundering as a 
process by which criminals attempt to disguise the criminal origin of the proceeds 
of crime.  
 
Money laundering is also a process by which criminals attempt to disguise the 
criminal origin of the proceeds of crime. Therefore it can concluded that money 
laundering is the hiding of the source of the money, which was obtained through 
illegal means.  
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6.3 BOTSWANA’S DIRECTORATE ON CORRUPTION AND ECONOMIC 
CRIME (DCEC) 
 
Figure 6.1: The logo of Botswana's Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime 
 
6.3.1 Background 
 
According to Heilbrunn (2004:15), Botswana is among the states that have 
adopted the universal model to combat corruption. Botswana’s commission 
evolved out of a series of scandals in which senior officials in the ruling Botswana 
Democratic Party were implicated in accepting bribes. In September 1994 the 
Botswana National Assembly enacted the Corruption and Economic Crime Act to 
establish the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crimes (DCEC). This Act 
created new offences of corruption, including being in control of disproportionate 
assets or maintaining an unexplained high standard of living.  
 
Changes in law were necessary to create clearly defined offences, to provide 
specific powers of investigation, and create effective deterrent punishments for 
those convicted. The investigation branch of the DCEC collects information on 
alleged corruption and other financial crimes and also effects arrests 
(http://www.gov.bw). Intelligence branch analysts are responsible for the 
information gathering functions of the directorate and they also receive reports 
from the public.  
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6.3.2 Types of crimes investigated by the DCEC 
 
The DCEC investigates public and private corruption, including bribery and 
related activities, as well as other economic crimes. On economic crimes, the 
legislation does not outline which offences are regarded as economic crimes. 
According to Batty (2004:45), the Directorate on Corruption and Economic 
Crimes Act only specifies private and public corruption as crimes falling under the 
jurisdiction of the DCEC. 
 
6.3.3 Crimes not covered by the DCEC 
 
In terms of the Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, the following crimes are not 
covered by the DCEC: murder, assault, robbery, rape (common or statutory), 
domestic violence, domestic disputes and stock theft. As for fraud and other 
commercial crimes such as advanced fee fraud - also known as “419 scams”, the 
Act does not specify whether the police or the DCEC should investigate. 
 
6.3.4 Schedule of duties 
 
Initially, the DCEC was staffed with a combination of imported expatriate experts 
and officers seconded from Botswana are other law enforcement agencies, 
notably the police, customs and taxes departments (Batty, 2004:46). It also 
recruited local newly graduated university students. By 2001 all but five of the 
original fourteen expatriate experts had left the organization, and secondments 
were no longer taking place. At managerial level, the DCEC is headed by a 
director who is appointed by the President of the country under the Office of the 
President (http://www.gov.bw). The Director is assisted by the regional heads 
and branch managers. No outsiders or members of the other agencies form part 
of the management team.  
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6.3.5 Code of conduct and ethical behaviour 
 
The Corruption and Economic Crimes Act does not make provision for a code of 
conduct for investigators. 
 
6.3.6 Legislative mandate to investigate 
 
The DCEC has a mandate to investigate, prevent and educate the public on all 
issues relating to economic crimes and corruption. The DCEC has, however, no 
role in the prosecution of corruption cases. Evidence is forwarded to judicial 
authorities for prosecution. This is similar to the Independent Commission 
Against Corruption (ICAC) model of Hong Kong. The mandate to investigate 
corruption is found in section 11 of the Corruption and Economic Crime Act, read 
with section 339 (5) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, which states 
that: “the DCEC officers have the same powers and authority as the Botswana 
Police Force members”. 
 
6.3.7 Powers and authority to investigate 
 
The Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) uses the Corruption 
and Economic Crime Act. This legislation was enacted to enable the government 
to establish the DCEC, so that cases of corruption and complex commercial 
crimes are not handled by the police alone.  
 
Section 7 (1) of the Corruption and Economic Crime Act provides that the DCEC 
has the same powers as the police, which include:  
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the power of arrest, search with or without a warrant, to compel 
banks and other financial institutions to disclose otherwise 
confidential information about suspects, to compel the provision of 
information by witnesses and suspects, of restraint of assets and of 
forfeiture of assets, investigate, detain and subpoena potentially 
incriminating information from suspects  
 
6.3.8 Authority to gather crime intelligence 
 
The authority to gather financial and intelligence information on corruption is 
found in section 10 of the Corruption and Economic Crime Act, read with section 
337 (2) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. However, wiretapping is not 
lawful in Botswana, but evidence obtained by other covert means such as 
physical and technical surveillance is admissible (Batty, 2004:45). The use of 
covert equipment is strictly controlled, and before such a process can be 
undertaken, authority from a Principal Investigator must be sought. 
 
6.3.9 Collaboration with other agencies 
 
The DCEC collaborates with agencies such as the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), as 
well as other law enforcement agencies in Botswana, including the Botswana 
Police Force.  
 
The only problematic area is the procedures used to locate suspects outside 
Botswana. According to the DCEC Investigation Procedures Manual (1999:40), 
consent should be obtained from concerned countries through INTERPOL 
Gaborone at least fourteen days prior to the intended visit.  
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6.3.10 Legislation governing corruption, fraud, organised crime, economic 
and financial crimes 
 
The Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) uses the following 
pieces of legislation to investigate corruption: Corruption and Economic Crime 
Act of 1994, Penal Code (particularly Division II of the Penal Code which makes 
certain conduct by public officials punishable as corruption), and the Criminal 
Procedure and Evidence Act. The Penal Code of 1970 also adopts as a common 
denominator the concept of “valuable consideration” as a commodity exchanged 
for corrupt activity, and defines the concept in wide, all-encompassing terms 
(Goredama, 2000:24).  
 
6.3.11 How to report cases to the DCEC 
 
The public can access the DCEC through the following means of communication: 
telephone (hotline), fax, and letter - or in person in strategically located offices of 
the DCEC throughout the country (http://www.gov.bw). 
 
6.3.12 Level of training for investigators 
 
No evidence is available concerning the level of training of the investigators. 
However, the fact that the agency is staffed by investigators, 
lawyers/prosecutors, intelligence gatherers and educators, indicates that 
members are highly qualified. In addition, the DCEC has a training Academy 
which caters for their own personnel and other local law enforcement agencies, 
as well as providing/hosting training for international agencies (DCEC 
Investigation Procedures Manual, 1999:45). This is an indication that it is a well-
functioning institution.  
 167
6.3.13 Civilian oversight /oversight bodies 
 
In carrying out its work, the DCEC functions as an autonomous Directorate under 
the Office of the President, but the decision to institute prosecutions is reserved 
for the Attorney General. Where evidence of an offence is obtained, it is referred 
to the Attorney General in a Prosecution Report (http://www.gov.bw).  
 
6.3.14 Best Practice Packages (BPPs) 
 
The Corruption and Economic Crime Act does not make provision for Best 
Practice Packages.  
 
6.3.15. Detention centres 
 
The DCEC does not have its own detention facilities. Sections 10 and 12 of the 
Corruption and Economic Crime Act stipulate that “after arrest, the DCEC 
investigators shall detain the suspects at a police station where the offence has 
been committed”. 
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6.4 MALAWI’S ANTI-CORRUPTION BUREAU (ACB) 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: The logo of the Malawi Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB)  
 
6.4.1 Background 
 
On 17 May 1995 the new Constitution of Malawi was introduced. This expressed 
the new democratic Malawi's commitment to public trust and good governance. 
Section 13 of the Constitution of 1995 committed the country to "introduce 
measures which will guarantee accountability, transparency, personal integrity 
and financial probity and which by virtue of their effectiveness and transparency 
will strengthen confidence in public institutions" (http://www.sdnp.org.mw).  
 
In conformity with this commitment, on 1 December 1995 the President gave his 
assent to the Corrupt Practices Act of 1995. The Bureau is a government 
department headed by a director, assisted by a deputy director, who is both 
appointed by the President, but whose appointment is subject to ratification by 
the Public Appointments Committee of Parliament. The Bureau commenced full 
operations on 9 February 1998.  
 
6.4.2 Types of crimes investigated by the ACB 
 
In terms of the Corrupt Practices Act, only corruption cases are investigated by 
the ACB. Although the Act does not stipulate the level of corruption that falls 
under the jurisdiction of the ACB, it is assumed that all corruption cases are 
investigated by the ACB. It is also not clear from the Act if some acts of 
corruption are referred to the police. 
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6.4.3 Crimes not covered by the ACB 
 
In terms of the Corrupt Practices Act, only corruption is investigated by the ACB. 
Essentially this means that the Bureau is restricted to only handling cases of 
corrupt practices, as mentioned above.  
 
However, it has already become apparent that many cases of alleged or 
suspected corrupt practices which are reported to the Bureau turn out, upon 
investigation, to involve other offences, particularly fraud, fraudulent false 
accounting and theft. In strict terms, the Bureau is not permitted to investigate 
such complaints (http://www.sdnp.org.mw). 
 
6.4.4 Schedule of duties 
 
According to the Corrupt Practices Act, the Bureau is managed by a director, 
assisted by a deputy director. These two members are accountable to the 
Minister of Justice who is in turn is accountable to the President. The Act does 
not make any provision for a Board of Directors or a Governing Body.  
 
6.4.5 Code of conduct and ethical behaviour 
 
The Bureau has Standing Orders, which are aimed at regulating operations of 
the Anti-Corruption Bureau that have been approved by the Minister of Justice in 
accordance with the Act. In addition, the ACB has a Code of Conduct and Ethical 
Behaviour for staff members. The Code sets ethical standards for all persons 
employed in the Bureau, and will form part of the employees' Conditions of 
Service (http://www.sdnp.org.mw).  
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The Code demonstrates the Bureau's commitment to high standards and 
professional conduct within its ranks. The Code of Conduct covers areas such as 
personal and professional conduct, use of information, bribes, financial and 
private interests, discipline, and complaints against the Bureau staff 
(http://www.sdnp.org.mw). 
 
6.4.6 Legislative mandate to investigate 
 
The legislative mandate to investigate corruption in Malawi is found in the 
following pieces of legislation: the Constitution of Malawi and the Corrupt 
Practices Act.  
 
6.4.7 Powers and authority to investigate 
 
The Anti-Corruption Bureau is empowered under Section 10 (1) (b) of the Corrupt 
Practices Act to receive and investigate complaints of alleged or suspected 
corrupt practices and, subject to the directions of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions, to prosecute offences under the Act. 
 
It also investigates under Section 10 (1) (c) “the conduct of any public officer 
which is conducive or connected to corruption and to report thereon to the 
Minister”. It does so through the Investigations and Legal Division, which 
comprises an Investigations Branch, a Prosecutions Branch and a 
Documentation Centre.  
 
The Investigations and Legal Division is under the command of an assistant 
director (http://www.sdnp.org.mw). Every single investigation must however, be 
authorised by the director in accordance with section 11 (1) (a) of the Act.  
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This section is an important safety check in the investigation process, as it 
guarantees that no officer of the Bureau can commence any investigation without 
authority, and hence precludes potential abuse of the investigative process. 
Similarly, the director can, in terms of section 11 (1) (a) of the Act, decline to 
investigate a complaint if he considers it to be made in bad faith, trivial, frivolous, 
unnecessary, improper or futile.  
 
A person who knowingly makes a false complaint or delays or hinders the work 
of the Bureau can be prosecuted under the law with heavy fines and long 
imprisonment. The law prohibiting false complaints against innocent citizens is 
similar to the one used by the ICAC of Hong Kong.  
 
This is done to ensure that time and resources are not wasted and that the 
credibility and image of the ACB are not tarnished. In deciding to authorise an 
investigation, the director therefore needs to critically examine the complaint to 
see that an investigation is justified and based on sound and credible 
information. It would be improper to order an investigation on frivolous grounds, 
or to satisfy unjustified public demand, or to witch-hunt (http://www.sdnp.org.mw). 
 
6.4.8 Authority to gather crime intelligence 
 
The ACB is only allowed to investigate corruption. No mandate is extended to the 
Bureau to gather intelligence. When an investigation is initiated and other crimes 
such as fraud and organised crime come out, the ACB refers them to the police.  
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6.4.9 Collaboration with other agencies 
 
The Bureau has made useful contacts with the Anti-Corruption Commission in 
Zambia, the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime in Botswana, the 
Independent Commission Against Corruption in the New South Wales, Australia, 
and the Independent Commission Against Corruption in Hong Kong. With the 
Bureau's capacity improving all the time, these contacts will be fully utilised in 
order for Malawi to learn about best practices in the anti-corruption fight in other 
jurisdictions (http://www.sdnp.org.mw). 
 
6.4.10 Legislation governing corruption, fraud, organised crime, economic 
and financial crimes 
 
Although the Corrupt Practices Act is more than ten years old, there are already 
signs that a review is necessary. Corruption is not defined in the Corrupt 
Practices Act, although the Act does define "corruptly" as the "soliciting, 
accepting or obtaining, or the giving, promising, or offering of gratification by way 
of a personal temptation or bribe". 
 
 "Gratification" means payment in cash or kind or in other forms made with the 
intention to bribe (http://www.sdnp.org.mw). Accordingly, all offences centre upon 
the giving or receiving of bribes (or the possession of unexplained property).  
 
This has caused some constraints to effective investigation and prosecution of 
corruption in Malawi. Section 10 (1) (b) of the Corrupt Practices Act permits the 
Bureau to receive and investigate complaints of corrupt practices, and, subject to 
the direction of the Director of Public Prosecutions, prosecute offenders. 
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6.4.11 How to report cases to the ACB 
 
In terms of the Corrupt Practices Act, members of the public are allowed to 
register their cases through the following: letters, fax, telephone and e-mail. 
 
6.4.12 Level of training for investigators 
 
The Act makes no mention of the level of training for investigators. However, one 
can deduce that the fact that the agency is staffed by investigators and 
lawyers/prosecutors, is an indication these are highly educated people. 
 
6.4.13 Civilian oversight /oversight bodies 
 
In terms of the Corrupt Practices Act, there is no provision for civilian oversight. 
The only instance that can be interpreted as a safety check is section 11 (1) (a) 
of the Corrupt Practices Act which provides that every single investigation must 
be authorised by the director, in accordance with the law.  
 
This section is an important safety valve in the investigation process, as it 
guarantees that no officer of the Bureau can commence any investigation without 
authority, and hence precludes potential abuse of the investigative process.  
 
6.4.14 Best Practice Packages (BPPs) 
 
The ACB is a fairly new organisation with limited resources. At this stage there is 
nothing that can be regarded as and equated to Best Practice Packages. 
However, section 10 (1) (a) (i) and (ii) of the Corrupt Practices Act require the 
 174
Bureau to discharge its preventive functions by working with both public and 
private institutions to review methods and systems of work in order to eradicate 
or minimise corruption opportunities, introducing new methods and systems of 
work in such institutions, assisting in the framing of a Code of Ethical Conduct for 
public officers. This process includes morality, conflict of interests and 
declaration of assets and liabilities and becomes directly involved in the 
strengthening of the Public Procurement Process. 
 
6.4.15 Detention centres 
 
The Corrupt Practices Act does not specify this aspect. The Act does not even 
indicate the procedures after arrest. 
 
6.5 NIGERIA’S ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRIMES COMMISSION (EFCC) 
 
Figure 6.3: The logo of the Nigerian Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) 
 
6.5.1 Background 
 
The preponderance of economic and financial crimes such as Advance Fee 
Fraud (419), money laundering, etc., has had severe negative consequences for 
Nigeria, including decreased Foreign Direct Investments in the country and 
tainting of Nigeria's national image (http://www.efccnigeria.org). . The menace of 
these crimes and the recognition of the magnitude and gravity of the situation led 
to the establishment of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)  
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The legal instrument backing the Commission is the EFCC (Establishment) Act, 
and the Commission has a high level of support from the Presidency, the 
Legislature and key security and law enforcement agencies in Nigeria. 
 
6.5.2 Types of crimes investigated by the EFCC 
 
In terms of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, 
the following are offences covered by the EFCC: all suspicious financial and 
economic transactions, illegal bunkering, vandalisation and damage to oil, gas 
and power lines and installations, all acts of economic sabotage, including: 
financial malpractices of all types (particularly in banks and other financial 
institutions), and money laundering (http://www.efccnigeria.org). 
 
The EFCC also investigates all acts or suspected acts of terrorism, or movement 
of money, assets or property for terrorist organisations. Cyber crime includes 
computer crime, which includes Internet fraud, Internet pornography, use of 
computers for theft, destruction, or harassment, and failure of a cybercafé to 
comply with EFCC regulations. It is the duty of the EFCC to investigate the 
following: bank fraud, issuance of bounced cheques, fraudulent cashing of 
cheques and foreign exchange malpractices, Advanced Fee Fraud (419), 
contract scams, inheritance scam, job scams, credit card scams, lottery scams, 
money doubling, marriage scams, counterfeiting, religious scams, juju-based 
scams, long-term stings and swindles, i.e. obtaining by false pretences, business 
scams and fraudulent schemes, land allocation fraud, tax fraud and evasion, 
fraud in relation to custom duties and other payments to Government, 
conversion, concealment or transfer of property used for criminal activity, 
financing of economic and financial crimes, destruction of records relating to 
financial crimes, and failure to report such crimes (http://www.efccnigeria.org). 
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6.5.3 Crimes not covered by the EFCC 
 
In terms of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, 
the following are offences not covered by the EFCC: marital disputes, chieftaincy 
matters, assault, petty theft, debt collection, communal clashes, religious riots, 
and so on. 
 
6.5.4 Schedule of duties 
 
In terms of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, 
the Commission consists of the following members: a Chairman, who is the Chief 
Executive and Accounting Officer of the Commission, a serving or retired 
member of any government security or law enforcement agency, a Director-
General who is the head of administration, a Governor of the Central Bank or his 
representative, a representative of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs not 
below the rank of a Director, a representative of the Federal Ministry of Finance 
not below the rank of a Director, a representative of the Federal Ministry of 
Justice not below the rank of a Director, the Chairman of the National Drug Law 
Enforcement Agency, the Director General of The National Intelligence Agency, 
the Director General of the Department of State Security Services, the Director-
General Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commissioner for Insurance, 
the Postmaster-General of the Nigerian Postal Services, the Chairman, Nigerian 
Communications Commission, Nigeria Customs Services, the Commissioner-
General of the Nigeria Immigration Services, a representative of the Nigeria 
Police Force not below the rank of an Assistant Inspector-General of Police, and 
four eminent Nigerians with cognate experience in any of the following: finance, 
banking or accounting (http://www.efccnigeria.org). 
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6.5.5 Code of Conduct and ethical behaviour 
 
The EFCC Establishment Act does not make any provision for a code of conduct 
for investigators. 
 
6.5.6 Legislative mandate to investigate 
 
The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Establishment Act mandates 
the EFCC to combat financial and economic crimes (http://www.efccnigeria.org). 
The Commission is empowered to prevent, investigate, prosecute and penalise 
economic and financial crimes, and is charged with the responsibility of enforcing 
the provisions of other laws and regulations relating to economic and financial 
crimes.  
 
6.5.7 Powers and authority to investigate 
 
Section 46 of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) 
Act mandates the EFCC to combat financial and economic crimes by authorising 
the Commission to identify, trace, freeze, confiscate or seize proceeds derived 
from terrorist activities, organised crime and other criminal activities. The 
Commission is empowered to prevent, investigate, prosecute and penalise 
economic and financial crimes, and is charged with the responsibility of enforcing 
the provisions of other laws and regulations relating to economic and financial 
crimes, including: the Money Laundering Act, the Money Laundering 
(Prohibition), the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Fraud Related Offences, the 
Failed Banks (Recovery of Debts) and Financial Malpractices in Banks Act, the 
Banks and other Financial Institutions Act, and the Miscellaneous Offences Act.  
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6.5.8 Authority to gather crime intelligence 
 
The activities of the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit are covered in Clause 1 
(2) (c) of the EFCC Act and Part I of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act. The 
two sections state that the EFCC has power to gather or investigate financial and 
crime intelligence through the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit. Such powers 
include gathering, processing, and dissemination of information. The core role of 
the NFIU is that it serves as the country's central agency for the collection, 
analysis and dissemination of information regarding money laundering and the 
financing of terrorism (http://www.efccnigeria.org). 
 
6.5.9 Collaboration with other agencies 
 
The EFCC has collaboration with all the law enforcement agencies in Nigeria, 
INTERPOL, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), the ICAC of Hong Kong, and Scotland Yard.  
 
6.5.10 Legislation governing corruption, fraud, organised crime, economic 
and financial crimes 
 
The EFCC uses the following pieces of legislation: the Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, the Money Laundering Act; the Money 
Laundering (Prohibition) Act, the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Fraud Related 
Offences Act; the Failed Banks (Recovery of Debts) and Financial Malpractices 
in Banks Act; the Banks and other Financial Institutions Act, and Miscellaneous 
Offences Act (http://www.efccnigeria.org). 
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6.5.11 How to report cases to the EFCC 
 
Cases are reported to the EFC by means of oral reports to the EFCC, written 
petitions by an individual or organisation, or EFCC Hot Lines, and all petitions are 
addressed to the Chairman. 
 
6.5.12 Level of training for investigators 
 
The Training and Research Institute (TRI) provide quality training for staff of the 
EFCC and other stakeholders. The training programmes are designed to ensure 
that personnel are equipped with the knowledge and skills to meet the challenges 
set by criminals who use technology in their criminal endeavours.  
 
Students or participants are taught how to ask the right questions, deal correctly 
with digital devices, investigate Internet and network crimes, conduct forensic IT 
investigations and know when specialist skills are needed and where to find them 
(http://www.efccnigeria.org). The following are minimum educational 
qualifications and experience prescribed:  
 
6.5.12.1 Junior Staff 
 
Minimum of Senior Secondary School Leaving Certificate with five credits and at 
least a Pass in English Language obtained after not more than two sittings.  
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6.5.12.2 Senior Staff 
 
Minimum of a first degree or (its equivalent) from recognised institutions of higher 
learning. In addition, such candidates must possess a discharge/exemption 
certificate.  
 
6.5.12.3 Management Staff  
 
A candidate must have not less than fourteen years’ relevant professional 
qualifications and experience, and be certified physically and mentally fit by a 
Government Medical Officer or any other designated Medical Practitioner 
registered by the Nigerian Medical Council (http://www.efccnigeria.org).  
 
6.5.13 Civilian oversight/ oversight bodies 
 
In terms of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, 
no provision is made for a civilian oversight. The only body that may be regarded 
as an oversight body is the EFCC Advisory Committee, which serves as advisory 
support to the Commission, through the Chairman. 
 
6.5.14 Best Practice Packages (BPPs) 
 
In terms of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, 
no provision is made for a Best Practice Package. 
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6.15 Detention centres 
 
The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act does not 
specify this aspect. The Act does not even indicate the procedures after arrest. 
 
6.6 HONG KONG’S INDEPENDENT COMMISSION AGAINST CORRUPTION 
(ICAC): THE UNIVERSAL MODEL 
 
Figure 6.4: The logo of the ICAC of Hong Kong 
 
6.6.1 Background 
 
The Independent Commission Against Corruption was set up in 1974. Since its 
inception, the Commission adopts a three-pronged approach to investigation, 
prevention and education to fight corruption. With the support of the Government 
and the community, Hong Kong has now become one of the least corrupt places 
in the world (Chen, 2006).  
 
Since 1974, the Hong Kong Independent Commission Against corruption has 
enjoyed resounding success in fighting corruption. The ICAC was established 
after a botched investigation into corruption in the colonial police led to Police 
Superintendent Peter Godber’s flight from prosecution. Shortly thereafter, 
governor Sir Murray MacLehose empanelled a commission under the 
chairmanship of Justice Alastair Blair-Kerr (Heilbrunn, 2004:19). 
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The Blair-Kerr Commission concluded that corruption was systemic in Hong 
Kong. High-level officials, as well as police officers on the street, were accepting 
bribes. In response, the Blair-Kerr Commission recommended the establishment 
of a special agency to investigate allegations of corruption, prevent bribery in 
business and government, and educate citizens about corruption through 
outreach programmes (Heilbrunn, 2004:9).  
 
To enact these changes, the Crown Colony established an independent 
commission to investigate allegations of corruption. In 1974 the ICAC 
commenced operations. In October 1974, the Independent Commission Against 
Corruption Act of 1974 set up an anti-corruption bureau independent of the 
Colonial Police. Political authorities recognised that “an essential part of the 
strategy was to ensure that the legal framework within which (the ICAC) was 
contained was as strong, clear and effective as it could be made” (Heilbrunn, 
2004:9).  
 
Existing legislation was revised and new laws were passed to set up an anti-
corruption agency with a mandate to investigate any allegations of corruption and 
forward evidence to colonial prosecutors. Nowadays, Hong Kong ranks one of 
the least corrupt jurisdictions in East Asia, and this reputation is despite its free-
wheeling market economy. Corruption is a secretive crime that is extremely 
difficult to investigate and prove in court. The ICAC is therefore given specific 
legal powers to bring the corrupt to book under three specific laws. 
 
6.6.2 Types of crimes investigated by the ICAC 
 
The Independent Commission Against Corruption Act stipulates that the ICAC is 
responsible for corruption only. This includes private and public corruption, 
including blackmail and misuse of public office.  
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6.6.3 Crimes not covered by the ICAC 
 
The ICAC does not have jurisdiction over any other crimes besides corruption. 
However, in cases where an investigation is conducted and other crimes are 
discovered, the Hong Kong Police are called in to form a joint investigation team 
(Chen, 2006). 
 
6.6.4 Schedule of duties 
 
The Independent Commission Against Corruption Act does not make provision 
for a body or committees to run the ICAC. Instead, the ICAC is headed by a CEO 
who is assisted by two directors. The four committees that exist are oversight 
bodies. 
 
6.6.5 Code of conduct and ethical behaviour 
 
The Independent Commission Against Corruption Act does not make provision 
for a code of conduct for ICAC investigators. 
 
6.6.6 Legislative mandate to investigate 
 
The Independent Commission Against Corruption Ordinance establishes the 
ICAC and prescribes the duties of the ICAC Commission as being to investigate, 
search and seizure that are consistent with the powers of arrest and detention; 
vests ICAC with the power of taking non-intimate sample from a suspect for 
forensic analysis; and empowers the ICAC to investigate any alleged offence of 
blackmail committed by a public servant through misuse of office as well as 
crimes facilitated by or connected with suspected corruption offences. 
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6.6.7 Powers and authority to investigate  
 
Corruption is a secretive crime that is extremely difficult to investigate and prove 
in court. The ICAC is therefore given specific legal powers to bring the corrupt to 
book under three specific laws, as follows: the Independent Commission Against 
Corruption Ordinance establishes the ICAC and prescribes the duties of the 
ICAC Commissioner, sets the parameters of the ICAC's investigation work, the 
procedure in handling a suspect and the disposal of property connected with 
offences; gives the ICAC the powers of arrest, detention; and granting bail, which 
are fundamental to any law enforcement agency; confers on the ICAC the 
powers of search and seizure that are consistent with the powers of arrest and 
detention, vests the ICAC with the power of taking non-intimate sample from a 
suspect for forensic analysis; and empowers the ICAC to investigate any alleged 
offence of blackmail committed by a public servant through misuse of office, as 
well as crimes facilitated by or connected with suspected corruption offences. 
 
6.6.8 Authority to gather crime intelligence 
 
Intelligence gatherings are conducted in terms of the Independent Commission 
Against Corruption Ordinance as well as the Interception of Communications and 
Surveillance Ordinance. Overt and covert operations are conducted in terms of 
the two pieces of legislation. 
 
6.6.9 Collaboration with other agencies 
 
The success of the ICAC fight against corruption does not lie solely in its 
capability to investigate, but also in its ability to liaise with other partners. 
Through joint proactive intelligence and regular Operational Liaison Group (OLG) 
meetings, the ICAC has developed and strengthened strategic partnerships with 
other law enforcement agencies (ICAC Operations Department, 2005:21).  
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6.6.10 Legislation governing corruption, fraud, organised crime, economic 
and financial crimes 
 
The following pieces of legislation govern the investigation of corruption in Hong 
Kong: Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (Cap.201), Prevention of Bribery (Appeal 
Against Confiscation Order) Rules (Cap.201.sub.leg.A), Independent 
Commission Against Corruption Commission (Cap.204), Independent 
Commission Against Corruption (Treatment of detained persons) Order (Cap.204 
sub. leg. A), Theft Ordinance (Cap.210), Elections (Corrupt and Illegal Conduct) 
Ordinance (Cap.554), and Interception of Communications and Surveillance 
Ordinance.  
 
6.6.11 How to report cases to the ICAC 
 
The Report Centre operates on a 24-hour basis like a police station. Reports and 
enquiries made to the ICAC’s regional offices are also referred to the Report 
Centre (Chen, 2006).  
 
The Quick Response Team (QRT) provides valuable support by dealing with 
minor cases which appear capable of quick resolution. The Quick Response 
Team also analyses the cases to see if such cases fall within the mandate of the 
ICAC or Hong Kong Police (ICAC Annual Report, 2005:39).  
 
6.6.12 Level of training for investigators 
 
Although the emphasis on a tertiary qualification as a requirement has been 
relaxed, the majority of investigators have degrees in various fields including law 
and accounting. Induction training for new recruits covers the first three years of 
the officer’s employment.  
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6.6.12.1 Stage 1 Induction Course 
 
The first stage of training is the fourteen-week Stage 1 Induction Course. This 
course includes law, legal issues, practical investigation techniques, cognitive 
interviews and outdoor activities (ICAC Operations Department Training School 
Manual, 2005:1). Officers are also given training in first aid, self-defence and the 
use of firearms. Other elements of the course deal with conduct and discipline, 
administrative procedures and the use of computers (ICAC Annual Report, 
2005:29).  
 
After Stage 1 Induction Course, the officers are placed in an investigation 
section, either in the Investigation Branch 1 that deals with Public Sector 
Corruption, or in Investigation Branch 2 that deals with Private Sector Corruption. 
 
6.6.12.2 Stage 2 Induction Course 
 
After a twelve-month tour of duty the in Investigation Branch1 or Investigation 
Branch 2, officers attend a three-week Stage 2 Induction Course. This course 
builds upon the practical experiences that they have been exposed to in their first 
year (Chen, 2006). This course also has a large element of fraud and financial 
investigation training.  
 
Upon the conclusion of this course, the officers are cross-posted to whichever 
investigation branch they had not been in during their first twelve months (ICAC 
Annual Report, 2005:29).  
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6.6.12.3 Stage 3 Induction Course 
 
Upon completion of the second twelve months’ induction or on-the-job training, 
officers attend a Stage 3 Induction Course. This course again builds upon their 
experience and introduces in more detail than hitherto the practical aspects of 
informant handling and undercover operations.  
 
The second and third week of the course are designed as an Assessment Centre 
exercise (ICAC Operations Department Training School Manual, 2005:1). Here 
officers are assessed while being put through a demanding series of practical 
scenarios, from briefing skills to arrest-and-search, to compilation of a file of 
evidence and giving oral evidence in court.  
 
Direct Entrant Investigators are given an opportunity to not only attend a three-
week Investigator Command Course, but are subject to one day Recall Days 
throughout their first year, to support their professional development (ICAC 
Annual Report, 2006:29). From time to time, investigators are called to attend a 
one-week Refresher Course to ensure that they keep up to date with 
developments in law and best practices. 
 
Newly promoted investigators attend a three weeks’ Investigators Command 
Course, which is aimed at leadership and management within a law enforcement 
context (ICAC Annual Report, 2006:29). The four weeks’ Chief Investigators 
Command Course is designed for newly promoted Chief Investigators in the 
Commission as a whole. The course focuses on leadership and management 
within a law enforcement context (Chen, 2006). In addition to these training 
courses, investigators are given financial investigation courses, firearms training 
and ad hoc training.  
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The ICAC also affords bursaries to those who want to study privately. For 
promotion purposes, officers write a promotion examination irrespective of a 
degree qualification.  
 
After writing the promotion examination, the candidates are assessed by their 
immediate supervisors and must then appear before a promotion board which 
has a final say in their suitability. However, candidates are also remunerated 
according to their educational qualifications (Chen, 2006).  
 
6.6.13 Civilian oversight/oversight bodies  
 
The three committees are the Operations Review Committee, the Corruption 
Prevention Advisory Committee, and the Citizen Advisory Committee on 
Community Relations. Members are nominated in recognition of their 
distinguished reputations in the larger community, and they meet at regular 
intervals to review the ICAC’s activities and issue a report to the Hong Kong 
Special Administrator.  
 
6.6.13.1 Operations Review Committee (ORC) 
 
The Operations Review Committee (ORC) examines reports on current 
investigations, cases over twelve months old, cases involving individuals on bail 
for more than six months, and searches authorised under section 17 of the 
Prevention of Bribery Act. The ORC enforces a level of accountability that 
prevents the ICAC from evolving into a tool of repression or political favoritism.  
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6.6.13.2 Corruption Prevention Advisory Committee (CPAC) 
 
The Corruption Prevention Advisory Committee receives reports on strategies to 
demonstrate the costs of corruption to private sector actors. Activities of the 
Prevention Department complement those outreach programmes of the 
Community Relations Department (Chen, 2006). 
 
6.6.13.3 The Citizens Advisory Committee on Community Relations (CACCR) 
 
The Citizens Advisory Committee plays a crucial role in the content of films, 
billboards and other forms of advertising to educate the public. The Citizens 
Advisory Committee on Community Relations also advises the Commissioner of 
the ICAC on the work of the Community Relations Department, and focuses on 
mass media, education and community research, by scrutinising specific aspects 
of the department’s work in relation to the measures to be taken to foster public 
support in combating corruption, as well as educating the public against the evils 
of corruption (Reports of the ICAC Advisory Committees, 2005:26). 
 
6.6.13.4 Advisory Committee on Corruption (ACC) 
 
The Advisory Committee on Corruption is the principal advisory body of the ICAC 
and oversees all the Commission’s activities. Its members include the members 
of the other three advisory committees (http://www.icac.org.hk).  
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6.6.14 Best Practice Packages (BPPs) 
 
Best practice packages (BPPs) have been developed by the Department to 
provide private sector companies and public corporations with user-friendly 
guidelines on plugging corruption loopholes.  
 
According to Chen (2006), the BPPs cover a wide range of topics and the related 
checklists outlining areas of potential corruption risks are provided here for 
reference, if any: Management of Consultants; Staff Administration; Stores 
Management; Contracting Out Security Services; Procurement Practices; 
Contracting Out Cleaning Services; Monitoring Staff Attendance and Overtime 
Work; Information Systems Security; Retail Incentive Programmes; Payment 
Procedures; Construction Industry Best Practices Principles; Construction Quality 
Control Testing; Sales Receipts Administration; Estate Management by Property 
Management Companies; Hotel Management and Travel Agent Operations. 
 
6.6.15 Detention Centres 
 
The power to detain arrested persons is provided for in section 10 A (2) of the 
ICAC Ordinance. The ICAC (Treatment of Detained Persons) Order sets out the 
rights and entitlements of persons detained. To ensure that the rights of the 
detainees are not violated, the law provides for visits by the Justices of the 
Peace. Another purpose of such visits is to ensure that the detention facilities are 
properly maintained, and to take notice of any requests or complaints that 
detainees may wish to make. The detention centre is used to detain suspects 
while the ICAC is still busy with the investigation. In exceptional cases suspects 
can be detained after conviction for the purpose of further investigations (Chen, 
2006). After conviction, suspects are taken to Correctional Services to serve their 
sentences. 
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6.7 NECESSITY FOR AN INDEPENDENT AGENCY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
With corruption in local and national governments on the rise, many countries 
and cities are calling for the creation and strengthening of independent anti-
corruption agencies. South Africa has more or less fourteen independent 
agencies which deal with corruption directly and indirectly.  
 
This is an indication of the seriousness of the government to fight corruption. 
However, this number seems to be too high and most of these agencies tend to 
duplicate functions; this is not helping the country. As corruption grows more 
sophisticated in character and method, conventional law enforcement agencies 
are less able to detect and prosecute complex corruption cases (Heilbrunn, 
2004:2). 
 
6.8 CONCLUSION 
 
Corruption, fraud, organised crime, and financial or economic crime are a major 
concern throughout the world. It is clear now that in order to fight these crimes, 
many countries have established independent agencies or commissions. It is the 
duty of every country to ensure that structures are established to deal with these 
problems.  
 
Corruption, fraud, organised crime, and financial or economic crime not only 
distorts economic decision making, but also deters investment, undermines 
competitiveness and, ultimately, weakens economic growth. This is why the 
United Nations has developed policy guidelines and protocols to deal with 
corruption and transnational crimes.  
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CHAPTER 7: PROPOSED INVESTIGATIVE MODEL FOR THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
It is now clear that South Africa has a serious problem with crime, particularly 
organised crime, corruption, and financial or economic crime. Therefore, the 
state has a legal duty to protect its citizens from crime. The State has made 
blunders there and there by creating various institutions that tend to duplicate 
functions. Now it is time for the State to rectify these problems by looking at a 
model that will assist South Africa in dealing with crime.  
 
One should also bear in mind that by creating a new agency, the government will 
not be taking away the functions of the police. It is also important to be aware 
that the ‘hands of the police are full’. As a result, there have been accusations of 
police incompetence and corruption.  
 
A multi-agency approach has proved to be problematic and inefficient. It is an 
international norm that a single-agency approach is used to solve these 
problems. Therefore, after analysing various international agencies that deal with 
organised crime, fraud, economic and financial crimes, the researcher proposes 
a model which will help South Africa to combat corruption, fraud, financial and 
economic crimes.  
 
The model is neither accusatorial nor inquisitorial but a “prosecution-led 
investigation” model. One need to acknowledge that corruption, fraud, organised 
crime, economic and financial crimes are terrorising South Africa and its 
newfound democracy.  
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During 2000, South Africa, in conjunction with the United Nations Office for Drug 
Control and Prevention, hosted an International Anti-Corruption Expert Round 
Table. The NPA were represented by Bulelani Ngcuka, the then National Director 
of Public Prosecutions. Other international agencies such as the ICAC were also 
represented.  
 
At this conference a document was compiled in which various anti-corruption 
agencies shared their experiences. On page 18 of the document presented at the 
conference, the ICAC outlined its origin, mandate and successes. These 
experiences were ignored by the NPA. 
 
The fact that South Africa subscribes to constitutional democracy, makes it vital 
that whatever South Africa establishes must be in line with the Constitution. The 
purpose of designing a new model is to assist the South African government and 
responsible Ministers to solve the current operational and legislative problems 
that have surfaced during this research. This will ensure effective investigation of 
organised crime, corruption, fraud, financial and economic crimes. 
 
7.2 DEFINITIONS 
 
7.2.1 Model 
 
According to the Pocket Oxford Dictionary (1994:611), a model is a 
representation in three dimensions of an existing person or thing, or of a 
proposed structure, especially on a smaller scale.  This definition is more or less 
in line with the present topic. 
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7.2.2 System 
 
A system is a complex whole, a set of connected things or parts or organised 
body of things (Pocket Oxford Dictionary 1994:982) This definition also includes 
methods, scheme of action, procedure classification or orderliness. 
 
7.3 PROSECUTION-LED INVESTIGATION: THE WAY FORWARD FOR THE 
SOUTH AFRICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
Prosecution-led investigations are not new in South Africa. On 12 January 2000 
Parliament passed amendments to the National Prosecuting Authority Act which, 
according to the preamble, were aimed at making provision for the establishment 
of an Investigating Directorate with the capacity to prioritise and investigate 
particularly serious criminal or unlawful conduct, and with the object of 
prosecuting such offences or unlawful conduct in the most efficient and effective 
manner.  
 
The Directorate of Special Operations, or the DSO, also known as the Scorpions, 
were to report at the office of the National Director of Public prosecution. The 
effects of these amendments were to carve out for the prosecution a niche in the 
investigation of crime, a role that had hitherto been the exclusive domain of the 
SAPS. These amendments heralded in South Africa the advent of the concept of 
prosecution-led investigations. These amendments represented such a 
fundamental deviation from conventional wisdom about the need for a “Chinese 
wall” to exist between the investigative and prosecutorial functions, that serious 
questions were raised about whether the amendments to the NPA Act 
establishing the DSO would in fact withstand constitutional muster.  
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7.3.1 Factors that warrant innovations to the traditional model 
 
Organised crime is an enterprise, not an event. There are, in the researchers’ 
view, several factors that justify the establishment, under the auspices of the 
prosecution, of a limited investigative capacity to deal with specific types of 
offences - in particular, organised crime and serious and complex financial crime, 
including fraud and corruption. South Africa today is characterised in the media 
both at home and abroad as a place where levels of serious violent crime, as well 
as crimes committed by more organised criminal networks, are rapidly on the 
increase. Statistics have been provided in Chapter 4 in this regard.  
 
Like many other emerging democracies in the world, South Africa has to grapple 
with the serious threat to the safety and security of its citizens. South Africa's 
unique location, relatively sophisticated infrastructure and many fairly “porous” 
borders, has turned the country into a playground of international criminal 
organisations, fleeing intensified law enforcement activity in their countries of 
origin (Ngcuka, 2001:3).  
 
Partly as a result of a general liberalisation that came with democratisation in 
1994, South Africa has increasingly become a target for international drug 
syndicates, both as a market and a conduit for onward distribution. The inability 
on the part of law enforcement to deal with the upsurge in criminal activity 
provided fertile ground for vigilante groups to fill the gap.  
 
The bombings of American franchises in the Western Cape posed new 
challenges to law enforcement in South Africa (http//:www.npa.gov.za). The role 
and rapid expansion of organised crime both in South Africa and other emerging 
democracies, has been well documented.  
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At best, law enforcement has been able to target the ‘foot soldiers’. The leaders 
of these organisations have been immune from prosecution. There are many 
reasons for this state of affairs. Syndicate leaders and other organised crime 
figures are often the first to invoke the protection that the South African Bill of 
Rights affords its citizens (http://www.npa.org.za). So much so, that there exists a 
perception by the public that it is only criminals who reap any benefits from the 
country’s democracy and that the Bill of Rights serves as a shield to protect 
criminals from being brought to justice.  
 
The reality of the situation is that since the inception of the Bill of Rights, the 
South African courts have developed a complex body of constitutional criminal 
jurisprudence that is a virtual minefield to the average prosecutor, let alone the 
average investigator. “Just a cursory glance at the grounds upon which cases are 
thrown out of court on a daily basis bears testimony to this fact” (Ngcuka, 
2001:4).  
 
If this is the case, does South Africa have to be complacent and watch the 
country being terrorised by criminals? This is a phenomenon far from unique to 
South Africa. Other constitutional democracies experience the same problems. 
Criminals and organised crime bosses in particular have exploited this trend. 
Invariably, whenever they are faced with a formidable case on the merits they 
focus the court's attention away from the determination of their innocence or guilt 
and turn the spotlight instead on the manner and propriety of the investigation 
(http://www.npa.org.za).  
 
Every decision taken in the course of the investigation is attacked: from the 
institution of the investigation and the application for a search warrant, to every 
aspect of how the warrant is effected. 
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Countries such as Nigeria, Botswana, Singapore, Hong Kong, Tanzania, and 
Malawi have changed from the traditional models to a single agency approach. It 
is often at the investigation stage that mistakes are made that ultimately result in 
the exclusion of evidence as a result of its inadmissibility, with the eventual 
acquittal of the accused. These are but some of the factors that precipitate the 
establishment of an agency and, in particular, the evolution of a greater role for 
prosecutors in the investigative process.  
 
The fact that in an accusatorial system a prosecutor is far away from an 
investigation process creates a problem, because such prosecutors do not have 
enough time to assist the police. This problem is made worse by the lack of 
teamwork between the prosecutors and the police. 
 
7.3.2 The evolution of a more expanded role for the prosecutor in criminal 
investigations 
 
Prior to the establishment of the DSO in South Africa, the Office for Serious 
Economic Offences (OSEO), established in 1991 by the Investigation of Serious 
Offences Act, co-located investigators, prosecutors and accountants for the 
purpose of investigating economic crimes.  
 
The Director of OSEO, a prosecutor, was empowered to institute an enquiry for 
purposes of determining whether or not an offence, which fell within its mandate, 
had been committed. The establishment of OSEO did not constitute a major 
departure from the conventional separation of the investigation and prosecution 
functions.  
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By and large, the investigators in OSEO remained under the ultimate command 
and control of the SAPS and were made available to work with the prosecutors in 
OSEO merely on a secondment basis (http://www.npa.org.za). In essence, 
OSEO had an investigative capacity that operated at a distance from the 
prosecution of the offences.  
 
The model still required that the investigation be completed and handed to 
someone who had to take time to familiarise themselves with the case from the 
beginning (http://www.npa.org.za). What was still lacking was a person intimately 
involved in the investigation of the matter and also taking responsibility for the 
prosecution thereof.  
 
This is a clear indication that the establishment of a new agency using a 
prosecution-led investigation method cannot be regarded as a new approach 
altogether, because it was once used and had some successes. According to 
Richards (2001), the model was not operationally functioning due to excessive 
red tape from the side of the police.  
 
In many instances, prosecutors could fly from one province to another, whereas 
police investigators (non-commissioned junior investigators) were only allowed to 
drive, which could take a few days to arrive at a particular destination to start an 
investigation. Only senior police officers were allowed to fly. These unnecessary 
restrictions led to a situation where the government had to change its strategies 
and approaches.  
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7.4 TYPES OF CRIMES TO BE INVESTIGATED BY THE NEW AGENCY 
 
The Act establishing the new agency needs to be clear in that there is no 
duplication of functions with agencies such as the police, the Asset Forfeiture 
Unit, the Special Investigating Unit and the Departmental Investigation Unit. In 
Hong Kong, for example, any corruption case goes to the ICAC because it is the 
only agency responsible for enforcing corruption legislation.  
 
In Nigeria, section 13 of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
(Establishment) Act, outlines the offences investigated by the EFCC as follows: 
offences relating to financial malpractices, offences relating to terrorism, offences 
relating to public officers, retention of proceeds of criminal conduct, offences 
relating to economic and financial crimes and penalties, forfeiture after conviction 
in criminal cases, and forfeited property.  
 
What is problematic about the Nigerian legislation is the exclusion of corruption, 
which falls under the jurisdiction of another agency. In Botswana, corruption and 
economic crimes fall under the jurisdiction of the DCEC, and in Malawi corruption 
is investigated by the ACB. In South Africa, the new agency needs a properly 
outlined mandate so that it is able to function properly.  
 
Before the researcher can address the issue of crimes to be investigated by the 
new agency, a definition of what shall be regarded as economic and financial 
crimes needs to be given. In this instance the researcher propose the following 
as a definition for economic and financial crimes:  
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Economic and financial crimes shall include the non-violent criminal 
and illicit activity committed with the objective of earning wealth 
illegally either individually or in a group or organized manner 
thereby violating existing legislation governing economic activities 
of Government and its administration and shall include any form of 
fraud, narcotic drug trafficking, money laundering, embezzlement, 
bribery/corruption, illegal arms dealing and smuggling, foreign 
exchange malpractices including counterfeit currency, pyramid 
schemes, advanced fee fraud (Nigerian 419 scams), transnational 
crimes, terrorism, gangsterism, and armed robberies (cash in 
transits. 
 
This definition is a combination of the Botswana and the Nigerian models. It is 
therefore suggested that the following offences be investigated by the new 
agency:  
• Corruption (private and public) 
• Organised crime 
• Advanced fee fraud (Nigerian 419 Scams) 
• Money laundering 
• Fraud and theft 
• Illicit drug trafficking 
• Transnational crimes 
• Terrorism (terrorism which involves financial transactions and organised 
crime). This is in line with the EFCC of Nigeria 
• Gangsterism 
• Armed robbery (cash in transit) 
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To ensure that the new agency does not investigate everything, legislation 
should provide a limit of R 500, 000.00. Anything less than this amount should go 
to the SAPS.  
 
7.5 CRIMES NOT COVERED BY THE NEW AGENCY 
 
Rape, child abuse, domestic violence, assault, murder, public violence, arson, 
kidnapping, and any other offence not listed above. 
 
7.6 SCHEDULE OF DUTIES 
 
The new agency shall be managed by a Board of Directors consisting of the 
following members: National Commissioner or one of the Deputies of the SAPS; 
Chiefs of Metropolitan/Municipal Police agencies; the Director General of SASS; 
the Director General of NIA; the Chief of Staff or the Commander of Military 
Intelligence (MI); the Commissioner of SARS; the Director General of Foreign 
Affairs; the Director General of Home Affairs; the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
of Business Against Crime (BAC); a Governor of the South African Reserve Bank 
or his representative; a representative of the Ministry of Finance and the National 
Treasury not below the rank of a Director; a representative of the Ministry of 
Justice and Constitutional Development not below the rank of a Director, the 
Chairman Office of the Interception Centre (OIC); a representative from Financial 
Services Board not below the rank of a Director; a representative of the Judicial 
Services Commission not below the rank of a Director; a representative of the 
South African Human Rights Commission not below the rank of a Director; a 
representative of the Legal Aid Board not below the rank of a Director; a 
representative of State Information Technology (SITA) not below the rank of a 
Director; a representative of the Safety and Security Education Training Authority 
(SASSETA) not below the rank of a Director and others. 
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This is in line with the EFCC of Nigeria, the ICAC of Hong Kong as well as 
section 19 of the South African Financial Intelligence Centre Act which 
established an Advisory Council on money laundering and terrorism financing, 
consisting of various law enforcement agencies in South Africa.  
 
7.7 THE RANK STRUCTURE OF THE NEW AGENCY 
 
In order to ensure that the agency discharges its mandate without any 
hindrances, the following rank structure, based on the ICAC and DCEC models, 
is suggested: 
• Director General 
• Deputy Director General 
• Director 
• Chief Investigator 
• Principal Investigator 
• Senior Investigator 
• Investigator 
• Assistant Investigator 
 
In order to eliminate excessive red tape, the following organogram is suggested: 
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Diagram 7.1: Structure of the new agency (the Scorpions) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.8 CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE INVESTIGATORS OF THE NEW 
INVESTIGATION AGENCY 
 
A Code of Conduct needs to be drawn up. Currently, section 40 of the National 
Prosecuting Authority Act makes provision for the Minister to promulgate 
regulations and a Code of Conduct for the members of the DSO.  
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Therefore, the new Act (to be known as the Directorate of Special Operations 
Act) needs to make provision for a code of conduct. This will ensure that the 
Code of Conduct will be integrated into the regulations which will assist 
management to enforce discipline. A Code of Conduct that is not attached to the 
discipline regulations does not have much of legal force and is difficult to enforce. 
This is in line with the ACB of Malawi.  
 
7.9 LEGISLATIVE MANDATE TO INVESTIGATE 
 
Due to the fact that South Africa is a constitutional State which subscribes to 
constitutional democracy, Chapter 9 of the Constitution which deals with “State 
Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy” needs to be amended to 
accommodate the new agency. 
 
In addition to this, Chapter 11 of the Constitution which deals with “Security 
Services” also need to be amended to accommodate the new agency, so that it 
will be able to gather intelligence without any constitutional restriction. Thereafter, 
a new Act must be enacted to establish the new agency. This is in line with 
international trends. In Hong Kong, the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance 
(Cap.201) makes provision for the establishment of the ICAC and provides a 
legal mandate thereof.  
 
The same applies to Nigeria, where the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (Establishment) Act provides a mandate to the EFCC. In Malawi the 
Corrupt Practices Act established the ACB and provided the legal mandate 
thereof. In Botswana the Corruption and Economic Crime Act of 1994 was 
enacted to establish the DCEC and its mandate thereof. Therefore, South Africa 
needs to promulgate an Act such as the abandoned Directorate of Special 
Operations Bill of 2000, to establish the new agency.  
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In addition, legislation such as the Prevention of Organised Crime Act, the Drugs 
and Drug Trafficking Act, the Regulation of Interception of Communications and 
Provision of Communication Related Information Act, the National Strategic 
Intelligence Act, the Special Investigating Unit and Tribunals Act and the 
Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act need to be amended to 
accommodate the new agency. Once these Acts have been amended, the new 
agency can function smoothly, without questions being asked about its 
legitimacy. 
 
7.10 POWERS AND AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE 
 
The current powers given to the SAPS by the Criminal Procedure Act should be 
given to the new agency. By so doing, the state will be ensuring that the new 
agency is not confronted with any hindrances in the execution of its duties. 
However it must also be ensured that while giving this new agency sweeping 
powers, human rights as enshrined in section 35 of the Constitution, are not 
compromised. The new agency shall exercise powers by its establishing Act, and 
shall possess the following powers: 
• Arrest 
• Arrest without warrant  
• Breaking open premises for purposes of arrest 
• Use of force in effecting arrest 
• Procedures after arrest 
• Seizures 
• Disposal of articles 
• Search with a warrant 
• Search procedures of arrested persons 
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• Search of premises 
• Forfeiture of article to the state 
• Powers in respect of prints and bodily appearance of the accused 
• Manner and effect of arrest 
• 48-hour rule after arrest 
• Detention procedures 
• Treatment of detainees 
• Procedures to be followed after conviction (criminal records) 
• Fingerprinting 
• DNA tests 
• Questioning, interrogation and interviewing  
 
Such sweeping powers are not something new in law enforcement. If South 
Africa wants to defeat crime, a compromise must be reached at some stage. In 
Hong Kong the ICAC has such powers and in Nigeria the EFCC has such 
powers. Botswana has given the DCEC sweeping powers to fight corruption and 
economic crime.  
 
7.11 AUTHORITY TO GATHER CRIME INTELLIGENCE  
 
In order to have an effective investigative agency, it is important to ensure proper 
intelligence structures. In South Africa, intelligence is governed by section 209 of 
the Constitution and the National Strategic Intelligence Act. These two pieces of 
legislation recognise intelligence gathering institutions such as the Military 
Intelligence of the SANDF, Crime Intelligence of the SAPS, the National 
Intelligence Agency and the South African Secret Services. With the birth of the 
new agency, this arrangement needs to change.  
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The new agency needs to be given the powers to “gather, keep and analyse 
information in relation to crimes falling under the jurisdiction of this agency”. As 
for the other agencies, they continue to gather, keep and analyse information as 
stipulated in the National Strategic Intelligence Act. In addition to these powers, 
the new agency needs to be able to use surveillance methods and wire-trappings 
in terms of legislation.  
 
7.11.1 Military Intelligence (MI) 
 
The South African National Defence Force shall conduct intelligence gathering 
and counter-intelligence; investigate offences relating to the security of the 
Republic, gather domestic military intelligence in a covert manner within the 
geographical area and time scales specified in such authorisation. Gather, 
correlate, evaluate and use foreign and local military intelligence relating to 
strategic intelligence to inform the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee. 
Gather, correlate, evaluate and use domestic military intelligence excluding 
covert collection. (This is in line with section 4 of the National Strategic 
Intelligence Act). 
 
7.11.2 SAPS Crime Intelligence 
 
According to section 3 of the National Strategic Intelligence Act, “it is the duty of 
the SAPS to gather, correlate, evaluate and use crime intelligence, in support of 
the SAPS as contemplated in section 205 (3) of the Constitution, to institute 
counter-intelligence measures within South Africa in order to supply crime 
intelligence to the National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee. This 
arrangement should be maintained as it is at the moment.  
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7.11.3 South African Secret Services (SASS) 
 
Conduct foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence, protect classified 
intelligence and any classified information, (section 1 (1) (a) of the National 
Strategic Intelligence Amendment Act).  
 
7.11.4 National Intelligence Agency (NIA) 
 
Conduct intelligence and counter intelligence, protect classified intelligence and 
any classified information, conduct security screening investigations and to 
counter subversion, treason and sabotage aimed at or against personnel, 
strategic installations or resources of the Republic (section 1 (1) (a) of the 
National Strategic Intelligence Amendment Act).  
 
7.11.5 Scorpions (new agency) 
 
The functions of the new agency shall be: to gather, correlate, evaluate and use 
crime intelligence in support of the Scorpions (new agency) as shall be 
contemplated in Chapter 11 of the Constitution, to institute counter-intelligence 
measures within the Scorpions in order to supply crime intelligence to the 
National Intelligence Coordinating Committee. These operations shall be limited 
to a situation where more than R500 000.00 is involved. This means that the new 
agency shall follow the format used by the EFCC and the ICAC. 
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7.12 COLLABORATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES 
 
Currently, the DSO and the SIU have collaborations with the FBI of the United 
States of America, DCEC of Botswana, Scotland Yard of England, ICAC of Hong 
Kong, SAPS, DCS and the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime. These 
collaborations should be maintained. In addition, it should be mentioned that in 
order to widen the scope of collaboration, the new agency may also collaborate 
with agencies such as INTERPOL, SARPCO, Serious Organised Crime Agency 
of England, High Authority Against Corruption (HAAC) of Angola, Directorate on 
Corruption and Economic Offences (DCEO) of Lesotho, Anti-Corruption Bureau 
(ACB) Malawi, Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) Zambia, Anti-Corruption 
Commission (ACC) Zimbabwe, Anti-Corruption Squad (ACS) later became 
Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB), of Tanzania, Anti-Corruption 
Commission (ACC) of Swaziland, Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) of Malaysia, 
Central Tender Board (CTB) and the Ombudsman of Mauritius, Anti-Corruption 
Commission (ACC) of Namibia, Economic and Financial Crime Commission of 
Nigeria (EFCC) of Nigeria, and Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) of 
Singapore. Such collaborations will enhance the investigative skills of the 
investigators. In addition to these international agencies, the new agency must 
collaborate with institutions such as the NIA, SASS, Customs Service, South 
African Receiver of Revenue (SARS), Department of Home Affairs, SAPS, DIU, 
and others. 
 
7.13. LEGISLATION GOVERNING CORRUPTION, FRAUD, ORGANISED 
CRIME, ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRIMES 
 
• The Constitution of Republic of South Africa Act  
• Prevention of Organised Crime Act  
• Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act  
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• Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Communication Related Information Act  
• National Strategic Intelligence Act  
• Special Investigating Unit and Tribunals Act  
• The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act  
• The Criminal Procedure Act  
• The Directorate of Special Operations Act (proposed new Act) 
• Financial Intelligence Centre Act  
 
7.14 HOW TO REPORT CASES TO THE NEW AGENCY 
 
The Quick Response Team (QRT) may be established to provide valuable 
support to Investigation Branches in dealing with routine and minor cases, thus 
enabling the investigation units to focus on cases of substance and complexity.  
 
This is in line with the ICAC model and the DCEC of Botswana. Teams need to 
be established in each province, so that cases can be scanned at local level 
without wasting time. In Hong Kong the ICAC uses this method very effectively. 
Cases should be reported through the provincial or regional Report Centre. 
These centres are like Client Service Centres of the police.  
 
In Hong Kong, Report Centres operate on a 24-hour basis to receive reports or 
complaints from the public. All complaints made to the Report Centre are 
carefully recorded and monitored. These Report Centres also act as a filter in 
order to filter out cases that fall outside the jurisdiction of the new agency. Cases 
that fall outside the scope of the new agency (e.g. where the amount involved is 
less than R500 000.00) are then forwarded to the SAPS for investigation.  
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7.15 LEVEL OF TRAINING FOR THE INVESTIGATORS 
 
Due to the fact that this agency is expected to deal with complex financial and 
economic crimes, it is suggested that investigators should possess the following 
qualifications: Diploma or Degree in Forensic Investigation, Diploma or Degree in 
Criminal Justice, Degree in Police Science, LLB, Diploma or Degree in Computer 
Science, Degree in Chartered Accounting or Auditing, or Diploma or Degree in 
Security Management and Intelligence. There shall be a strong emphasis for a 
tertiary qualification as an entry requirement.  
 
The fact that the new agency involves amalgamation of other agencies, means 
that it will not be easy to start a new agency like the ICAC. However, it is 
recommended that it does not recruit from the police, to ensure credibility. In 
addition to this requirement, recruits shall be trained in line with the ICAC and the 
EFCC model, which consists of three stages.  
 
7.15.1 Stage 1 Basic training 
 
This course shall include law, legal issues, practical investigation techniques, 
cognitive interviews and outdoor activities (Operations Department Training 
School Manual, 2005:1). Investigators shall be given training in first aid, self-
defence and the use of firearms. Other elements of the course shall deal with 
conduct and discipline, administrative procedures and the use of computers 
(ICAC Annual Report, 2005:29). After Stage 1 Induction Course, investigators 
shall be placed to an investigation section. After a twelve-month tour of duty in 
that section, the investigators shall attend a three-week Stage 2 Induction 
Course.  
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7.15.2 Stage 2 Induction Course 
 
This course shall build upon the practical experiences that the investigators have 
been exposed to in their first year. This course shall contain a large element of 
fraud and financial investigation training. Upon the conclusion of this course, the 
investigators shall be posted to whichever investigation unit they have not been 
in during their first twelve months (ICAC Annual Report, 2005:29). Upon 
completion of the second twelve months’ induction or on the job training, 
investigators shall attend a Stage 3 Induction Course.  
 
7.15.3 Stage 3 Induction Course 
 
The purpose of the Stage 3 Induction Course is to build upon their experience, 
and introduce in more detail than hitherto the practical aspects of informant 
handling and undercover operations. The second and third week of the course 
shall be designed as an Assessment Centre exercise (Operations Department 
Training School Manual, 2005:1).  
 
Here investigators shall be assessed while being put through a demanding series 
of practical scenarios from briefing skills to arrest, search, compilation of a 
dossier of evidence and giving oral evidence in court. Direct Entrant Investigators 
shall be given an opportunity to not only attend a three-week Investigator 
Command Course, but shall be subject to one day Recall Days throughout their 
first year, to support their professional development (ICAC Annual Report, 
2006:29). From time to time, investigators shall be called to attend a one-week 
Refresher Course to ensure that they keep up to date with developments in law 
and best practices. Newly promoted investigators shall attend a three-week 
Investigators Command Course which is aimed at leadership and management 
within a law enforcement context (ICAC Annual Report, 2006:29). 
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The four weeks’ Chief Investigators Command Course shall be designed for 
newly promoted Chief Investigators in the agency. In addition to these training 
courses, investigators shall be given financial investigation courses, firearms 
training and ad hoc training. The new agency can also afford bursaries for those 
who want to study privately. For promotion purposes, officers shall write a 
promotion examination irrespective of a degree qualification. After writing the 
promotion examination, the candidates shall be assessed by their immediate 
supervisors and must then appear before a promotion board which has a final 
say in their suitability (ICAC Annual Report, 2006:29). 
 
In order to ensure that officers are retained by the agency, they shall be 
remunerated according to their educational qualifications. In addition to these 
training programmes, the new agency will be required to establish a Learnership 
Programme that will focus on the following fields:  
• Investigation techniques and tactics 
• Criminal prosecutions 
• Asset seizure procedures 
• Financial intelligence 
• Computer specialisation 
• Crime intelligence gathering and analysis  
• Crime scene management 
• Interviewing, questioning and interrogation skills 
• Informer handling 
• How to conduct covert and overt operations 
• Weapons handling 
• Statement taking and investigation reporting 
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• Arrest, search, seizure procedures 
• Exhibit handling and storage 
• Forensic or financial investigation 
• Extradition 
• How to give evidence and how to oppose bail 
 
This kind of training or learnerships will ensure that the agency invests in new 
recruits. In order to cut training costs, the new agency needs to establish a 
Training Academy. It has now become an international norm that independent 
law enforcement agencies have their own Training Academies. Institutions such 
as the FBI, ICAC, EFCC and the DCEC have their own Training Academies. 
Such a Training Academy shall be headed by a Director.  
 
The purpose of the establishment of the Training Academy is to create a centre 
of excellence to train, develop and improve training programmes for the new 
agency and for the development of the staff charged with the responsibility of 
eradicating corruption, organised crime, fraud, economic and financial crimes.  
 
The training to be developed shall be required to involve the following, inter alia: 
• Methods of crime detection 
• Criminal techniques and their countermeasures 
• Techniques for detecting and monitoring the movement of proceeds and 
property derived from corruption, fraud, organised crime, economic and 
financial crimes and their countermeasures 
• Methods of collecting evidence 
• Law enforcement techniques  
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• Dissemination of information on corruption, fraud, organised crime, 
economic and financial crimes and related offences. 
• Electronic surveillance 
• Matters of extradition 
• Criminal confiscations 
• Dealing with illicit funds and recovery of illicit funds 
• Easing the burden of proof in gathering and use of evidence to prove 
corruption, fraud, organised crime, economic and financial crimes - 
especially money laundering based on country cases and international 
cases. 
 
The Training Academy shall be required to acquire proper infrastructure, 
equipment, office consumables and the academy structure. The fact that the new 
agency shall be regarded as the elite crime fighting agency means that it shall be 
required to provide sufficient training to the staff of the agency, and to local and 
international law enforcement agencies.  
 
7.16 CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT/ OVERSIGHT BODIES 
 
The Constitution and the Establishment Act need to outline the accountability of 
the agency. This means the Head of the new agency needs to be accountable to 
the parliament as is the ICAC in Hong Kong. To ensure checks and balances, the 
standing committee on safety and security in Parliament must also play an 
oversight role.  In addition, an independent oversight body needs to be 
established to ‘police’ the new agency. Alternatively, the ICD needs to be 
established by another Act so that it assumes its status as an independent organ 
of the State. The fact that the ICD functions in terms of the South African Police 
Service Act 68 of 1995 makes it impossible to have powers over the new agency. 
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To ensure that the new agency is a credible organisation, there should be other 
bodies acting as oversights. This is in line with the practice in Hong Kong. Such 
bodies may include the Operation Review Committee (ORC). This committee will 
examine reports on current investigations, cases over twelve months old, cases 
involving individuals on bail for more than six months, and searches.  
 
The ORC will enforce a level of accountability that will prevent the new agency 
from evolving into a tool of repression or political favouritism. For example, the 
ORC may maintain both a supervisory and advisory role over any investigation, 
and a case cannot be dropped without its approval.  
 
This is in line with the ICAC model of Hong Kong. The Citizens Advisory 
Committee on Community Relations will advise the Head of the new agency on 
the work of the Community Relations Department, and focus on mass media and 
education and community research by scrutinising specific aspects of the 
department’s work in relation to the measures to be taken to foster public support 
in combating corruption, fraud, organised crime and economic crime, as well as 
educating the public against the evils of crime. 
 
This is a common practice in Hong Kong. The Advisory Committee on 
Corruption, fraud, organised crime and economic crime will be the principal 
advisory body of the new agency and will oversee all the agency’s activities. Its 
members may include the members of the other three advisory committees 
(http://www.icac.org.hk).  
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7.17 BEST PRACTICE PACKAGES (BPPs) 
 
The DCEC, ACB and EFCC have no Best Practice Packages (BPPs). However, 
the new agency needs to develop its own Best Practice Packages (BPPs) in line 
with the ICAC model. These packages shall be developed to provide private 
sector companies and public corporations with user-friendly guidelines on 
plugging loopholes on corruption, organised crime, fraud, money laundering, 
terrorism financing and other financial and economic crime loopholes.  
 
Such Best Practice Packages (BPPs) shall cover a wide range of topics and the 
related checklists outlining areas of potential risks for criminal activities. The 
BPPs shall provide the following guidelines: Management of Consultants; Staff 
Administration; Stores Management; Contracting Out Services; Procurement 
Practices and Procedures; Monitoring Staff Attendance And Overtime Work; 
Information Systems Security; Retail Incentive Programmes; Payment 
Procedures; Construction Industry Best Practices and Principles; Construction 
Quality Control Testing; Sales Receipts Administration; Estate Management by 
Property Management Companies; Hotel Management, Travel Agent Operations, 
and others. This is in line with the ICAC model.  
 
7.18 DETENTION CENTRES 
 
The Criminal Procedure Act, as well as section 35 of the Constitution, lays down 
the rights and entitlements of a person detained in custody. Such detention 
centres are needed to ensure that suspects in the custody of the police and 
those under the new agency are not mixed.  
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This is in line with the ICAC model of Hong Kong. Such detention centres need to 
be visited by the Justices of the Peace, the Human Rights Commission and Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs). The purpose of these visits is to ensure 
that the detention centres’ facilities are properly maintained, and to take notice of 
any requests or complaints that detainees may wish to make.  
 
7.19 CONCLUSION 
 
Corruption, fraud and organised crime are a serious problem in South Africa. It is 
clear that the SAPS is not coping in dealing with each crime that is reported. On 
the other hand, it is not helping South Africa to establish many criminal 
investigative institutions with overlapping mandates. This is the time where South 
Africa needs to assemble its best resources to fight the scourge of corruption, 
fraud and organised crime. This can only be achieved by means of a 
prosecution-led investigation model. It is time to stop crisis management and 
start building an agency that will stand tall amongst the best in the world. It is 
very important to ensure that private and public corruption is dealt with the same 
way as does the ICAC in Hong Kong and DCEC in Botswana. The researcher 
supports the existing system in place in South Africa, namely, the investigation-
led principle. However, the new model combines and replaces the three existing 
investigative agencies (AFU, DSO and SIU). This will solve the problems 
presently encountered between the SAPS and the DSO, as it will clearly explain 
the mandate of each agency. 
 
 The new model will eliminate all existing discrepancies regarding various 
mandates: to investigate, to collect intelligence and prosecution, as identified in 
this research. The DIU will remain an internal investigation unit of the DCS with a 
minor role to investigate misconduct. The current crimes investigated by the DIU 
shall be handed over to the new agency to eliminate duplication of functions. 
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CHAPTER 8: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The objectives of doing this research were to alert the politicians to the legislative 
ambiguities with regard to the investigation of corruption, organised crime, fraud, 
financial and economic crimes within the Criminal Justice System. The 
researcher has been a police official for eleven years and has first-hand 
experience regarding the stated problems, such as cooperation, communication, 
accountability, separation of powers, intelligence gathering and others.  
 
By means of this research the researcher intended developing a criminal 
investigation model to solve the stated problems. The objective of this research 
was also to identify, analyse, interpret and explain the stated research problem. 
The last objective of this research was to contribute to the criminal justice field of 
study, especially the investigation of crime, in order to contribute to the 
development of skillful investigators within the Criminal Justice System.  
 
8.2 FINDINGS 
 
After discussing the issues identified in this research, the researcher has come to 
the following findings:  
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8.2.1 Research rationale 
 
The research rationale in Chapter 1 suggested that there was a perception and 
confusion created by the media when activities of the SAPS, DIU, SIU, AFU and 
DSO are reported. Therefore, this research has found that these perceptions and 
confusion are caused by the following:  
 
Types of crimes investigated: In terms of sections 19 to 59 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act, read with section 205 (3) of the Constitution, the SAPS has the 
monopoly to investigate any crime in South Africa. Section 34 of the Correctional 
Services Amendment Act gives the DIU mandate to “conduct investigations of 
theft, corruption and any other dishonest practices or irregularities”, and section 
95 of the Correctional Services Act suggests ‘‘measures to combat theft, fraud, 
corruption and any dishonest practices.’’  
 
Theft, corruption and fraud are also investigated by the SAPS and the DSO. This 
amounts to duplication of functions. As for the DSO, Presidential Proclamation 
R102 of 16 October 1998 provides a long list of offences investigated by the 
DSO. The offences on this list are the same as those covered by the SAPS. This 
is also a duplication of functions. 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act make provision for 
property tainted by criminal activity to be forfeited to the State by way of a civil 
action. The Act also give powers to the State to seize large amounts of cash 
associated with the drug trade; seize property used in the drug trade; corruption; 
white collar crime; targeting serious criminals; and violent crime.  
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The SIU investigate corruption and maladministration in the Public Sector, and 
uses civil proceedings to recover losses and secure savings for the State. 
Corruption is covered by the DIU, DSO and the SAPS. The recovery of losses is 
also covered by the AFU. Therefore, there is duplication between the SIU and 
the DIU, SAPS, DSO and AFU. This is a serious problem and amounts to an 
excessive waste of State resources. 
 
Types of crimes not covered: In terms of Presidential Proclamation R102 of 16 
October 1998, offences covered by the DSO are the same offences covered by 
the SAPS. The SIU does not cover cases of murder, rape, assault, robbery, etc. 
In terms of the Proclamation for the DSO, nothing is excluded. DIU and AFU do 
not investigate murder cases, but this is not spelt out properly in the respective 
pieces of legislation. 
 
Schedule of duties: It has been found that the SAPS is commanded by the 
National Commissioner of Police who in turn reports to the Minister of Safety and 
Security. The DIU is under the command of the National Commissioner of 
Correctional Services who in turn reports to the Minister of Correctional Service. 
In terms of the National Prosecuting Authority Act, the DSO reports to the NPA 
which is accountable to the National Director of Public Prosecution.  
 
However, in terms of the findings of the Khampepe Commission of 2005, the 
DSO is supposed to report to the Minister of Safety and Security. This is very 
unrealistic, because one cannot be responsible for an institution which has no 
total control in terms of budget, methods and procedures. Both the AFU and the 
SIU are managed by the Deputy Head of the NPA. This is unrealistic because 
the SIU is an independent institution which was expected to be independent from 
the NPA. 
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Code of conduct and ethical behaviour: It has been found that the SAPS have 
two codes of conduct: one for civilians and one for police officials. The same 
applies to the DIU whose code of conduct is generally applicable to all 
correctional officials and there is one applicable to the civilian employees. The 
DSO and AFU use the same code of conduct which is applicable to all public 
servants. This is problematic, because members of the DSO are not ordinary 
public servants. It is not wise to enforce discipline on law enforcement members 
by using a general code of conduct or discipline regulations. As for the SIU, they 
use their own code of conduct. 
 
Legal mandate to investigate: The legal mandate of the SAPS’ Detective 
Service comes from section 205 (3) of the Constitution, read with sections 5 and 
section 17 of the South African Police Service Act. The DIU’s legal mandate is 
found in section 96 of the Correctional Services Act and section 34 (b) of the 
Correctional Services Amendment Act. The legal mandate of the DIU does not 
come from the Constitution, as opposed to the SAPS. As for the DSO, its legal 
mandate is found in the following pieces of legislation: Section 43A and 7 of the 
National Prosecuting Authority Act, as well as section 2 of the National 
Prosecuting Authority Amendment Act.  
 
The mandate of the DSO is not spelt out in section 179 of the Constitution, which 
deals with the National Prosecuting Authority. The legal mandate of the Asset 
Forfeiture Unit is found in Chapters 5 and 6 of the Prevention of Organised Crime 
Act. This mandate is not covered by the Constitution, the National Prosecuting 
Authority Act or the National Prosecuting Authority Amendment Act. The 
mandate of the SIU is contained in the Special Investigating Units and Tribunals 
Act. No other law covers the mandate of the SIU.  
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However, in terms of operating procedures, there is a thin line between the 
functions performed by the Asset Forfeiture Unit and those performed by the 
Special Investigating Unit (SIU). This is a clear case of duplication of functions 
that result in wastage of resources and manpower. 
 
Powers and authority to investigate: The powers of the SAPS are found in 
sections 19 to 59 of the Criminal Procedure Act, read with sections 5 and 17 of 
the South African Police Service Act. These powers include, among others, 
power to arrest, detain, search, etc. In addition to these powers, the police have 
a monopoly of enforcing almost all the laws of South Africa.  
 
What is important is that the Criminal Procedure Act provides guidelines on what 
the police should do, and how to do it. The powers of the DIU are found in 
sections 40 and 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act and section 96 of the 
Correctional Services Act, read with section 34 (b) of the Correctional Services 
Amendment Act.  
 
These powers are limited in the sense that section 40 deals with arrest by a 
private person and section 49 deals with the use of force. No other legislation 
gives power to the DIU. The powers of the DSO are found in section 7 and 43A 
of the National Prosecuting Authority Act, read with section 2 of the National 
Prosecuting Authority Amendment Act. In addition, these powers are 
supplemented by sections 40 and 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act.  
 
The Criminal Procedure Act does not mention any name of the DSO except that 
it gives powers to private people, in sections 40 and 49. This study has found 
that there are no guidelines on how the DSO must perform their duties in the 
Criminal Procedure Act as opposed to the SAPS.  
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According to Presidential Proclamation R102 of 16 October 1998, the then 
Minister of Justice, A.M Omar gave power to the National Prosecuting Authority, 
particularly the DSO, to investigate the following crimes: murder, fraud, theft and 
any offence involving dishonesty, robbery with aggravating circumstances as 
defined in section 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act, extortion, kidnapping, arson, 
malicious injury to property, breaking or entering any premises, with the intent to 
commit an offence, or public violence.  
 
These are the same offences investigated by the SAPS. Therefore, there is 
excessive duplication of functions between the SAPS and the DSO. Although 
sections 35 and 36 of the Constitution are worded vaguely, in the sense that they 
do not mention specifically that the rights of the arrested, the accused and the 
detained must be respected at all times.  
 
It is common knowledge that this was meant for the police. The National 
Prosecuting Authority Act, the National Prosecuting Authority Amendment Act, 
the Criminal Procedure Act and the Constitution do not mention the manner in 
which the issue of human rights should be handled by the DSO.  
 
The powers of the AFU are found in Chapters 5 and 6 of the Prevention of 
Organised Crime Act. These powers do not include powers to arrest, detain and 
the use of firearms. No other law gives power to the AFU.  
 
Section 5 of the Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Amendment 
Act give powers to the SIU. These powers do not include powers to arrest and 
detain suspects. No other law extends the powers of the SIU. 
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Methodologies: The SAPS uses a traditional accusatorial system, where a case 
is reported at a police station and investigated by the detectives. After the 
investigation has been completed, the docket is forwarded to the Public 
Prosecutor for a decision to prosecute. In court the prosecutor leads the 
proceedings and the judge is a neutral umpire. 
 
The DIU uses accusatorial investigation methods. According to Malatjie (2006), 
certain investigations are sent to the police after their completion, which uses an 
accusatorial system. Some cases are also referred to the DSO, AFU and SIU 
which use a more inquisitorial system.  
 
All these methodologies are not prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Act. This 
causes confusion within the Criminal Justice System. The methodology used by 
the DSO is based on the troika principle, which integrates the following: 
analysis/intelligence, investigation and prosecution. This methodology differs 
from the rest of the agencies within the Criminal Justice System.  
 
This in itself could be interpreted as interference by the NPA, thus gaining an 
unfair advantage and defeating the spirit of the separation of powers. Neither the 
National Prosecuting Authority Act nor the Criminal Procedure Act prescribes an 
accusatorial or an inquisitorial system. What is also visible within the DSO is the 
prosecution-led investigation process which is not prescribed by either the 
National Prosecuting Authority Act or the Criminal Procedure Act.  
 
It has been found that both the SAPS and the DSO perform the same duties, but 
they use different methodologies to achieve the same goal. According to Chinner 
(2006), the AFU uses both inquisitorial and accusatorial systems, depending on 
the situation.  
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The researcher’s observation of the AFU is that the fact that investigators are 
located within the NPA premises makes it more inquisitorial than accusatorial. 
However, neither the Criminal Procedure Act nor the Prevention of Organised 
Crime Act makes provision for the use of an inquisitorial or accusatorial 
methodology. Another problem is the use of civil procedure, which is the same 
method used by the SIU. The SIU employs investigators, lawyers, forensic 
accountants and analysts in multi-disciplinary investigations.  
 
According to PSC (August 2001:73), the activities of the SIU are designed to 
effectively combat maladministration, corruption and fraud involving the 
administration of State institutions, to protect assets and public money and to 
take civil legal action to correct any wrongdoing. The multi-disciplinary approach 
is almost the same methodology used by the DSO and AFU. This amounts to a 
duplication of functions with the DSO and AFU. 
 
Intelligence gathering: Section 199 of the Constitution identifies four 
government departments as the leading departments mandated to gather 
intelligence, namely, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), the 
South African Police Service (SAPS), the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and 
the South African Secret Services (SASS).  
 
According to section 3 of the National Strategic Intelligence Act, it is the duty of 
the SAPS to gather, correlate, evaluate and use crime intelligence. Crime 
intelligence is carried out by the Crime Intelligence Division. According to the 
Constitution, the Correctional Services Act and the Correctional Services 
Amendment Act, the DIU has no power to gather intelligence. According to 
section 1 of the National Strategic Intelligence Act, the DSO is not part of the 
security agencies, but in practice it collects and analyses crime intelligence in 
terms of section 7 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act.  
 227
This is a violation of section 209 (1) of the Constitution and sections 1, 2 and 3 of 
the National Strategic Intelligence Act. This means that, legally, the DSO does 
not have an intelligence gathering mandate.  
 
Civilian oversight/oversight bodies: Civilian oversight for the police is 
governed by section 50 of the South African Police Service Act. In terms of 
section 50 of this Act, the functions of the Independent Complaints Directorate 
(ICD), include the “investigation of police misconduct, deaths in police custody or 
as a result of police action”.  
 
These functions are extended to the members of the Metropolitan/Municipal 
Police agencies. As for the DSO, DIU, SIU and AFU, the ICD has no jurisdiction. 
This is a problem, because in a democratic society, there is a need to be 
transparent. Transparency cannot be achieved if certain institutions are excluded 
from certain processes. The fact that the DSO and the DIU carry firearms but are 
not covered by the ICD, creates a serious concern.  
 
Separation of powers: The doctrine of separation of powers requires the 
functions of the government to be classified as legislative, executive or judicial, 
and that each separate function be performed by separate branches of 
Government (De Waal et al., 2001:20).  
 
This means that the functions of making laws, executing the law and resolving 
disputes through the application of the law, should be kept separate, and in 
principle they should be performed by different institutions and persons. The 
purpose of separating functions and personnel in this manner is to prevent the 
excessive concentration of power in a single person or body.  
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It has been found that this arrangement does not solve the lack of the separation 
of powers in South Africa, because the DSO and AFU are part of the NPA which 
reports to the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development.  
 
The SIU is an independent entity which is overseen by Advocate Willie 
Hofmeyer, who is the Deputy Head of the NPA. This is against the principle of 
separation of powers. In this instance, the DSO, AFU and the SIU fall under the 
command of the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, but 
investigate crimes which should be the sole mandate of the executive branch. 
What is also problematic is the use of the inquisitorial investigative methodology 
which might imply that they are ‘player and referee.  
 
Cooperation and communication: From the discussion of the five agencies, it 
has been found that there is communication and cooperation between the 
following agencies: 
SAPS, AFU and SIU 
DIU, AFU and SIU 
DIU, AFU, SIU and DSO. 
 
However, there is no good cooperation and communication between the SAPS’ 
Detective Service and the DSO. The cooperation and communication between 
the SIU, AFU and the DSO are strengthened by the fact that they all report to the 
same accounting officer, even though there is no memorandum of understanding 
among them. The Khampepe Commission of Enquiry of 2005 also made the 
same findings.  
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Media reporting: It has been found that the media does not differentiate 
between the SIU and the DSO (Scorpions), between the SIU and the AFU, or 
between the SAPS Detective Service and the DSO. In addition to this, whenever 
there is a joint operation between the SIU and the DIU or the DIU and the DSO, 
these operations are reported as being those of the DSO.  
 
This was confirmed by Davids (2006). Such reports have a tendency to be 
biased, and tend to give credit to the wrong agency. In this case it has been 
found that all the credit is normally given to the DSO.  
 
Collaboration with other agencies: It has been found that the SAPS have 
collaborations with institutions such as INTERPOL, SARPCO, the AFU, the SIU, 
and the DIU. The DSO has collaboration with the FBI, Scotland Yard, ICAC, 
AFU, SIU, and the DCEC.  
The DIU has collaboration with the SAPS, DSO, AFU and SIU whilst the AFU 
and the SIU have collaboration with the SAPS, DSO and the DIU. 
 
Legislation governing corruption, fraud, economic and financial crimes: It 
has been found that both the DSO and the SAPS use the same pieces of 
legislation to perform their functions which include: the Prevention of Organised 
Crime Act, the Criminal Procedure Act, the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act, the 
Regulation of Interception of Communications, the Provision of Communication 
Related Information Act and the Financial Intelligence Centre Act.  
 
The only difference is the use of the of the National Prosecuting Authority Act by 
the DSO and the use of the South African Police Service Act and the National 
Strategic Intelligence Act by the SAPS. The SIU use the Special Investigating 
Unit and Tribunals Act.  
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Level of training for investigators: It has been found that the SAPS provides a 
basic training for all police officials, this is followed by the basic detective course 
for those chosen to be detectives. Later, the chosen detectives undergo further 
specialised training. As for the DSO, training is not structured because their 
investigators are either trained by the FBI, Scotland Yard and the SANDF, as 
well as to some extent by the SAPS.  
 
According to Chinner (2006), the AFU members are qualified attorneys and 
advocates. It has been found that the DIU employs trained and experienced 
investigators. The DIU has no training programmes for their investigators at this 
stage. It has also been found that the SIU has in-house training for their 
investigators, coupled with internship programmes as well as training provided by 
the University of Stellenbosch. 
 
Best Practice Packages: It has been found that no best practice packages exist 
for the SAPS, DSO, DIU, AFU and the SIU. 
 
How to report cases: It has been found that if a person wants to report a case 
to the SAPS, they simply go to the nearest police station. This is not possible for 
the DSO because they do not have offices throughout the country. It has also 
been found that the National Prosecuting Act does not provide procedures on 
how to report cases.  
 
According to Malatjie (2006), cases at Correctional Services are reported by 
means of a toll-free number which is manned by the Public Service Commission. 
Neither the AFU nor the SIU have any procedures on how to report cases to 
them. The problem is that few people have access to a telephone. 
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Detention centres: It has been found that the SAPS makes use of its own 
detention centres and correction/prison facilities. The DSO has no such facilities. 
The National Prosecuting Authority Act does not provide guidelines on how the 
DSO can detain its suspects. Practically, however, they use police and 
correction/prison facilities.  
 
The DIU does not detain its suspects because it does not effect arrest. Their 
detentions are carried out by either the SAPS or DSO which in turn hands the 
suspects to the SAPS or correction/prison facilities.  
 
8.2.2 Research objectives 
 
The first objective in doing this research was to alert South African politicians to 
the legislative ambiguities regarding the investigation of crime, within the Criminal 
Justice System. By means of this research, the researcher intended developing 
solutions to the stated problems.  
 
The second objective of this research was to identify, analyse, interpret and 
explain the stated research problem. The third objective was to design an 
investigative model for the South African Criminal Justice System. Therefore, the 
following findings have been made:  
 
• Objective no.1: Legislative ambiguities have been found in the 
Constitution, the Criminal Procedure Act and the Prevention of Organised 
Crime Act. 
• Objective no.2: Five institutions within the South African Criminal Justice 
System have been analysed, as well as four international agencies. This 
was done in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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• Objective no.3: A prosecution-led investigation model has been 
designed. This was done in Chapter 7. 
• Objective no.4: A comparative study with international agencies has been 
done (Botswana, Malawi, Nigeria and Hong Kong).  
• Objective no.5: Contribution to the community. This was achieved by 
analysing five South African agencies and four international agencies, with 
the aim of developing a model for the South African Criminal Justice 
System. 
 
8.2.3 Hypotheses 
 
Hypothesis no.1: The structure of the South African Criminal Justice System 
could be described as an emerging federated system. This hypothesis has been 
proved by the fact that the analysis of federal and unitary States revealed that 
South Africa is a unitary State with strong federal characteristics. The use of a 
more accusatorial system is a strong inclination towards a unitary State, while a 
prosecution-led approach has a strong federal character.  
 
This is attributed by the fact that the Constitution, the Criminal Procedure Act, the 
National Prosecuting Authority Act, the Prevention of Organised Crime Act, as 
well as the Special Investigating Unit and Tribunals Act, do not outline the use of 
an inquisitorial or an accusatorial system. The SAPS has shown that it is more an 
accusatorial than an inquisitorial system. 
 
Hypothesis no.2: Divisions within the Criminal Justice System are the 
consequence of differing investigative mandates. It has been found that the five 
institutions use different mandates to investigate crime. However, such mandates 
tend to overlap with one another.  
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For example, it was found that the SAPS and the DSO have the same mandates. 
If this is the case why does South Africa have different agencies doing the same 
functions? It has also been found that the majority of functions of the DIU fall 
within the mandate of the SAPS. The fact that the SIU uses civil action to recover 
assets is similar to the process used by the AFU. Both the SIU and AFU use 
different pieces of legislation but they report to the same authority. This is not 
acceptable. 
 
Hypothesis no.3: The investigation of organised crime and collective corruption 
requires a unitary approach. International experience has revealed that 
corruption, organised crime, fraud, and economic and financial crimes need a 
unitary approach. Countries such as Botswana, Hong Kong, Malawi and Nigeria 
have shown that the use of an agency to deal with these crimes is the preferred 
method.  
 
8.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
After analysing all the five investigative institutions within the South African 
Criminal Justice System and international agencies, the following 
recommendations are proposed: 
 
8.3.1 Establish a new single prosecution-led investigation agency 
 
Countries such as Botswana, Malawi, Nigeria, and Hong Kong have gone the 
route of establishing a single agency that can dedicate its time and resources to 
fighting corruption, fraud and organised crime.  
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In this instance, it is recommended that South Africa should amalgamate the 
DSO, the Asset Forfeiture Unit, the Special Investigating Unit and the Financial 
Intelligence Centre into one formidable agency.  
 
The new agency shall maintain the name “Scorpions” because of the legacy that 
they have created. The fact that the AFU and SIU deal with the tracing of assets 
which have been acquired through criminal acts means that the two agencies are 
duplicating functions.  
 
In this case, the researcher believes that if the two units are combined to form 
one strong asset forfeiture unit in the new agency, South Africa can have one of 
the strongest asset recoveries in Africa, if not in the world. There is no reason 
why the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) should form part of the National 
Treasury. In Hong Kong the Financial Intelligence Unit forms part of the 
investigation units of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC).  
 
Therefore, the researcher recommends that the FIC should form part of the new 
agency - which is in line with the Hong Kong model. It should be borne in mind 
that organised crime is an enterprise, not an event. Therefore, the researcher’s   
view is that there are enough reasons to justify the establishment of an 
independent agency to investigate and prosecute these crimes. 
 
8.3.2 Redefine the mandate of the DCS Departmental Investigation Unit 
 
Proper demarcation of functions for the DIU needs to be drawn up so that they 
should focus on aspects such as misconduct. The current functions of the DIU 
should be refined to give a proper jurisdiction, so that there is no duplication with 
the SAPS.  
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Corruption, fraud and theft investigations need to be removed from the DIU’s 
mandate and handed over to the new agency or the SAPS. This will depend on 
whether the offence is less or more than R500 000.00. 
 
8.3.3 Remove the Specialised Commercial Crimes Unit from the NPA 
 
The Specialised Commercial Crimes Unit within the NPA was established in 
1999 with the purpose of assisting the police in the investigation and prosecution 
of commercial crimes. According to the NPA Annual Report (2001/2002:34), this 
unit had a conviction rate of 88.6%. The researcher recommends that this unit be 
removed from the NPA and form part of the new agency as suggested in Chapter 
7. 
 
8.3.4 ‘Beef up’ the Specialised Commercial Crimes Court  
 
These courts were established in 1999, and their aims were to prosecute 
commercial crimes. Amazingly, these courts provide services to both the SAPS 
Commercial Branch and the DSO. According to the NPA Annual Report 
(2001/2002:35), some high profile cases tried during 2001 included: S v Albert 
Eksteen, a former senior police officer, S v Winnie Madikizela Mandela, ex-wife 
of the former president Nelson Mandela, and S v Tony Yengeni, former ANC 
Chief Whip.  
 
Therefore, if these courts can be established in all the provinces, backlogs and 
postponements can be avoided. By so doing, these courts can focus on 
commercial crimes, thereby relieving other courts of a lot of pressure.  
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8.3.5 Build strong legislation to fight corruption, fraud, organised crime, 
financial and economic crimes  
 
In order to fight corruption, organised crime, economic and financial crimes, 
South Africa needs strong legislation to assist the new agency. The success of 
the ICAC in Hong Kong, the DCEC in Botswana and the EFCC in Nigeria lies in 
strong legislation. New legislation needs to be designed to empower the new 
agency to conduct intelligence-driven investigations, seizures and prosecutions.  
 
The new legislation needs to give a proper mandate to the new agency. By so 
doing, duplication of functions will be minimised. In Hong Kong the success of 
the ICAC lies with the clear demarcation of functions between the police and the 
ICAC.  
 
8.3.6 Simplify the rank structure of the new agency 
 
In order to ensure that the new agency discharges its mandate without any 
hindrances, the following rank structure, which is based on the ICAC and DCEC 
models, is suggested: Director General, Deputy Director General, Director, Chief 
Investigator, Principal Investigator, Senior Investigator, Investigator and Assistant 
Investigator. This flat rank structure will eliminate excessive ‘red tape’ and ensure 
maximum results. 
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8.3.7 Design a Case Management System (CMS) 
 
The SAPS uses a Criminal Administration System (CAS) to record all cases at 
station level. It is therefore recommended that the new agency establish its own 
Case Management System (CMS), so that cases can be managed 
systematically. This is in line with the ACB, DCEC, EFCC and ICAC models. This 
process will also assist the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development to recognise cases dealt with by the police and those dealt with by 
the new agency. 
 
8 3.8 Establish a centre for the safeguarding of exhibits 
 
An exhibit is any property which comes into the possession of any investigator, 
which is relevant to the investigation. This exhibit provides evidence in relation to 
the investigation and will be produced in court. The researcher recommends that 
the new agency establish a safe and secure exhibit store to ensure that evidence 
is secured.   
 
8.3.9 Establish a Forensic Science Laboratory 
 
Whenever complex crimes are investigated, there is always a need for a forensic 
laboratory to examine evidence such as questioned documents, firearms, dead 
bodies, signature disputes and others. Currently, the SAPS have a huge backlog 
of cases which need to be proved by means of forensic evidence. The 
researcher would not like the SAPS to be burdened by the new agency’s 
workload, and therefore recommends that the new agency establish its own 
forensic laboratory. In order to save money for rent, the laboratory can be 
accommodated in the same premises where the Training Academy can be built. 
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8.3.10 Remove the Criminal Record Centre from the SAPS 
 
The recording of criminal convictions is vital for any country that subscribes to the 
rule of law. It is very important for the new agency to develop a system where 
cases investigated by them are clearly recognised. Currently, the Criminal 
Record Centre is an entity of the SAPS.  
 
In countries such as the United States of America, such facilities do not belong to 
a particular department, but to the government. It is therefore recommended that 
the Criminal Record Centre be removed from the SAPS. This will ensure that any 
government institution will be able to use the Criminal Record Centre. 
 
8.4. CONCLUSION 
 
Corruption, fraud and organised crime are a serious problem in South Africa. It is 
clear that the SAPS is not coping in dealing with every crime that is reported. On 
the other hand, it is not helping South Africa to establish too many criminal 
investigative institutions with overlapping mandates. This is the time where South 
Africa needs to assemble its best resources to fight the scourge of corruption, 
fraud, organised crime, financial and economic crimes. 
 
It is time to stop crisis management and start building an agency that will ‘stand 
tall’ amongst the best in the world. It is very important to ensure that private and 
public corruption is dealt with the same way as the ICAC in Hong Kong and the 
CPIB in Singapore.  
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